I'm a Philosopher of
Science at the University of Düsseldorf. My main area of expertise is Structural Realism. This website
primarily contains information about my work.
What's new?
'The
Double Life of Evidence: From the Streets to the Labs'
- An integral part of the schooling of scientists, especially
experimental ones, is the cultivation of the significance and role of
scientific evidence. Naturally this schooling is not conducted in
vacuuo. Budding scientists already have experiences of, and intuitions
about, the use of evidence in everyday life. In this talk I take a
sustained look at the relations between common-sense notions of
evidence and scientific ones. Among other things, I argue that
scientific notions of evidence and associated practices are in many
ways conservative extensions of what is best about our common-sense
notions and practices. This contradicts a rather widely held but often
tacit view that science and its notions are largely insular. (Part of a
Symposium
on Evidence I am co-organising with Giora Hon, Maarten van Dyck, Dave
Lagnado and Jan Willem Romeijn for the European Philosophy
of Science Association Biennial Conference 2009, Free University of
Amsterdam,
Oct 21-24 2009).
'Δομικός Ρεαλισμός:
Ιστορική Συνοχή και τα Όρια της' - In this first talk I
will deliver in my native language, Greek, I scrutinise the structural
continuity claim endorsed by most structural realists. The structural
continuity claim is, roughly, the idea that the
structure of successful scientific theories survives theory change
because it has latched on to the structure of the world. I elaborate,
elucidate and modify the structural continuity claim and
its associated argument. I do so without presupposing a particular
conception of structure that favours this or that kind of structural
realism but instead by concentrating on neutrally formulated historical
facts. The result, I hope, crystallises some of the shared commitments,
desiderata and limits of structural realists. (To be presented at the 5th
Pan-Hellenic Conference in the History, Philosophy and Teaching of
Natural Sciences, University of Cyprus,
June 11-14 2009).
'Metaphilosophical
Ruminations on Theoretical Term Reference' - In this talk I
examine the concepts of referential success and referential continuity
as they are used to assert or deny claims about theoretical term
reference. In particular, I examine the intuitions that motivate
different theoretical accounts of such concepts. In contrast to
existing approaches, I argue that even when such intuitions are
conflicting they play an evidential role in lending credence to
distinct referential concepts. What is more, I argue that some of these
concepts are useful in making sense of the historical record of science
and in evaluating scientific realist claims. (Presented at the Research
Seminar in Epistemology and Philosophy of Science, University of Tilburg,
March 3 2009).
'Data
Meet Theories: Up Close and Personal' - In this talk I extend
my critique of Bogen and Woodward's claim that we do not (and perhaps
cannot) use theories to infer, predict or explain observations. I do so
by demonstrating that paradigmatic cases of novel prediction could not
have been made unless the relationship between data and theories is
more direct than Bogen and woodward would have us believe. (Presented
at the conference Data
- Phenomena - Theories: What's the notion of a scientific phenomenon
good for?, University of Heidelberg, September 11-13 2008).
'Kuhn Loss: A
Dilemma' - In this talk, I present anti-realist advocates of
Kuhn loss with an unattractive dilemma: Either Kuhn loss has historical
instantiations but is innocuous to the epistemic commitments of the
scientific realist or it is a real threat to those commitments but has
no historical instantiations. (Presented at the Sixth European
Congress of Analytic Philosophy, Krakow, Aug 21-26 2008).
'Ecumenical
Empiricism' - In this paper, I put forth a broader conception
of observability that seeks to allay the realist’s concerns about
knowledge in natural science yet panders to vital empiricist
sensitivities. Along with the new conception of observability I propose
a new form of empiricism. Ecumenical empiricism, as I call it, divorces
itself from traditional conceptions of experience while remaining
wedded to the idea that reliable detection of our surroundings has
precedence over all other forms of knowledge. (Presented at the Joint Session
of the Aristotelian Society and Mind Association, University of Aberdeen,
July 11-14 2008).
'What’s Wrong with the
Problem of Unconceived Alternatives?' - Kyle Stanford (2006)
puts forth a new challenge to scientific realism, the problem of
unconceived alternatives (PUA). He claims that it is a much more
powerful challenge than traditional arguments from underdetermination
because it is well supported by historical evidence. Contra Stanford, I
argue that the abundant evidence comes at great expense, for in order
to obtain it he turns PUA into an ineffectual challenge. (Presented at
the British
Society for the Philosophy of Science, University of St. Andrews,
July 10-11 2008).
I co-organised with Gerhard Schurz the Theoretical
Frameworks and Empirical Underdetermination Workshop (April
10-12 2008, University of Duesseldorf). The workshop brought
together some of the
world’s leading experts in the scientific realism debate to discuss the
latest developments in the field. The programme commenced with
a
eulogy to the late Peter Lipton, who was originally scheduled to give a
talk at the workshop. David Papineau who had known Peter for over
twenty years delivered the eulogy.
