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I'm a Philosopher of
Science at the University of Düsseldorf. My main area of expertise is Structural Realism. This website
primarily contains information about my work.
What's new?
Upcoming Talks:
'The
Scientific Method' - In this talk, I argue, contrary to
popular belief, that there is such a thing as the scientific method and
that we already possess some of its principles or at least approximate
versions of them. The popularity of the opposite view can be traced
back to the fact that most attempts to identify the scientific method
involve an overly strong conception and are therefore bound to fail. I
propose a weaker conception, one that maintains that there is core
methodology shared across all domains of inquiry while at the same time
allows for variation on the periphery. (To be presented
at the
British
Society for the Philosophy of Science Annual Conference,
University of Exeter, July 4-5 2013).
'Post-Hoc
Monsters and the Frankenstein Theory of Confirmation' - This
talk concerns the highly vexing issue of how a confirmation theory
ought to handle post-hoc monsters, that is, post-hocly constructed or
modified hypotheses like Velikovsky's theory or Ptolemaic astronomy.
One approach to this issue has been to demonise post-hocness itself,
arguing that no hypothesis earns support from evidence that has been
used in its construction or modification. Another approach has been to
attempt to segregate the monstrous from the non-monstrous post-hoc
hypotheses and to argue that only the latter earn support from
accommodated evidence. In this talk, I'd like to put forth a more
subtle approach which I call the 'Frankenstein' theory of confirmation.
According to this approach, even post-hoc monsters earn confirmation
from accommodated evidence but the confirmation earned does not spread
evenly throughout the content of such hypotheses. (Invited talk to be
presented at
the
Logos Colloquium, Logic, Language and Cognition Research Group,
University of
Barcelona, April 18 2013).
Recent Talks:
'The
Houdini Argument for Intrinsic Properties' - The aim of this
talk is two-fold. First, to motivate some desiderata for an adequate
conception of the intrinsic vs. extrinsic property distinction. Second,
to try to answer the question whether any scientific properties qualify
as intrinsic (in a sense that satisfies the above desiderata) through a
series of related thought-experiments. The thought-experiments center
around the idea of shielding objects to prevent them from causal
interactions with other objects and seeing what, if anything, remains
invariant and is therefore a good candidate for being intrinsic.
(Invited talk presented
at the
Metaphysics of Scientific Realism Workshop, Department
of Philosophy and History of Science, University of Athens,
March 1-2 2013).
'Universal
Empiricism' - In this talk, I consider and reject van
Fraassen’s conception of observability and corresponding brand of
empiricism. I put forth an alternative conception that
seeks to allay the realist’s concerns about the validity of
instrument-based observation in science yet preserves vital empiricist
sensitivities. Along with the new conception of observability I lay the
foundations for a new form of empiricism. Universal empiricism, as I
call it, divorces itself from traditional conceptions of experience
while remaining wedded to what is epistemically meritorious about
empiricism, namely the idea that truth-conducive contact with the
environment is the ultimate judge of knowledge. (Presented at the ’,
Philosophy of Science Association Twenty-Third Biennial Meeting, San
Diego [presented in my absence by Otavio Bueno], November 15
2012).
'A
Structuralist Theory of Reference' - This talk is divided
into
three parts. The first part concerns the clash between existing
conceptions of reference. It is argued that although in conflict there
is a sense in which these conceptions are legitimate in different
contexts. Even so, some contexts are more demanding than others and, as
a consequence, put constraints on the appropriateness of the concept of
reference. In the context of the scientific realism debate, one
important constraint is the ability to provide an adequate account of
the phenomena surrounding the reference of scientific terms in cases of
theory change or of full-blown scientific revolution. The second part
reflects on what happens to concepts of reference when specific
versions of realism and anti-realism are endorsed. The emphasis here is
on the most promising such versions of late, namely structural realism
and empiricist structuralism. In spite of their differences, both of
these views put forth a structuralist epistemology that, as it turns
out, forces our conceptions of reference to take into account the
relations that the objects we wish to refer to stand in with respect to
other objects. Finally, the third part considers the ways in which our
attempts to refer to things in the world appear to fall short or indeed
do so. The focus here is on puzzles relating to the indeterminacy of
reference. Two such puzzles are discussed and dismissed. At the end of
the talk it is conceded that reference is in a sense indeterminate but
that this indeterminacy springs from structuralist limitations on
knowledge and is not to be feared.- (Invited talk presented at the
Reference and Scientific Realism Symposium, Wuhan University,
August 17 2012).
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Philosophisches Institut,
Heinrich Heine Universität Düsseldorf, Universitätsstraße 1, Gebäude
23.21, D-40225 Düsseldorf, Germany. Tel.: +49 (0) 211 81-12198,
Fax: +49(0) 211 81-11750. Email: votsis@phil.uni-duesseldorf.de
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