Index

I'm a Philosopher of Science at the University of Düsseldorf. My main area of expertise is Structural Realism. This website primarily contains information about my work.

What's new?

Upcoming Talks:

'The Scientific Method' - In this talk, I argue, contrary to popular belief, that there is such a thing as the scientific method and that we already possess some of its principles or at least approximate versions of them. The popularity of the opposite view can be traced back to the fact that most attempts to identify the scientific method involve an overly strong conception and are therefore bound to fail. I propose a weaker conception, one that maintains that there is core methodology shared across all domains of inquiry while at the same time allows for variation on the periphery. (To be presented at the British Society for the Philosophy of Science Annual Conference, University of Exeter, July 4-5 2013).

'Post-Hoc Monsters and the Frankenstein Theory of Confirmation' - This talk concerns the highly vexing issue of how a confirmation theory ought to handle post-hoc monsters, that is, post-hocly constructed or modified hypotheses like Velikovsky's theory or Ptolemaic astronomy. One approach to this issue has been to demonise post-hocness itself, arguing that no hypothesis earns support from evidence that has been used in its construction or modification. Another approach has been to attempt to segregate the monstrous from the non-monstrous post-hoc hypotheses and to argue that only the latter earn support from accommodated evidence. In this talk, I'd like to put forth a more subtle approach which I call the 'Frankenstein' theory of confirmation. According to this approach, even post-hoc monsters earn confirmation from accommodated evidence but the confirmation earned does not spread evenly throughout the content of such hypotheses. (Invited talk to be presented at the Logos Colloquium, Logic, Language and Cognition Research Group, University of Barcelona, April 18 2013).

Recent Talks:

'The Houdini Argument for Intrinsic Properties' - The aim of this talk is two-fold. First, to motivate some desiderata for an adequate conception of the intrinsic vs. extrinsic property distinction. Second, to try to answer the question whether any scientific properties qualify as intrinsic (in a sense that satisfies the above desiderata) through a series of related thought-experiments. The thought-experiments center around the idea of shielding objects to prevent them from causal interactions with other objects and seeing what, if anything, remains invariant and is therefore a good candidate for being intrinsic. (Invited talk presented at the Metaphysics of Scientific Realism Workshop, Department of Philosophy and History of Science, University of Athens, March 1-2 2013).

'Universal Empiricism' - In this talk, I consider and reject van Fraassen’s conception of observability and corresponding brand of empiricism. I put forth an alternative conception that seeks to allay the realist’s concerns about the validity of instrument-based observation in science yet preserves vital empiricist sensitivities. Along with the new conception of observability I lay the foundations for a new form of empiricism. Universal empiricism, as I call it, divorces itself from traditional conceptions of experience while remaining wedded to what is epistemically meritorious about empiricism, namely the idea that truth-conducive contact with the environment is the ultimate judge of knowledge. (Presented at the ’, Philosophy of Science Association Twenty-Third Biennial Meeting, San Diego [presented in my absence by Otavio Bueno], November 15 2012).

'A Structuralist Theory of Reference' - This talk is divided into three parts. The first part concerns the clash between existing conceptions of reference. It is argued that although in conflict there is a sense in which these conceptions are legitimate in different contexts. Even so, some contexts are more demanding than others and, as a consequence, put constraints on the appropriateness of the concept of reference. In the context of the scientific realism debate, one important constraint is the ability to provide an adequate account of the phenomena surrounding the reference of scientific terms in cases of theory change or of full-blown scientific revolution. The second part reflects on what happens to concepts of reference when specific versions of realism and anti-realism are endorsed. The emphasis here is on the most promising such versions of late, namely structural realism and empiricist structuralism. In spite of their differences, both of these views put forth a structuralist epistemology that, as it turns out, forces our conceptions of reference to take into account the relations that the objects we wish to refer to stand in with respect to other objects. Finally, the third part considers the ways in which our attempts to refer to things in the world appear to fall short or indeed do so. The focus here is on puzzles relating to the indeterminacy of reference. Two such puzzles are discussed and dismissed. At the end of the talk it is conceded that reference is in a sense indeterminate but that this indeterminacy springs from structuralist limitations on knowledge and is not to be feared.- (Invited talk presented at the Reference and Scientific Realism Symposium, Wuhan University, August 17 2012).