Dr. Ioannis Votsis

I'm a Philosopher of Science at the University of Düsseldorf. My main area of expertise is Structural Realism. This website primarily contains information about my work.

What's new?

'Data Meet Theories: Up Close and Personal' - In this talk I extend my critique of Bogen and Woodward's claim that we do not (and perhaps cannot) use theories to infer, predict or explain observations. I do so by demonstrating that paradigmatic cases of novel prediction could not have been made unless the relationship between data and theories is more direct than Bogen and woodward would have us believe. (To be presented at the conference Data - Phenomena - Theories: What's the notion of a scientific phenomenon good for?, University of Heidelberg, September 11-13 2008).

'Kuhn Loss: A Dilemma' - In this talk, I present anti-realist advocates of Kuhn loss with an unattractive dilemma: Either Kuhn loss has historical instantiations but is innocuous to the epistemic commitments of the scientific realist or it is a real threat to those commitments but has no historical instantiations. (To be presented at the Sixth European Congress of Analytic Philosophy, Krakow, Aug 21-26 2008).

'Ecumenical Empiricism' - In this paper, I put forth a broader conception of observability that seeks to allay the realist’s concerns about knowledge in natural science yet panders to vital empiricist sensitivities. Along with the new conception of observability I propose a new form of empiricism. Ecumenical empiricism, as I call it, divorces itself from traditional conceptions of experience while remaining wedded to the idea that reliable detection of our surroundings has precedence over all other forms of knowledge. (To be presented at the Joint Session of the Aristotelian Society and Mind Association, University of Aberdeen, July 11-14 2008).

'What’s Wrong with the Problem of Unconceived Alternatives?' - Kyle Stanford (2006) puts forth a new challenge to scientific realism, the problem of unconceived alternatives (PUA). He claims that it is a much more powerful challenge than traditional arguments from underdetermination because it is well supported by historical evidence. Contra Stanford, I argue that the abundant evidence comes at great expense, for in order to obtain it he turns PUA into an ineffectual challenge. (To be presented at the British Society for the Philosophy of Science, University of St. Andrews, July 10-11 2008).

I am co-organising with Gerhard Schurz the Theoretical Frameworks and Empirical Underdetermination Workshop (April 10-12, University of Duesseldorf). It brings together some of the world’s leading experts in the scientific realism debate to discuss the latest developments in the field. The programme will commence with a eulogy to the late Peter Lipton, who was originally scheduled to give a talk at the workshop. David Papineau who had known Peter for over twenty years will give the eulogy.

The brief sketch of Structural Realism is now updated to reflect recent devopments in the field. The Structural Realism bibliography has also been updated. If you think there are relevant references that are not included in this bibliography please let me know. Last update: 16 February 2008.

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