ioannis votsis


1. 'Simplicity as a Guide to Falsity?' - Participants in the debate about whether simplicity is a guide to truth or merely pragmatically useful typically wrangle over two problems: (1) how to weigh simplicity against other virtues like strength and fitness and (2) whether there is a unique measure for simplicity that straps it to truth. I would like to put forth a third problem: (3) Even if problems (1) and (2) were solved, it is far from clear whether the simplest theory out of an available class of competitors would always be the one closest to the truth. (To be presented at the 14th Congress of Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science, Nancy, July 19-26 2011).

2. 'Structural Realism and Causation: An Unhappy Marriage?' - It has recently been objected that structural realism, in its various guises, is unable to adequately account for causal phenomena (see, for example, Psillos 2006). In this talk, I consider whether structural realism has the resources to address this objection. (To be presented at the British Society for the Philosophy of Science Annual Conference, University of Sussex, July 7-8 2011).

3. 'Runaway Models' - Among the main aims of science are to predict and explain the world. In order to pursue those aims, scientists employ theories, models, equations and the like to represent features of the world. How are we to understand this representation relation? Supporters of the semantic view of theories typically construe the representation relation in one of two ways: (i) in terms of some notion of morphism or (ii) in terms of some notion of similarity. In this talk, I take a closer look at a number of objections mounted against (i) and (ii). I argue that on the whole such objections are misguided for they demand representation in science to meet loose standards that the critics conceive of as appertaining to representation in art. Indeed, I argue that if we were to take such a demand seriously it would lead to runaway models of scientific representation that are of no clear benefit to the debate over what makes a scientific theory, model or equation represent its target domain informatively and adequately. (Invited talk presented at the Seminario di Logica e Filosofia della Scienza, Università di Firenze, May 5 2011).

4. 'Endorsing the Methods of Science' - In this talk, I examine when and why we should trust scientific theories. I start off by considering a number of methods for deciding when to trust beliefs in the context of everyday life. I then compare these methods to those utilised in the context of science. It turns out that despite some differences there are plenty of common practices towards good believing in the two contexts. Indeed in various cases it can be argued that the practices of science are more stringent versions of those we employ in everyday life. At least with respect to these cases then one cannot endorse (either explicitly or implicitly) the validity of everyday life practices but reject the analogous ones in science. (Invited talk presented at the Dipartimento di Filosofia, Università di Pisa, May 4 2011).

5. 'Structural Realism meets the Social Sciences' - Structural realism is arguably one of the most influential movements to have emerged in philosophy of science in the last decade or so. Advocates of this movement attempt to answer epistemological and/or ontological questions concerning science by arguing that the key to all such questions is the mathematical formalism of a theory. This is so, according to structural realists, because the mathematical formalism encodes all and only what is important about a theory’s target domain, namely its structure. Almost without exception, discussions of structural realism centre on the natural sciences and in particular on modern physics. Given that a number of other sciences are less – indeed in some cases much less – mathematised than modern physics, does structural realism have anything informative to say about them? In this talk, I take up the task of articulating what structural realists ought to say about the social sciences if they are to consider themselves as offering a coherent philosophy for the whole of science. (Invited talk presented at the , Economics and Institutional Change Research Seminar, Institute for Advanced Studies (IMT) Lucca, May 3 2011).

6. 'Philosophy and Science: Past, Present and Future' - Philosophy and science have a rather intricate relationship. In this talk I will make some tentative steps towards answering a number of questions that are pertinent to this relationship in the hope of throwing some further light on it. The questions are as follows: (1) In what respects, if any, are the subject matter, aims, methods and achievements of the two endeavours similar? (2) How, if at all, has the development of the one influenced that of the other? (3) To what extent are they currently interacting? (4) What does the future hold for science and philosophy? (Invited talk presented at the Metaphysical Society's Annual Symposium, Trinity College Dublin, April 13 2011).

7. 'Epistemic and Ontic Commitments: In Perfect Alignment?' - The epistemic form of structural realism asserts that our knowledge of the world is restricted to its structural features. Several proponents of this view assume that the world possesses non-structural features; features which, according to their view, cannot be known. In other words, they assume that there is, or, there ought to be (on the basis of normative arguments in epistemology), always a gap between our epistemological and ontological commitments. The ontic form of structural realism denies that this is, or ought to be, the case. Proponents of this view argue that the perfect alignment of epistemological and ontological commitments is a highly desirable meta- theoretical feature. They argue this on the basis of the prima facie sensible principle that our ontological commitments ought never to overreach our epistemic ones. Naturally the issue of alignment transcends the debate between the epistemic and the ontic structural realists. Is it in principle impossible for there to be circumstances under which we ought to subscribe to the misalignment of epistemological and ontological commitments? What do the different answers to this question entail for ontic structural realism? (Invited talk presented at the Structuralism Workshop, John J. Reilly Center for Science, Technology, and Values, University of Notre Dame, November 17-20 2010).

8. 'The Prospective Stance in Realism' - Scientific realists endeavour to secure inferences from empirical success to approximate truth by arguing that despite the demise of empirically successful theories the parts of those theories responsible for their success do in fact survive theory change. If, as some anti-realists have recently suggested, those parts of theories that are responsible for their success are only identifiable in retrospect, namely as those that have survived, then the realist approach is trivialised for now success and survival are guaranteed to coincide. The aim of this paper is to counter this argument by identifying successful theory parts independently from their survival. (Presented at the Philosophy of Science Association 2010 Biennial Conference, Montreal, November 4-6 2010).

9. 'The Logic of Crucial Experiments' - Although Duhem’s thesis that in physics crucial experiments are impossible contains some grains of truth in it, its effects have been greatly exaggerated. In this talk I argue against this and other associated theses by pointing out the various ways in which these theses can be curtailed. In the process of doing so, I examine a few recent attempts to overcome the problems posed by these theses and identify their strengths and weaknesses. (Presented at the Philosophy of Scientific Experimentation: A Challenge to Philosophy of Science, University of Pittsburgh, October 15-17 2010).

10. 'Structural Realism: From an Epistemological Point of View' - Structural realism is a rather popular view in philosophy of science. As with many popular views, sprouting is never far behind. No sprout has had as much grip on the view’s image as ontic structural realism. Indeed its supporters have such a stranglehold that ‘structural realism’ has almost become a byword for their views. In this talk, I want to redress this imbalance by returning to structural realism’s humble epistemic beginnings to examine exactly what made the view so attractive in the first place. To this effect, I will reconstruct several arguments – some of which little known – proposed in the early part of the twentieth century in support of the epistemic version of structural realism. Not wanting to dwell too much on the past, I will then switch to more recent arguments both for and against the position. A careful evaluation of these arguments will hopefully provide useful information as to what form, if any, epistemic structural realism must take in order to be a viable alternative to its direct competitors, namely standard scientific realism and constructive empiricism. (Invited talk at the Lunchtime Colloquium, Center for Philosophy of Science, University of Pittsburgh, September 28 2010).

11. 'Heat in Inter-Theory Relations' - If the realists are right, not only did certain theoretical parts of the caloric theory survive into our modern conception of heat but these parts are in fact solely responsible for the success the caloric theory enjoyed. I test this claim against two of the caloric theory’s successes, namely the explanations (i) that matter expands by heating and contracts by cooling and (ii) that a special kind of heat (i.e. latent heat) is involved in changes of state. Take (i) as an illustration. The caloric explanation of this phenomenon has the same structure as the kinetic one. As the quantity of heat – caloric in the one case, kinetic energy in the other – is increased/decreased the force generated – repulsive in the caloric case, pressure in the kinetic case – increases/decreases and that in turn leads to an increase/decrease in the volume needed. Thus the caloric explanation was successful because it had managed to get the structure of such processes right, even though the specifics of the ontology were wrong, i.e. the existence of caloric and its repulsive force. This result tallies well with a special kind of realism, namely structural realism. (Presented at the British Society for the Philosophy of Science Annual Conference, University College Dublin , July 8-9 2010).

12. 'Scientific Representation and Perspective' - Critics of the semantic view of theories have, among other things, demurred that isomorphic specification is not sufficient for the representation of at least some physical systems. The same physical system will often, if not always, be amenable to representation via different non-isomorphic models. Thus a construal of theories as sets of structures does not seem sufficient to uniquely identify all target systems. Structural realists face the same objection. Their endorsement of the view that physical objects may only be specified up to isomorphism means that they are as susceptible to this objection as semantic theorists. In this talk I aim to rescue semantic theorists and structural realists from this and other closely related objections by endorsing a perspectivalist approach towards scientific representation. (Invited talk at the Research Colloquium, University of Bochum, June 17 2010).

13. 'Thinking about Scientific Understanding and Explanation as a Structural Realist' - Structural Realism is a viewpoint in the scientific realism debate. In its epistemological guise it holds that our knowledge of the physical world is at best structural. More precisely, we can only know the physical world up to isomorphism. In its ontological guise it explains this structural limitation to our knowledge by appeal to an ontology which is itself in some sense or other wholly structural. Although research into structural realism is booming, little has been said about what its implications are for scientific understanding and explanation. In this talk I explore these implications and argue that at least when it comes to the natural sciences what counts as understanding and explanation has taken a highly abstract and mathematical turn that is very much in line with the structural realist pronouncements. (Presented at the Understanding and the Aims of Science, Young Scholars Section, Lorentz Center, University of Leiden, May 31 - June 4 2010).

14. 'The Pessimistic Meta-Inductivist: A Sheep in Wolf’s Clothing?' - Realists assert that when a successful theory is abandoned, not all of its components are discarded but only those that are inessential or idle for the theory’s success. So long as the essential components survive into the new theory there is no cause for alarm. More precisely, an outdated theory T which enjoyed some measure of success must, according to the realist, be: (i) partially true precisely because some of its theoretical claims are responsible for its success and (ii) superseded by a (strictly) more approximately true theory T* which, of course, preserves T’s successful theoretical claims. In this talk I test this requirement of realism against the background of the outdated caloric theory of heat and its successor the kinetic theory. (Presented at the Philosophy of Science in a Forest (PSF2010), Dutch Association for the Philosophy of Science., May 14 - 15 2010).

15. 'The Double Life of Evidence: From the Streets to the Labs - An integral part of the schooling of scientists, especially experimental ones, is the cultivation of the significance and role of scientific evidence. Naturally this schooling is not conducted in vacuuo. Budding scientists already have experiences of, and intuitions about, the use of evidence in everyday life. In this talk I examine the extent to which everyday life evidential practices are continuous with scientific ones. I begin by offering a tentative formulation of the continuity hypothesis: Most, if not all, good (i.e. practically successful) evidential practices in everyday life have better performing or at least equally-well performing analogues in science AND most, if not all, good evidential practices in science have at best equally-well performing analogues in everyday life. I then proceed to illustrate some cases of continuity, where good evidential practices in science (e.g. calibration) have everyday life analogues. (Part of a Symposium on Evidence I co-organised with Giora Hon, Maarten van Dyck, Dave Lagnado and Jan Willem Romeijn for the European Philosophy of Science Association Biennial Conference 2009, Free University of Amsterdam, Oct 21-24 2009).

16. 'Structural Realism: Invariance through Theory Change' - Structural realists of nearly all stripes endorse the structural continuity claim. Roughly, this is the idea that the structure of successful scientific theories survives theory change because it has latched on to the structure of the world. In this talk I elaborate, elucidate and modify the structural continuity claim and its associated argument. I do so without presupposing a particular conception of structure that favours this or that kind of structural realism but instead by concentrating on neutrally formulated historical facts. The result, I hope, throws light on what a structural realist must do to evidentially benefit from the historical record of science. (Presented at the Congrès triennal de la SOPHA 2009, University of Geneva, Sept 2-5 2009).

17. 'The Caloric Under a Frame-Theoretic Spotlight' - In this joint work with Gerhard Schurz we conduct a frame-theoretic investigation of the respects in which the central concept of the caloric theory of heat has survived into modern accounts of thermodynamics despite the theory’s demise in the latter half of the nineteenth century. We first present a brief account of the development of the caloric theory as well as that of its competitor, the motion theory of heat. We then compare the two theories’ explanatory and predictive successes, paying particular attention to the role their central concepts played in facilitating those successes. The comparison will be performed to evaluate whether or not (i) some parts of the caloric theory are in some sense approximately true and (ii) the term ‘caloric’ can be said to refer to a modern counterpart posit. Our conjecture is that to the extent that the caloric theory enjoyed genuine success, the structural parts responsible for that success have been incorporated into the kinetic theory of heat. (Presented at the Second Conference on Concept, Types and Frames in Language, Cognition and Science, University of Duesseldorf, Aug 24-26 2009).

18. ‘Δομικός Ρεαλισμός: Ιστορική Συνοχή και τα Όρια της’ - Σύμφωνα με το γνωσιολογικό είδος του δομικού ρεαλισμού στην καλύτερη περίπτωση μπορούμε να έχουμε γνώση της δομής του κόσμου. Μιλώντας πρόχειρα, κατά τον ισχυρισμό αυτό η δομή των επιτυχημένων επιστημονικών θεωριών επιβίωνει μέσα από τις επιστημονικές επαναστάσεις επειδή έχει αγκιστρωθεί πάνω στη πραγματική δομή του κόσμου. Με άλλα λόγια, η δομή διατηρείται μέσα από την αλλαγή θεωριών γιατι είναι αληθής ή τουλάχιστον αληθής κατά προσέγγιση – απ’εδώ και στο εξής θα εκφράζω αυτή τη διαζευκτική φράση ως ‘(κατά προσέγγιση) αληθής’. Οι οπαδοί του ισχυρισμού δομικής συνοχής συχνά δίνουν σιωπηρή έγκριση στον αντίστροφο ισχυρισμό, δηλ. στο ότι η διατήρηση της δομής των επιτυχημένων επιστημονικών θεωριών συνεπάγεται την (κατά προσέγγιση) αλήθεια τους. Σε αυτή την ομιλία στοχεύω να αποσαφηνίσω, να επιφέρω βελτιωτικές μετατροπές και να επεκτείνω τον ισχυρισμό της δομικής συνοχής και το συνδεδεμένο επιχείρημα του. (Presented at the 5th Pan-Hellenic Conference in the History, Philosophy and Teaching of Natural Sciences, University of Cyprus, June 11-14 2009).

19. 'Metaphilosophical Ruminations on Theoretical Term Reference' - In this talk I examine the concepts of referential success and referential continuity as they are used to assert or deny claims about theoretical term reference. In particular, I examine the intuitions that motivate different theoretical accounts of such concepts. In contrast to existing approaches, I argue that even when such intuitions are conflicting they play an evidential role in lending credence to distinct referential concepts. What is more, I argue that some of these concepts are useful in making sense of the historical record of science and in evaluating scientific realist claims. (Invited talk presented at the Research Seminar in Epistemology and Philosophy of Science, University of Tilburg, March 3 2009).

20. 'The Scope of Fiction: Comments on Tim Button’s ‘Where Fiction Ends and Reality Begins’ ' - Suppose you want to distance yourself from fiction, i.e. suppose you want no commitment to the literal truth of a fictional sentence φ. Suppose further that you want to be able to treat all sorts of discourses as fiction, i.e. not just literary fiction but also ethics, mathematics, science, parts thereof, etc. Tim Button considers and rejects a number of fictionalist views that could be applicable to any of these discourses, namely the paraphrastic approach, the extended fiction approach, the pretence fiction approach and the spotty scope approach. Although I agree with quite a few of the conclusions that Button draws, I find some of his motivation and arguments problematic. MetaMetaphysics Conference at Logos (Logic, Language and Cognition Research Group), University of Barcelona, June 19-21 2008).

21. 'Data Meet Theories: Up Close and Personal' - In this talk I extend my critique of Bogen and Woodward's claim that we do not (and perhaps cannot) use theories to infer, predict or explain observations. I do so by demonstrating that paradigmatic cases of novel prediction could not have been made unless the relationship between data and theories is more direct than Bogen and woodward would have us believe. (Presented at the conference Data - Phenomena - Theories: What's the notion of a scientific phenomenon good for?, University of Heidelberg, September 11-13 2008).

22. 'Kuhn Loss: A Dilemma' - In this talk, I present anti-realist advocates of Kuhn loss with an unattractive dilemma: Either Kuhn loss has historical instantiations but is innocuous to the epistemic commitments of the scientific realist or it is a real threat to those commitments but has no historical instantiations. (Presented at the Sixth European Congress of Analytic Philosophy, Krakow, Aug 21-26 2008).

23. 'Ecumenical Empiricism' - In this paper, I put forth a broader conception of observability that seeks to allay the realist’s concerns about knowledge in natural science yet panders to vital empiricist sensitivities. Along with the new conception of observability I propose a new form of empiricism. Ecumenical empiricism, as I call it, divorces itself from traditional conceptions of experience while remaining wedded to the idea that reliable detection of our surroundings has precedence over all other forms of knowledge. (Presented at the Joint Session of the Aristotelian Society and Mind Association, University of Aberdeen, July 11-14 2008).

24. 'What’s Wrong with the Problem of Unconceived Alternatives?' - Kyle Stanford (2006) puts forth a new challenge to scientific realism, the problem of unconceived alternatives (PUA). He claims that it is a much more powerful challenge than traditional arguments from underdetermination because it is well supported by historical evidence. Contra Stanford, I argue that the abundant evidence comes at great expense, for in order to obtain it he turns PUA into an ineffectual challenge. (Presented at the British Society for the Philosophy of Science, University of St. Andrews, July 10-11 2008).

25. 'Saving the Intuitions: Polylithic Reference' - Different theories of reference aspire to satisfy conflicting intuitions. Assuming that intuitions play a crucial role in pinning down the concept of reference, two options become available: Either establish a consistent set of intuitions by rejecting at least some of them or find a radical way to accommodate all of them. The former option has been the primary focus of research up to now. I will explore the latter option, arguing that reference might not be a monolithic notion. With this aim in mind, I sketch a hierarchy of concepts of reference, each of which satisfying different intuitions and standards of successful reference. (Presented at the Theoretical Frameworks and Empirical Underdetermination Workshop, University of Duesseldorf, April 10-12 2008).

26. 'Making Contact with Observations' - Following Bogen and Woodward’s influential ‘Saving the Phenomena’, many philosophers claim that theories do not (and perhaps cannot) entail, predict or explain observations. Utilising various case studies, I argue that observation statements can often be derived straight from the theory because the right auxiliaries are in place. (Presented at the First Conference of the European Philosophy of Science Association, Complutense University Madrid, November 15-17 2007).

27. 'The Observation-Ladenness of Theory' - This paper contests the purity of theories assumed in discussions of theory-ladenness, arguing instead that theories and theoretical terms can be afflicted by observation-ladenness. (Presented at the Joint Session of the Aristotelian Society and Mind Association, University of Bristol in July 2007).

28. 'Structural Realism 2.0' - In this paper, I explore new sources of support for Epistemic Structural Realism, as well as suggest various adjustments, tackle certain threats, discuss neglected issues, and, last but not least, try to put things in perspective. (Presented at the Philosophy of Physics Research Seminar, University of Oxford on Nov. 9 2006).

29. 'Structural Continuity and its Limits' - This paper explores some of the limits faced by structural realism in its claims of structural continuity through scientific theory change. (Presented at the Institute for the History and Foundations of Science (IHFS), Department of Physics & Astronomy, Utrecht University in June 2006).

30. 'Seeing the Same Things' - This paper motivates a positive answer to the question 'Whether different people experience the same public things?' (Presented at the Erasmus Institute for Philosophy and Economics, University of Rotterdam in May 2006).

31. 'Extracting Evidence from Observation' - In this talk I contest the claim that theories even when accompanied by suitable theoretical auxiliaries cannot be directly tested via observations. (Presented at the History and Philosophy of Science Seminar Series, University of Leeds in March 2006).

32. 'Deflating Scientific Explanation, or How to Make the Realist Raft Float' - This paper re-evaluates the role intuitions play in the notions of scientific explanation and explanatory power. (Part of this paper was presented at the conference Philosophical Perspectives on Scientific Understanding, Free University of Amsterdam in August 2005).

33. 'Evidential Equivalence' - This paper explores the limits and consequences of the underdetermination and empirical equivalence theses. (Part of it was presented at the British Society for the Philosophy of Science Annual Conference, University of Manchester in July 2005).

34. 'The Upward Path to Structural Realism' - My aim here is threefold: (1) to evaluate part of Psillos’ offence on the Russellian version of epistemic structural realism (ESR), (2) to elaborate more fully what Russellian ESR involves and (3) to suggest improvements where it is indeed failing. (Presented at the Philosophy of Science Association Nineteenth Biennial Conference, University of Texas - Austin in November 2004).

35. 'Caloric: Centre or Offstage' - In this talk, I criticise Psillos' strategy against the pessimistic meta-induction and in particular his conception of what makes theoretical terms (in)dispensable for their respective theories. (Accepted for presentation at the 8th Summer Symposium on the Philosophy of Chemistry and Biochemistry, University of Durham in August 2004).

36. 'N-Correspondence' - This paper sketches a correspondence principle that: (a) bodes well with some central episodes in the history of science and (b) can fend off accusations of triviality. (Accepted for presentation at the British Society for the Philosophy of Science Annual Conference, University of Kent in July 2004).

37. 'What the History of Science Cannot Teach Us' - This paper criticises the view that the preservation of a theoretical component is a necessary and/or sufficient condition of its approximate truth/truth.
(Presented at 12th. International Congress of Logic Methodology and Philosophy of Science, Oviedo in August 2003).



Philosophisches Institut, Heinrich Heine Universität Düsseldorf, Universitätsstraße 1, Gebäude 23.21/04.86, D-40225 Düsseldorf, Germany. Tel.: +49 (0) 211 81-11473, Fax: +49(0) 211 81-11750. Email: votsis@phil-fak.uni-duesseldorf.de

last updated: 14 June 11