Dr. Ioannis Votsis

1. 'Data Meet Theories: Up Close and Personal' - In this talk I extend my critique of Bogen and Woodward's claim that we do not (and perhaps cannot) use theories to infer, predict or explain observations. I do so by demonstrating that paradigmatic cases of novel prediction could not have been made unless the relationship between data and theories is more direct than Bogen and woodward would have us believe. (Presented at the conference Data - Phenomena - Theories: What's the notion of a scientific phenomenon good for?, University of Heidelberg, September 11-13 2008).

2. 'Kuhn Loss: A Dilemma' - In this talk, I present anti-realist advocates of Kuhn loss with an unattractive dilemma: Either Kuhn loss has historical instantiations but is innocuous to the epistemic commitments of the scientific realist or it is a real threat to those commitments but has no historical instantiations. (Presented at the Sixth European Congress of Analytic Philosophy, Krakow, Aug 21-26 2008).

3. 'Ecumenical Empiricism' - In this paper, I put forth a broader conception of observability that seeks to allay the realist’s concerns about knowledge in natural science yet panders to vital empiricist sensitivities. Along with the new conception of observability I propose a new form of empiricism. Ecumenical empiricism, as I call it, divorces itself from traditional conceptions of experience while remaining wedded to the idea that reliable detection of our surroundings has precedence over all other forms of knowledge. (Presented at the Joint Session of the Aristotelian Society and Mind Association, University of Aberdeen, July 11-14 2008).

4. 'What’s Wrong with the Problem of Unconceived Alternatives?' - Kyle Stanford (2006) puts forth a new challenge to scientific realism, the problem of unconceived alternatives (PUA). He claims that it is a much more powerful challenge than traditional arguments from underdetermination because it is well supported by historical evidence. Contra Stanford, I argue that the abundant evidence comes at great expense, for in order to obtain it he turns PUA into an ineffectual challenge. (Presented at the British Society for the Philosophy of Science, University of St. Andrews, July 10-11 2008).

5. 'Saving the Intuitions: Polylithic Reference' - Different theories of reference aspire to satisfy conflicting intuitions. Assuming that intuitions play a crucial role in pinning down the concept of reference, two options become available: Either establish a consistent set of intuitions by rejecting at least some of them or find a radical way to accommodate all of them. The former option has been the primary focus of research up to now. I will explore the latter option, arguing that reference might not be a monolithic notion. With this aim in mind, I sketch a hierarchy of concepts of reference, each of which satisfying different intuitions and standards of successful reference. (Presented at the Theoretical Frameworks and Empirical Underdetermination Workshop, University of Duesseldorf, April 10-12 2008).

6. 'Making Contact with Observations' - Following Bogen and Woodward’s influential ‘Saving the Phenomena’, many philosophers claim that theories do not (and perhaps cannot) entail, predict or explain observations. Utilising various case studies, I argue that observation statements can often be derived straight from the theory because the right auxiliaries are in place. (Presented at the First Conference of the European Philosophy of Science Association, Complutense University Madrid, November 15-17 2007).

7. 'The Observation-Ladenness of Theory' - This paper contests the purity of theories assumed in discussions of theory-ladenness, arguing instead that theories and theoretical terms can be afflicted by observation-ladenness. (Presented at the Joint Session of the Aristotelian Society and Mind Association, University of Bristol in July 2007).

8. 'Structural Realism 2.0' - In this paper, I explore new sources of support for Epistemic Structural Realism, as well as suggest various adjustments, tackle certain threats, discuss neglected issues, and, last but not least, try to put things in perspective. (Presented at the Philosophy of Physics Research Seminar, University of Oxford on Nov. 9 2006).

9. 'Structural Continuity and its Limits' - This paper explores some of the limits faced by structural realism in its claims of structural continuity through scientific theory change. (Presented at the Institute for the History and Foundations of Science (IHFS), Department of Physics & Astronomy, Utrecht University in June 2006).

10. 'Seeing the Same Things' - This paper motivates a positive answer to the question 'Whether different people experience the same public things?' (Presented at the Erasmus Institute for Philosophy and Economics, University of Rotterdam in May 2006).

11. 'Extracting Evidence from Observation' - In this talk I contest the claim that theories even when accompanied by suitable theoretical auxiliaries cannot be directly tested via observations. (Presented at the History and Philosophy of Science Seminar Series, University of Leeds in March 2006).

12. 'Deflating Scientific Explanation, or How to Make the Realist Raft Float' - This paper re-evaluates the role intuitions play in the notions of scientific explanation and explanatory power. (Part of this paper was presented at the conference Philosophical Perspectives on Scientific Understanding, Free University of Amsterdam in August 2005).

13. 'Evidential Equivalence' - This paper explores the limits and consequences of the underdetermination and empirical equivalence theses. (Part of it was presented at the British Society for the Philosophy of Science Annual Conference, University of Manchester in July 2005).

14. 'The Upward Path to Structural Realism' - My aim here is threefold: (1) to evaluate part of Psillos’ offence on the Russellian version of epistemic structural realism (ESR), (2) to elaborate more fully what Russellian ESR involves and (3) to suggest improvements where it is indeed failing. (Presented at the Philosophy of Science Association Nineteenth Biennial Conference, University of Texas - Austin in November 2004).

15. 'Caloric: Centre or Offstage' - In this talk, I criticise Psillos' strategy against the pessimistic meta-induction and in particular his conception of what makes theoretical terms (in)dispensable for their respective theories. (Accepted for presentation at the 8th Summer Symposium on the Philosophy of Chemistry and Biochemistry, University of Durham in August 2004).

16. 'N-Correspondence' - This paper sketches a correspondence principle that: (a) bodes well with some central episodes in the history of science and (b) can fend off accusations of triviality. (Accepted for presentation at the British Society for the Philosophy of Science Annual Conference, University of Kent in July 2004).

17. 'What the History of Science Cannot Teach Us' - This paper criticises the view that the preservation of a theoretical component is a necessary and/or sufficient condition of its approximate truth/truth.
(Presented at 12th. International Congress of Logic Methodology and Philosophy of Science, Oviedo in August 2003).