53. 'Ad
hoc-ness and Monstrousness'
- The aim of this talk is to throw
some light on the notion of ad hoc-ness and its value to scientific
methodology. In discussing the notion, I focus and attempt to explicate
one particular undesirable characteristic associated with it, namely
what I dub ‘monstrousness’. Roughly speaking, monstrousness reflects
the degree to which parts of a hypothesis are unnaturally joined
together. (Talk presented at the Unification
and Coherence workshop, University of Duesseldorf, January 16
2014).
52. 'An
Inferentialist Account of Confirmation' - The aim of this
talk is to defend the inferentialist view from a challenge that
originates in predictivism. It is argued that predictivism and its
challenge fail because the non-inferential elements it introduces
invariably lead to the issuing of contradictory confirmational
judgments. (Talk to be presented at the Workshop
on Inferentialism in
Epistemology and Philosophy of Science, UNED Madrid, November
11-13
2013).
51.
'Science with Artificially Intelligent Agents: The Case of
Gerrymandered Hypotheses' - Barring some civilisation-ending
natural or
man-made catastrophe, future scientists will likely incorporate fully
fledged artificially intelligent agents in their ranks. Their tasks
will include the conjecturing, extending and testing of hypotheses. If
we are to hand over at least some of the aforementioned tasks to
artificially intelligent agents, we need to find ways to make explicit
and ultimately formal, not to mention computable, the more obscure of
the methods that scientists currently employ with some measure of
success in their inquiries. This talk puts forward a fully articulated
formal solution to the problem of how to conjecture new hypotheses or
extend existing ones such that they do not save phenomena in
gerrymandered or ad hoc ways. (To be presented at the 2nd Conference on
the Philosophy and Theory of Artificial Intelligence (PT-AI 2013),
University of Oxford, September 21-22 2013).
50.
'Logic as Ultra-Physics' - The number of rival logical
systems is growing without an end in sight. This has proved to be
a mixed blessing. On the one hand, we have a rich set of formal tools
that allows us to
model inferences in a variety of ways. On the other hand, the existence
of rival logical
systems threatens to undermine logic’s role as a univocal and
definitive arbiter of
disagreements over the validity of inferences. If, for any given
inference, one can always
find a logical system that sanctions its validity and another that
forbids it, then it seems that
the aforementioned role no longer befits logic. The most that we can
hope for are intrasystem
evaluations of the validity of inferences. The consequences for
rational debate are
dire. Disputes in philosophy, science and beyond run the risk of
turning into trivial squabbles
as anybody who finds themselves in a logical pickle may be able to slip
away to a more
agreeable logical system. The aim of this talk is to mount a defence of
the view that logic
can, and in actual fact does, univocally and definitively answer
questions about the validity
of at least some inferences. This is tantamount to saying that some
rules (and potentially
axioms) are the right ones. If you like, they are the ones that would
fill the pages of a book
on the one ‘true’ logic. More controversially, I argue that their
rightness is determined by
the physical world itself. Indeed, I argue that the right logic, but
obviously not our
conception of it, is itself a structural feature of the world. For
obvious reasons I call the
emerging view ‘logic as ultra-physics’. As a case study of this
ultra-physics, I utilise the
principle of non-contradiction. (Invited talk, presented at the Departmental
Colloquium,
California State University Los Angeles, October 10 2013).
49.
'Positivism in the 21st Century' - In this talk I argue that,
despite various differences, there are substantial connections between
'Universal Empiricism' and the old Logical Positivism movement. The
upshot is that the former can be viewed as a successor movement to the
latter, continuing much of what made the Logical Positivist movement
such a success a century ago. (Invited talk, presented at Aldo Antonelli's
graduate seminar, University of California Davis, October 8
2013).
48.
'Empiricism Unchained' - Empiricism has a long and venerable
history. Aristotle, the Epicureans, Sextus Empiricus, Francis
Bacon, Locke, Hume, Mill, Mach and the Logical Empiricists, among
others, represent a long line of historically influential empiricists
who, one way or another, placed an emphasis on knowledge gained through
the senses. In recent times the most highly articulated and influential
edition of empiricism is undoubtedly Bas van Fraassen’s constructive
empiricism. Science, according to this view, aims at empirically
adequate theories, i.e. theories that save all and only the observable
phenomena. Roughly put, something is observable in van Fraassen’s view
if a member of the human epistemic community can detect it with their
unaided senses. Critics
have contested this notion, citing, among other reasons, that most of
what counts as knowledge in
natural science concerns things that are detectable only with
instruments, i.e. things that are
unobservable and hence unknowable by van Fraassen’s lights.
Beg-the-question accusations fly
back and forth. As a consequence a stalemate has ensued. In this talk,
I put forth a
liberalised conception of observability and an associated, and
accordingly liberalised, conception of
empiricism. ‘Universal observability’ and ‘universal empiricism’, as I
call them, unchain themselves from
traditional conceptions of experience while remaining firmly tethered
to what, I argue, is the
true source of epistemic merit in the senses. (Invited talk, presented
at the Bay
Area Philosophy of Science seminar, San
Francisco State University, October 03 2013).
47. 'The
Scientific Method' - In this talk, I argue, contrary to
popular belief, that there is such a thing as the scientific method and
that we already possess some of its principles or at least approximate
versions of them. The popularity of the opposite view can be traced
back to the fact that most attempts to identify the scientific method
involve an overly strong conception and are therefore bound to fail. I
propose a weaker conception, one that maintains that there is core
methodology shared across all domains of inquiry while at the same time
allows for variation on the periphery. (Presented at the British
Society for the Philosophy of Science Annual Conference, University of
Exeter, July 4-5 2013).
46. 'Objectivity
in Confirmation' - The study of confirmation is the study
of the conditions under which a piece of evidence supports, or ought to
support, a hypothesis as well as of the level of that support. There
are two major kinds of confirmation theories, objective and subjective.
Objective theories hold that confirmation questions are settled via
purely objective considerations. Subjective ones hold that at least
some non-objective considerations come into play. With some exceptions
(see, for example, Williamson 2010), most confirmation theorists
nowadays opt for subjective theories. The pessimism over objective
theories is most probably due to the fact that it has proved very hard,
some may even say impossible, to find reasonable principles that decide
every question about confirmation in purely objective terms. The aim of
this talk is to reverse some of that pessimism by putting in place some
cornerstones in the foundations for an objective theory of
confirmation. This is achieved by considering lessons not from the
failures of subjective theories, which, no doubt, there are many, but
rather from the failures of predictivism, a mini theory of confirmation
that is typically conceived of as objective. (Presented at the
Philosophy
of Science in a Forest (PSF2013) Triennial Conference,
Leusden, Netherlands, May 23-25 2013).
45. 'Post-Hoc
Monsters and the Frankenstein Theory of Confirmation' - This
talk concerns the highly vexing issue of how a confirmation theory
ought to handle post-hoc monsters, that is, post-hocly constructed or
modified hypotheses like Velikovsky's theory or Ptolemaic astronomy.
One approach to this issue has been to demonise post-hocness itself,
arguing that no hypothesis earns support from evidence that has been
used in its construction or modification. Another approach has been to
attempt to segregate the monstrous from the non-monstrous post-hoc
hypotheses and to argue that only the latter earn support from
accommodated evidence. In this talk, I'd like to put forth a more
subtle approach which I call the 'Frankenstein' theory of confirmation.
According to this approach, even post-hoc monsters earn confirmation
from accommodated evidence but the confirmation earned does not spread
evenly throughout the content of such hypotheses. (Invited talk
presented at the Logos
Colloquium, Logic, Language and Cognition
Research Group, University of Barcelona, April 18 2013).
44. 'The
Houdini Argument for Intrinsic Properties' - The aim of this
talk
is two-fold. First, to motivate some desiderata for an adequate
conception of the intrinsic vs. extrinsic property distinction. Second,
to try to answer the question whether any scientific properties qualify
as intrinsic (in a sense that satisfies the above desiderata) through a
series of related thought-experiments. The thought-experiments center
around the idea of shielding objects to prevent them from causal
interactions with other objects and seeing what, if anything, remains
invariant and is therefore a good candidate for being intrinsic.
(Invited talk presented at the Metaphysics
of Scientific Realism
Workshop, Department of Philosophy and History of Science, University
of Athens, March 1-2 2013).
43. 'Universal
Empiricism' - In this talk, I consider and reject van
Fraassen’s conception of observability and corresponding brand of
empiricism. I put forth an alternative conception that seeks to allay
the realist’s concerns about the validity of instrument-based
observation in science yet preserves vital empiricist sensitivities.
Along with the new conception of observability I lay the foundations
for a new form of empiricism. Universal empiricism, as I call it,
divorces itself from traditional conceptions of experience while
remaining wedded to what is epistemically meritorious about empiricism,
namely the idea that truth-conducive contact with the environment is
the ultimate judge of knowledge. (Presented at the Philosophy
of Science Association Twenty-Third Biennial Meeting, San Diego
[presented
in my absence by Otavio Bueno], November 15 2012).
42.
'A
Structuralist Theory of Reference' - This talk is divided
into three parts. The first part concerns the clash between existing
conceptions of reference. It is argued that although in conflict there
is a sense in which these conceptions are legitimate in different
contexts. Even so, some contexts are more demanding than others and, as
a consequence, put constraints on the appropriateness of the concept of
reference. In the context of the scientific realism debate, one
important constraint is the ability to provide an adequate account of
the phenomena surrounding the reference of scientific terms in cases of
theory change or of full-blown scientific revolution. The second part
reflects on what happens to concepts of reference when specific
versions of realism and anti-realism are endorsed. The emphasis here is
on the most promising such versions of late, namely structural realism
and empiricist structuralism. In spite of their differences, both of
these views put forth a structuralist epistemology that, as it turns
out, forces our conceptions of reference to take into account the
relations that the objects we wish to refer to stand in with respect to
other objects. Finally, the third part considers the ways in which our
attempts to refer to things in the world appear to fall short or indeed
do so. The focus here is on puzzles relating to the indeterminacy of
reference. Two such puzzles are discussed and dismissed. At the end of
the talk it is conceded that reference is in a sense indeterminate but
that this indeterminacy springs from structuralist limitations on
knowledge and is not to be feared.- (Invited talk presented at the Reference
and Scientific Realism Symposium, Wuhan University, August 17
2012).
41. 'The
Feeble, Few and Far Between Coincidences Argument for Realism'
- The no coincidences argument for realism holds that we can infer the
truth or approximate truth of
a theory when it reaches a certain level of success. It would be a
cosmic coincidence, the realists
claim, if a theory were to enjoy such success and yet not be true. In
this talk, I focus on the most
prominent realist conception of the level of success required to
licence inferences to truth or
approximate truth. The conception I refer to involves the demand that
theories generate novel
predictions. I argue that, as it stands, this conception is too weak to
deflect a rather simple
challenge. I then propose ways to strengthen the realist conception in
the hope that it is better able
to overcome whatever challenges we throw at it. (Presented
at the
British Society for the Philosophy of Science Annual Conference,
University of Sterling,
July 5-6 2012).
40. 'Arguing
for Scientific Realism: Some Lessons from Confirmation Theory'
- The most commonly cited argument for scientific realism is the
so-called ‘no miracles’ argument. According to this argument, it is
highly implausible to claim that the predictive success enjoyed by some
scientific theories is the product of a long series of lucky
coincidences. A more plausible, indeed some argue the only plausible,
claim is that the corresponding theories are true, or, at the very
least, contain some non-negligible truth content. The majority of
realists deem novel predictive success, roughly the ability of a theory
to predict hitherto unknown types of phenomena, to be particularly
telling in favour of the second claim. In this talk, I argue against
the superiority of novel as opposed to non-novel predictive success. I
do so by pointing out that objective standards in confirmation theory
can only be had if confirmational assessments remain invariant under
anything other than the evidence and the hypothesis under
consideration, something that is not true in accounts of novel
predictive success. After laying the foundations of what I take to be
the correct conception of confirmation relations, I argue that support
from evidence to different parts of a theory does not spread as broadly
as has been popularly maintained. Among other things, this conception
of confirmation relations has crucial consequences for the defence of
scientific realism, consequences that I plan to explore in some depth
during the last part of my talk. (Invited talk presented
at the
Mind, Language, Knowledge: The Perspective of Philosophy, University of
Cyprus,
June 29 2012).
39. 'Why
Care about the Scientific Realism Debate?'
- In this talk, I try to provide motivation for why one ought to take
the scientific realism debate seriously, paying particular attention to
two groups: philosophers of science and scientists. Among other things,
it is argued that various debates in the philosophy of science as well
as in science turn out to involve, sometimes even inadvertently,
substantial epistemic or metaphysical claims of the kind being debated
in the scientific realism debate. (Plenary talk presented
at the
7th Quadrennial International Pittsburg Fellows Conference, University
of Mugla,
June 12-14 2012).
38. 'Perspectival
Realism'
- Scientific realists often assert that our best scientific theories
and models provide true or approximately true descriptions of facts
about nature and that they cut nature at its joints. The latter
assertion presupposes, among other things, that the physical domains
investigated by such theories and models are structured in a unique
way. More metaphorically put, that nature has joints! Let us call this
the ‘uniqueness assumption’. As is customary in philosophy no
assumption is safe from scrutiny. The idea has been floated that nature
has no joints. Frigg (2006), for example, suggests that “the physical
world does not come sliced up” (p. 56). Let us call this the
‘non-uniqueness assumption’. In this talk I attempt to articulate a
view that submits to the non-uniqueness assumption and yet is able to
maintain realist credentials. (Presented
at the
Perspectivalism Workshop, University of Ghent,
January 19-20 2012).
NB: I have now turned this
talk into a paper ‘Putting
Realism in Perspectivism’, 2012, Philosophica,
vol. 84: 85–122.
37. 'Simplicity
as a Guide to Falsity?' - Participants in the debate about
whether simplicity is a guide to truth or merely pragmatically useful
typically wrangle over two problems: (1) how to weigh simplicity
against other virtues like strength and fitness and (2) whether there
is a unique measure for simplicity that straps it to truth. I would
like to put forth a third problem: (3) Even if problems (1) and (2)
were solved, it is far from clear
whether the simplest theory out of an available class of competitors
would always be the one closest
to the truth. (To be presented
at the 14th Congress
of Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science, Nancy, July
19-26 2011).
36. 'Structural
Realism and Causation: An Unhappy Marriage?' - It has
recently been objected that structural realism, in its various guises,
is unable to adequately account for causal phenomena (see, for example,
Psillos 2006). In this talk, I consider whether structural realism has
the resources to address this objection. (To be presented at the British
Society for the Philosophy of Science Annual Conference,
University of
Sussex, July 7-8 2011).
35. 'Runaway
Models' - Among the main aims of science are to predict and
explain the world. In order to pursue those aims, scientists employ
theories, models, equations and the like to represent features of the
world. How are we to understand this representation relation?
Supporters of the semantic view of theories typically construe the
representation relation in one of two ways: (i) in terms of some notion
of morphism or (ii) in terms of some notion of similarity. In this
talk, I take a closer look at a number of objections mounted against
(i) and (ii). I argue that on the whole such objections are misguided
for they demand representation in science to meet loose standards that
the critics conceive of as appertaining to representation in art.
Indeed, I argue that if we were to take such a demand seriously it
would lead to runaway models of scientific representation that are of
no clear benefit to the debate over what makes a scientific theory,
model or equation represent its target domain informatively and
adequately. (Invited talk presented
at the Seminario
di Logica e Filosofia della Scienza, Università di Firenze,
May 5 2011).
34. 'Endorsing
the Methods of Science' - In this talk, I examine when and
why we should trust scientific theories. I start off by considering a
number of methods for deciding when to trust beliefs in the context of
everyday life. I then compare these methods to those utilised in the
context of science. It turns out that despite some differences there
are plenty of common practices towards good believing in the two
contexts. Indeed in various cases it can be argued that the practices
of science are more stringent versions of those we employ in everyday
life. At least with respect to these cases then one cannot endorse
(either explicitly or implicitly) the validity of everyday life
practices but reject the analogous ones in science. (Invited talk
presented at the Dipartimento
di Filosofia, Università di Pisa, May 4 2011).
33. 'Structural
Realism meets the Social Sciences' - Structural realism is
arguably one of the most influential movements to have emerged in
philosophy of science in the last decade or so. Advocates of this
movement attempt to answer epistemological and/or ontological questions
concerning science by arguing that the key to all such questions is the
mathematical formalism of a theory. This is so, according to structural
realists, because the mathematical formalism encodes all and only what
is important about a theory’s target domain, namely its structure.
Almost without exception, discussions of structural realism centre on
the natural sciences and in particular on modern physics. Given that a
number of other sciences are less – indeed in some cases much less –
mathematised than modern physics, does structural realism have anything
informative to say about them? In this talk, I take up the task of
articulating what structural realists ought to say about the social
sciences if they are to consider themselves as offering a coherent
philosophy for the whole of science. (Invited talk presented at the Economics
and Institutional Change Research Seminar, Institute for
Advanced Studies (IMT) Lucca, May 3 2011).
32. 'Philosophy
and Science: Past, Present and Future' - Philosophy and
science have a rather intricate relationship. In this talk I will make
some tentative steps towards answering a number of questions that are
pertinent to this relationship in the hope of throwing some further
light on it. The questions are as follows: (1) In what respects, if
any, are the subject matter, aims, methods and achievements of the two
endeavours similar? (2) How, if at all, has the development of the one
influenced that of the other? (3) To what extent are they currently
interacting? (4) What does the future hold for science and philosophy?
(Invited talk presented at the Metaphysical
Society's Annual Symposium, Trinity College Dublin, April 13
2011).
31. 'Epistemic
and Ontic Commitments: In Perfect Alignment?' - The epistemic
form of structural realism asserts that our knowledge of the world is
restricted to its structural features. Several proponents of this view
assume that the world possesses non-structural features; features
which, according to their view, cannot be known. In other words, they
assume that there is, or, there ought to be (on the basis of normative
arguments in epistemology), always a gap between our epistemological
and ontological commitments. The ontic form of structural realism
denies that this is, or ought to be, the case. Proponents of this view
argue that the perfect alignment of epistemological and ontological
commitments is a highly desirable meta-
theoretical feature. They argue this on the basis of the prima facie
sensible principle that our ontological commitments ought never to
overreach our epistemic ones. Naturally the issue of alignment
transcends the debate between the epistemic and the ontic structural
realists. Is it in principle impossible for there to be circumstances
under which we ought to subscribe to the misalignment of
epistemological and ontological commitments? What do the different
answers to this question entail for ontic structural realism?
(Invited talk presented at the Structuralism
Workshop, John J. Reilly Center for Science, Technology, and Values,
University of Notre Dame, November 17-20 2010).
30. 'The
Prospective Stance in Realism' - Scientific realists
endeavour to secure inferences from empirical success to approximate
truth by arguing that despite the demise of empirically successful
theories the parts of those theories responsible for their success do
in fact survive theory change. If, as some anti-realists have recently
suggested, those parts of theories that are responsible for their
success are only identifiable in retrospect, namely as those that have
survived, then the realist approach is trivialised for now success and
survival are guaranteed to coincide. The aim of this talk is to
counter this argument by identifying successful theory parts
independently from their survival. (Presented
at the Philosophy
of Science Association 2010 Biennial Conference, Montreal,
November 4-6 2010).
29. 'The
Logic of Crucial Experiments' - Although Duhem’s thesis that
in physics crucial experiments are impossible contains some grains of
truth in it, its effects have been greatly exaggerated. In this talk I
argue against this and other associated theses by pointing out the
various ways in which these theses can be curtailed. In the process of
doing so, I examine a few recent attempts to overcome the problems
posed by these theses and identify their strengths and weaknesses.
(Presented
at the Philosophy
of Scientific Experimentation:
A Challenge to Philosophy of Science, University of Pittsburgh,
October 15-17 2010).
28. 'Structural
Realism: From an Epistemological Point of View' - Structural
realism is a rather popular view in philosophy of science. As with many
popular views, sprouting is never far behind. No sprout has had as much
grip on the view’s image as ontic structural realism. Indeed its
supporters have such a stranglehold that ‘structural realism’ has
almost become a byword for their views. In this talk, I want to redress
this imbalance by returning to structural realism’s humble epistemic
beginnings to examine exactly what made the view so attractive in the
first place. To this effect, I will reconstruct several arguments –
some of which little known – proposed in the early part of the
twentieth century in support of the epistemic version of structural
realism. Not wanting to dwell too much on the past, I will then switch
to more recent arguments both for and against the position. A careful
evaluation of these arguments will hopefully provide useful information
as to what form, if any, epistemic structural realism must take in
order to be a viable alternative to its direct competitors, namely
standard scientific realism and constructive empiricism. (Invited talk
at the Lunchtime
Colloquium, Center for Philosophy of Science, University of Pittsburgh,
September 28 2010).
27. 'Heat in
Inter-Theory Relations' - If the realists are right, not only
did certain theoretical parts of the caloric theory survive into our
modern conception of heat but these parts are in fact solely
responsible for the success the caloric theory enjoyed. I test this
claim against two of the caloric theory’s successes, namely the
explanations (i) that matter expands by heating and contracts by
cooling and (ii) that a special kind of heat (i.e. latent heat) is
involved in changes of state. Take (i) as an illustration. The caloric
explanation of this phenomenon has the same structure as the kinetic
one. As the quantity of heat – caloric in the one case, kinetic energy
in the other – is increased/decreased the force generated – repulsive
in the caloric case, pressure in the kinetic case – increases/decreases
and that in turn leads to an increase/decrease in the volume needed.
Thus the caloric explanation was successful because it had managed to
get the structure of such processes right, even though the specifics of
the ontology were wrong, i.e. the existence of caloric and its
repulsive force. This result tallies well with a special kind of
realism, namely structural realism. (Presented
at the British
Society for the Philosophy of Science Annual Conference, University
College Dublin , July 8-9 2010).
26. 'Scientific
Representation and Perspective' - Critics of the semantic
view of theories have, among other things,
demurred that isomorphic specification is not sufficient for the
representation of at least some physical systems. The same physical
system will often, if not always, be amenable to representation via
different non-isomorphic models. Thus a construal of theories as sets
of structures does not seem sufficient to uniquely identify all target
systems. Structural realists face the same objection. Their endorsement
of the view that physical objects may only be specified up to
isomorphism means that they are as susceptible to this objection as
semantic theorists. In this talk I aim to rescue semantic theorists and
structural realists from this and other closely related objections by
endorsing a perspectivalist approach towards scientific representation.
(Invited talk at the
Research Colloquium, University of Bochum, June 17 2010).
25. 'Thinking
about Scientific Understanding and Explanation as a Structural Realist'
- Structural Realism is a viewpoint in the scientific realism debate.
In its epistemological guise it holds
that our knowledge of the physical world is at best structural. More
precisely, we can only know the
physical world up to isomorphism. In its ontological guise it explains
this structural limitation to our
knowledge by appeal to an ontology which is itself in some sense or
other wholly structural.
Although research into structural realism is booming, little has been
said about what its implications
are for scientific understanding and explanation. In this talk I
explore these implications and argue
that at least when it comes to the natural sciences what counts as
understanding and explanation
has taken a highly abstract and mathematical turn that is very much in
line with the structural realist
pronouncements. (Presented at the Understanding
and the Aims of Science, Young Scholars Section, Lorentz
Center, University of Leiden, May 31 - June 4 2010).
24. 'The
Pessimistic Meta-Inductivist: A Sheep in Wolf’s Clothing?'
- Realists assert that when a successful theory is abandoned, not all
of its components are
discarded but only those that are inessential or idle for the theory’s
success. So long as the essential components survive into the new
theory there is
no cause for alarm. More precisely, an outdated theory T which enjoyed
some measure of success must, according to the realist, be: (i)
partially true precisely because some of its theoretical claims are
responsible for its success and (ii) superseded by a (strictly) more
approximately true theory T* which, of course, preserves T’s successful
theoretical claims. In this talk I test this requirement of realism
against the background of the outdated caloric theory of heat and its
successor the kinetic theory. (Presented at the Philosophy
of Science in a Forest (PSF2010), Dutch Association for the Philosophy
of Science.,
May 14 - 15 2010).
23. 'The
Double Life of Evidence: From the Streets to the Labs
- An integral part of the schooling of scientists, especially
experimental ones, is the cultivation of the significance and role of
scientific evidence. Naturally this schooling is not conducted in
vacuuo. Budding scientists already have experiences of, and intuitions
about, the use of evidence in everyday life. In this
talk I examine the extent to which everyday life evidential practices
are continuous with scientific ones. I begin by offering a tentative
formulation of the continuity hypothesis: Most, if not all, good (i.e.
practically successful) evidential practices in everyday life have
better performing or at least equally-well performing analogues in
science AND most, if not all, good evidential practices in science have
at best equally-well performing analogues in everyday life. I then
proceed to illustrate some cases of continuity, where good evidential
practices in science (e.g. calibration) have everyday life analogues.
(Part of a Symposium on Evidence I co-organised with Giora Hon,
Maarten van Dyck, Dave Lagnado and Jan Willem Romeijn for the European Philosophy
of Science Association Biennial Conference 2009, Free University of
Amsterdam, Oct 21-24 2009).
22. 'Structural
Realism: Invariance through Theory Change'
- Structural realists of nearly all stripes endorse the structural
continuity claim. Roughly, this is the idea that the structure of
successful scientific theories survives theory change because it has
latched on to the structure of the world. In this talk I elaborate,
elucidate and modify the structural continuity claim and its associated
argument. I do so without presupposing a particular conception of
structure that favours this or that kind of structural realism but
instead by concentrating on neutrally formulated historical facts. The
result, I hope, throws light on what a structural realist must do to
evidentially benefit from the historical record of science. (Presented
at the Congrès
triennal de la SOPHA 2009, University of Geneva, Sept 2-5
2009).
21. 'The
Caloric Under a Frame-Theoretic Spotlight'
- In this joint work with Gerhard Schurz we conduct a frame-theoretic
investigation of the respects in which the central concept of the
caloric theory of heat has survived into modern accounts of
thermodynamics despite the theory’s demise in the latter half of the
nineteenth
century. We first present a brief account of the development of the
caloric theory as well as that of its competitor, the motion theory of
heat. We then compare the two theories’ explanatory and predictive
successes, paying particular attention to the role their central
concepts played in facilitating those successes. The comparison will be
performed to evaluate whether or not (i) some parts of the caloric
theory are in some sense approximately true and (ii) the term ‘caloric’
can be said to refer to a modern counterpart posit. Our conjecture is
that to the
extent that the caloric theory enjoyed genuine success, the structural
parts responsible for that success have been incorporated into the
kinetic theory of heat. (Presented
at the Second
Conference on Concept, Types and Frames in Language, Cognition and
Science, University of Duesseldorf,
Aug 24-26 2009).
20. ‘Δομικός
Ρεαλισμός: Ιστορική Συνοχή και τα Όρια της’ - Σύμφωνα με το
γνωσιολογικό είδος του δομικού ρεαλισμού στην καλύτερη περίπτωση
μπορούμε να έχουμε γνώση της δομής του κόσμου. Μιλώντας
πρόχειρα, κατά τον ισχυρισμό αυτό η δομή των επιτυχημένων επιστημονικών
θεωριών επιβίωνει μέσα από τις επιστημονικές επαναστάσεις επειδή έχει
αγκιστρωθεί πάνω στη πραγματική δομή του κόσμου. Με άλλα λόγια, η δομή
διατηρείται μέσα από την αλλαγή θεωριών γιατι είναι αληθής ή
τουλάχιστον αληθής κατά προσέγγιση – απ’εδώ και στο εξής θα εκφράζω
αυτή τη διαζευκτική φράση ως ‘(κατά προσέγγιση) αληθής’. Οι οπαδοί του
ισχυρισμού δομικής συνοχής συχνά δίνουν σιωπηρή έγκριση στον αντίστροφο
ισχυρισμό, δηλ. στο ότι η διατήρηση της δομής των επιτυχημένων
επιστημονικών θεωριών συνεπάγεται την (κατά προσέγγιση) αλήθεια τους.
Σε αυτή την ομιλία στοχεύω να αποσαφηνίσω, να επιφέρω βελτιωτικές
μετατροπές και να επεκτείνω τον ισχυρισμό της δομικής συνοχής και το
συνδεδεμένο επιχείρημα του. (Presented
at the 5th
Pan-Hellenic Conference in the History, Philosophy and Teaching of
Natural Sciences, University of Cyprus, June 11-14 2009).
19. 'Metaphilosophical
Ruminations on Theoretical Term Reference' - In this talk I
examine the concepts of referential success and referential continuity
as they are used to assert or deny claims about theoretical term
reference. In particular, I examine the intuitions that motivate
different theoretical accounts of such concepts. In contrast to
existing approaches, I argue that even when such intuitions are
conflicting they play an evidential role in lending credence to
distinct referential concepts. What is more, I argue that some of these
concepts are useful in making sense of the historical record of science
and in evaluating scientific realist claims. (Invited talk presented at
the Research
Seminar in Epistemology and Philosophy of Science, University of Tilburg,
March 3 2009).
18. 'The
Scope of Fiction:
Comments on Tim Button’s ‘Where Fiction Ends and Reality Begins’
' - Suppose you want to distance yourself from fiction, i.e.
suppose you want no commitment to the literal truth of a fictional
sentence φ. Suppose further that you want to be able to treat all sorts
of discourses as fiction, i.e. not just literary fiction but also
ethics, mathematics, science, parts thereof, etc. Tim Button considers
and rejects a number of fictionalist views that could be applicable to
any of these discourses, namely the paraphrastic approach, the extended
fiction approach, the pretence fiction approach and the spotty scope
approach. Although I agree with quite a few of the conclusions that
Button draws, I find some of his motivation and arguments problematic.
MetaMetaphysics
Conference at Logos (Logic, Language and Cognition Research Group),
University of Barcelona, June 19-21 2008).
17. 'Data
Meet
Theories: Up Close and Personal' - In this talk I extend my
critique of Bogen and Woodward's claim that we do not (and perhaps
cannot) use theories to infer, predict or explain observations. I do so
by demonstrating that paradigmatic cases of novel prediction could not
have been made unless the relationship between data and theories is
more direct than Bogen and woodward would have us believe. (Presented
at the conference Data
- Phenomena - Theories: What's the notion of a scientific phenomenon
good for?, University of Heidelberg, September 11-13 2008).
16. 'Kuhn
Loss: A Dilemma' - In this talk, I present anti-realist
advocates of Kuhn loss with an unattractive dilemma: Either Kuhn loss
has historical instantiations but is innocuous to the epistemic
commitments of the scientific realist or it is a real threat to those
commitments but has no historical instantiations. (Presented at
the Sixth
European Congress of Analytic Philosophy, Krakow, Aug 21-26
2008).
15. 'Ecumenical
Empiricism' - In this talk, I put forth a broader conception
of observability that seeks to allay the realist’s concerns about
knowledge in natural science yet panders to vital empiricist
sensitivities. Along with the new conception of observability I propose
a new form of empiricism. Ecumenical empiricism, as I call it, divorces
itself from traditional conceptions of experience while remaining
wedded to the idea that reliable detection of our surroundings has
precedence over all other forms of knowledge. (Presented at the Joint Session
of the Aristotelian Society and Mind Association, University of Aberdeen,
July 11-14 2008).
14. 'What’s
Wrong
with the
Problem of Unconceived Alternatives?' - Kyle Stanford (2006)
puts forth a new challenge to scientific realism, the problem of
unconceived alternatives (PUA). He claims that it is a much more
powerful challenge than traditional arguments from underdetermination
because it is well supported by historical evidence. Contra Stanford, I
argue that the abundant evidence comes at great expense, for in order
to obtain it he turns PUA into an ineffectual challenge. (Presented at
the British
Society for the Philosophy of Science, University of St. Andrews,
July 10-11 2008).
13. 'Saving
the Intuitions: Polylithic Reference' - Different theories of
reference aspire to satisfy conflicting intuitions. Assuming that
intuitions play a crucial role in pinning down the concept of
reference, two options become available: Either establish a consistent
set of intuitions by rejecting at least some of them or find a radical
way to accommodate all of them. The former option has been the primary
focus of research up to now. I will explore the latter option, arguing
that reference might not be a monolithic notion. With this aim in mind,
I sketch a hierarchy of concepts of reference, each of which satisfying
different intuitions and standards of successful reference. (Presented
at the Theoretical
Frameworks and Empirical Underdetermination Workshop, University of
Duesseldorf, April 10-12 2008).
12. 'Making Contact
with Observations' - Following Bogen and Woodward’s
influential ‘Saving the Phenomena’, many philosophers claim that
theories do not (and perhaps cannot) entail, predict or explain
observations. Utilising various case studies, I argue that observation
statements can often be derived straight from the theory because the
right auxiliaries are in place. (Presented at the First
Conference of the European Philosophy of Science Association,
Complutense University Madrid, November 15-17 2007).
11. 'The
Observation-Ladenness of Theory' - This talk contests the
purity of theories assumed in discussions of theory-ladenness, arguing
instead that theories and theoretical terms can be afflicted by
observation-ladenness. (Presented at the Joint
Session of the Aristotelian Society and Mind Association, University of
Bristol in July 2007).
10. 'Structural
Realism 2.0' - In this talk, I explore new sources of
support for Epistemic Structural Realism, as well as suggest various
adjustments, tackle certain threats, discuss neglected issues, and,
last but not least, try to put things in perspective. (Presented at the
Philosophy
of Physics Research Seminar, University of Oxford on Nov. 9
2006).
09. 'Structural
Continuity and its Limits' - This talk explores some of the
limits faced by structural realism in its claims of structural
continuity through scientific theory change. (Presented at the
Institute for the History and Foundations of Science (IHFS), Department
of Physics & Astronomy, Utrecht University in June
2006).
08. 'Seeing
the Same Things' - This talk motivates a positive answer to
the question 'Whether different people experience the same public
things?' (Presented at the Erasmus
Institute
for Philosophy and Economics, University of Rotterdam in May
2006).
07. 'Extracting
Evidence from Observation' - In this talk I contest the claim
that theories even when accompanied by suitable theoretical auxiliaries
cannot be directly tested via observations. (Presented at the
History and Philosophy of Science Seminar Series, University of Leeds
in March 2006).
06. 'Deflating
Scientific Explanation, or How to Make the Realist Raft Float'
- This talk re-evaluates the role intuitions play in the notions of
scientific explanation and explanatory power. (Presented at the
conference Philosophical
Perspectives on Scientific Understanding, Free University of Amsterdam
in August 2005).
05. 'Evidential
Equivalence' - This talk explores the limits and
consequences of the underdetermination and empirical equivalence
theses. (Part of it was presented at the
British Society for the Philosophy of Science Annual Conference,
University of Manchester in July 2005).
04. 'The Upward
Path to Structural Realism' - My aim here is threefold: (1)
to evaluate part of Psillos’ offence on the Russellian version of
epistemic structural realism (ESR), (2) to elaborate more fully what
Russellian ESR involves and (3) to suggest improvements where it is
indeed failing. (Presented at the Philosophy
of Science Association Nineteenth Biennial Conference, University of
Texas - Austin in November 2004).
03. 'Caloric:
Centre or Offstage' - In this talk, I criticise Psillos'
strategy against the pessimistic meta-induction and in particular his
conception of what makes theoretical terms (in)dispensable for their
respective theories. (Accepted for presentation at the 8th Summer
Symposium on the Philosophy of Chemistry and Biochemistry, University
of Durham in August 2004).
02. 'N-Correspondence'
- This talk sketches a correspondence principle that: (a) bodes well
with some central episodes in the history of science and (b) can fend
off accusations of triviality. (Accepted for presentation at the
British Society for the Philosophy of Science Annual Conference,
University of Kent in July 2004).
01. 'What
the History of Science Cannot Teach Us' - This talk
criticises the view that the preservation of a theoretical component is
a necessary and/or sufficient condition of its approximate truth/truth.
(Presented at 12th.
International Congress of Logic Methodology and Philosophy of Science,
Oviedo in August 2003).
Philosophy Faculty, New College of the Humanities, 19 Bedford
Square, London WC1B 3HH, ioannis.votsis(/a-t\)nchlondon.ac.uk