Dr. Ioannis Votsis

I'm a Philosopher of Science at the University of Düsseldorf. My main area of expertise is Structural Realism. This website primarily contains information about my work.

What's new?

'Scientific Representation and Perspective' - Critics of the semantic view of theories have, among other things, demurred that isomorphic specification is not sufficient for the representation of at least some physical systems. The same physical system will often, if not always, be amenable to representation via different non-isomorphic models. Thus a construal of theories as sets of structures does not seem sufficient to uniquely identify all target systems. Structural realists face the same objection. Their endorsement of the view that physical objects may only be specified up to isomorphism means that they are as susceptible to this objection as semantic theorists. In this talk I aim to rescue semantic theorists and structural realists from this and other closely related objections by endorsing a perspectivalist approach towards scientific representation. Research Colloquium, University of Bochum, June 17 2010).

'Thinking about Scientific Understanding and Explanation as a Structural Realist' - Structural Realism is a viewpoint in the scientific realism debate. In its epistemological guise it holds that our knowledge of the physical world is at best structural. More precisely, we can only know the physical world up to isomorphism. In its ontological guise it explains this structural limitation to our knowledge by appeal to an ontology which is itself in some sense or other wholly structural. Although research into structural realism is booming, little has been said about what its implications are for scientific understanding and explanation. In this talk I explore these implications and argue that at least when it comes to the natural sciences what counts as understanding and explanation has taken a highly abstract and mathematical turn that is very much in line with the structural realist pronouncements. Understanding and the Aims of Science, Young Scholars Section, Lorentz Center, University of Leiden, May 31 - June 4 2010).

'The Pessimistic Meta-Inductivist: A Sheep in Wolf’s Clothing?' - Realists assert that when a successful theory is abandoned, not all of its components are discarded but only those that are inessential or idle for the theory’s success. So long as the essential components survive into the new theory there is no cause for alarm. More precisely, an outdated theory T which enjoyed some measure of success must, according to the realist, be: (i) partially true precisely because some of its theoretical claims are responsible for its success and (ii) superseded by a (strictly) more approximately true theory T* which, of course, preserves T’s successful theoretical claims. In this talk I test this requirement of realism against the background of the outdated caloric theory of heat and its successor the kinetic theory. Philosophy of Science in a Forest (PSF2010), Dutch Association for the Philosophy of Science., May 14 - May 15 2010).

'The Double Life of Evidence: From the Streets to the Labs' - An integral part of the schooling of scientists, especially experimental ones, is the cultivation of the significance and role of scientific evidence. Naturally this schooling is not conducted in vacuuo. Budding scientists already have experiences of, and intuitions about, the use of evidence in everyday life. In this talk I examine the extent to which everyday life evidential practices are continuous with scientific ones. I begin by offering a tentative formulation of the continuity hypothesis: Most, if not all, good (i.e. practically successful) evidential practices in everyday life have better performing or at least equally-well performing analogues in science AND most, if not all, good evidential practices in science have at best equally-well performing analogues in everyday life. I then proceed to illustrate some cases of continuity, where good evidential practices in science (e.g. calibration) have everyday life analogues. (Part of a Symposium on Evidence I am co-organising with Giora Hon, Maarten van Dyck, Dave Lagnado and Jan Willem Romeijn for the European Philosophy of Science Association Biennial Conference 2009, Free University of Amsterdam, Oct 21-24 2009).

'The Caloric Under a Frame-Theoretic Spotlight' - In this joint work with Gerhard Schurz we conduct a frame-theoretic investigation of the respects in which the central concept of the caloric theory of heat has survived into modern accounts of thermodynamics despite the theory’s demise in the latter half of the nineteenth century. We first present a brief account of the development of the caloric theory as well as that of its competitor, the motion theory of heat. We then compare the two theories’ explanatory and predictive successes, paying particular attention to the role their central concepts played in facilitating those successes. The comparison will be performed to evaluate whether or not (i) some parts of the caloric theory are in some sense approximately true and (ii) the term ‘caloric’ can be said to refer to a modern counterpart posit. Our conjecture is that to the extent that the caloric theory enjoyed genuine success, the structural parts responsible for that success have been incorporated into the kinetic theory of heat. Second Conference on Concept, Types and Frames in Language, Cognition and Science, University of Duesseldorf, Aug 24-26 2009).

'Structural Realism: Invariance through Theory Change' - Structural realists of nearly all stripes endorse the structural continuity claim. Roughly, this is the idea that the structure of successful scientific theories survives theory change because it has latched on to the structure of the world. In this talk I elaborate, elucidate and modify the structural continuity claim and its associated argument. I do so without presupposing a particular conception of structure that favours this or that kind of structural realism but instead by concentrating on neutrally formulated historical facts. The result, I hope, throws light on what a structural realist must do to evidentially benefit from the historical record of science. Congrès triennal de la SOPHA 2009, University of Geneva, Sept 2-5 2009).

'Metaphilosophical Ruminations on Theoretical Term Reference' - In this talk I examine the concepts of referential success and referential continuity as they are used to assert or deny claims about theoretical term reference. In particular, I examine the intuitions that motivate different theoretical accounts of such concepts. In contrast to existing approaches, I argue that even when such intuitions are conflicting they play an evidential role in lending credence to distinct referential concepts. What is more, I argue that some of these concepts are useful in making sense of the historical record of science and in evaluating scientific realist claims. (Presented at the Research Seminar in Epistemology and Philosophy of Science, University of Tilburg, March 3 2009).

'Data Meet Theories: Up Close and Personal' - In this talk I extend my critique of Bogen and Woodward's claim that we do not (and perhaps cannot) use theories to infer, predict or explain observations. I do so by demonstrating that paradigmatic cases of novel prediction could not have been made unless the relationship between data and theories is more direct than Bogen and woodward would have us believe. (Presented at the conference Data - Phenomena - Theories: What's the notion of a scientific phenomenon good for?, University of Heidelberg, September 11-13 2008).

'Kuhn Loss: A Dilemma' - In this talk, I present anti-realist advocates of Kuhn loss with an unattractive dilemma: Either Kuhn loss has historical instantiations but is innocuous to the epistemic commitments of the scientific realist or it is a real threat to those commitments but has no historical instantiations. (Presented at the Sixth European Congress of Analytic Philosophy, Krakow, Aug 21-26 2008).

'Ecumenical Empiricism' - In this paper, I put forth a broader conception of observability that seeks to allay the realist’s concerns about knowledge in natural science yet panders to vital empiricist sensitivities. Along with the new conception of observability I propose a new form of empiricism. Ecumenical empiricism, as I call it, divorces itself from traditional conceptions of experience while remaining wedded to the idea that reliable detection of our surroundings has precedence over all other forms of knowledge. (Presented at the Joint Session of the Aristotelian Society and Mind Association, University of Aberdeen, July 11-14 2008).

'What’s Wrong with the Problem of Unconceived Alternatives?' - Kyle Stanford (2006) puts forth a new challenge to scientific realism, the problem of unconceived alternatives (PUA). He claims that it is a much more powerful challenge than traditional arguments from underdetermination because it is well supported by historical evidence. Contra Stanford, I argue that the abundant evidence comes at great expense, for in order to obtain it he turns PUA into an ineffectual challenge. (Presented at the British Society for the Philosophy of Science, University of St. Andrews, July 10-11 2008).

I co-organised with Gerhard Schurz the Theoretical Frameworks and Empirical Underdetermination Workshop (April 10-12 2008, University of Duesseldorf). The workshop brought together some of the world’s leading experts in the scientific realism debate to discuss the latest developments in the field. The programme commenced with a eulogy to the late Peter Lipton, who was originally scheduled to give a talk at the workshop. David Papineau who had known Peter for over twenty years delivered the eulogy.