

# INTUITIONS

**TIME AND PLACE:** Tuesdays 16:00-18:00, 23.21/U1.64

**Instructor:** Dr. Ioannis Votsis

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**Office hours (Room Geb. 23.21/04.86):** Wednesdays 11:00-12:00

Intuitions have traditionally played a central role in philosophy. They have not only been useful heuristic tools but have also been tasked with the momentous role of adjudicating between competing accounts of philosophical concepts like knowledge, goodness, and reference. The aim of this course is to examine in detail and scrutinise the role of intuitions in philosophy. In pursuing this aim, we will delve into a number of debates in epistemology, metaphysics, ethics, logic, philosophy of language, philosophy of mathematics and philosophy of science. Among other things, we will seek answers to the following questions: What are intuitions? Are all intuitions acceptable? If not, how can we tell good from bad intuitions? What ought we to do when intuitions conflict? Is there a core body of intuitions on which consensus can be formed? Can we distinguish between pre-theoretical and theoretical intuitions? If so, what would be the benefit of such a distinction? Can intuition be cultivated? Under what circumstances, if any, can intuitions overrule empirical results? How are thought experiments and intuitions related? Whence do intuitions obtain their force? Ought we to trust intuitions? If not, what would that mean for philosophy in general and conceptual analysis in particular?

## **Main Textbook**

DePaul, M. and W. Ramsey (eds.) (1999) *Rethinking Intuition: The Psychology of Intuition and Its Role in Philosophical Inquiry*, Lanham, Maryland: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, Inc.

## **General Surveys:**

Beaney, M. (2007) 'Analysis', *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, Edward N. Zalta (ed.), <http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/analysis/>

Margolis, E. and S. Laurence (2006) 'Concepts', *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, Edward N. Zalta (ed.), <http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/concepts/>

## **Coursework:**

One presentation to be assigned on one of the essential readings. One essay to be handed in to the department by **31/01/09**. Suggested essay topics will be distributed nearer the deadline.

## **WEEK 1: Introduction**

## **WEEK 2: What is Conceptual Analysis?**

## **Essential Reading:**

Jackson, F. (1998) 'The Role of Conceptual Analysis', *From Metaphysics to Ethics: A Defence of Conceptual Analysis*, Oxford: Clarendon Press, ch.2.

**Further Reading:**

- Beaney, M. (ed.) (2007) *The Analytic Turn: Analysis in Early Analytic Philosophy and Phenomenology*, London: Routledge.
- Block, N. and R. Stalnaker (1999) 'Conceptual Analysis and the Explanatory Gap', *Philosophical Review*, vol. 108(1): 1-46.
- Laurence, S. and E. Margolis (2003) 'Concepts and Conceptual Analysis', *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, vol. 67(2): 253-282.

**WEEK 3: Methods in Epistemology****Essential Reading:**

- Weatherson, B. (2003) 'What Good Are Counterexamples?', *Philosophical Studies*, vol. 115(1): 1-31.

**Further Reading:**

- Kornblith, H. (2006) 'Intuitions and Epistemology', in *Epistemology Futures*, S. Hetherington, (ed.), Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 10-25.
- Shope, R. (1983) *The Analysis of Knowledge*, Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Spicer, F. (2006) 'Epistemic Intuitions and Epistemic Contextualism', *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, vol. 72(2): 366-385.

**WEEK 4: Methods in Philosophy of Mind****Essential Reading:**

- Jackson, F. (1998) 'Serious Metaphysics and Supervenience', *From Metaphysics to Ethics: A Defence of Conceptual Analysis*, Oxford: Clarendon Press, ch. 1.

**Further Reading:**

- Beaney, M. (2001) 'From Conceptual Analysis to Serious Metaphysics', *International Journal of Philosophical Studies*, vol. 9(4): 521-529.
- Stalnaker, R. (2001) 'Metaphysics Without Conceptual Analysis', *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, vol. 62(3): 631-636.
- Stich, S. and J. M. Weinberg (2001) 'Jackson's Empirical Assumptions', *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, vol. 62(3): 637-643.

**WEEK 5: Methods in Ethics****Essential Reading:**

- Horowitz, T. (1999) 'Philosophical Intuitions and Psychological Theory', in M. DePaul and W. Ramsey, pp. 143-160.

**Further Reading:**

- Hauser, M. (2006) *Moral Minds: How Nature Designed Our Universal Sense of Right and Wrong*, New York: Harper Collins.
- Jackson, F. (1998) 'The Location Problem for Ethics: Moral Properties and Moral Content', *From Metaphysics to Ethics: A Defence of Conceptual Analysis*, Oxford: Clarendon Press, ch.5.
- Stratton-Lake, P. (ed.) (2002) *Ethical Intuitionism*, Oxford: Clarendon Press.

## **WEEK 6: Methods in Philosophy of Language**

### **Essential Reading:**

Machery, E. et al. (2004) 'Semantics, cross-cultural style', *Cognition*, vol. 92(3): B1-B12.

### **Further Reading:**

- Katz, J. J. (1990) 'Has the Description Theory of Names Been Refuted?' in *Meaning and Method: Essays in Honor of Hilary Putnam*, G. Boolos (ed.), Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Kroon, F. W. (1987) 'Causal Descriptivism', *Australasian Journal of Philosophy*, vol. 65(1): 1-17.
- Putnam, H. (1975) 'The Meaning of "Meaning"', reprinted in *The Twin Earth Chronicles*, A. Pessin and S. Goldberg (eds.), New York: M.E. Sharpe, pp. 3-19, 1996.

## **WEEK 7: Methods in Philosophy of Science**

### **Essential Reading:**

Votsis, I. (forthcoming) 'Saving the Intuitions: Polythetic Reference', *Synthese*.

### **Further Reading:**

- Hardin, C.L. and A. Rosenberg (1982) 'In Defence of Convergent Realism', *Philosophy of Science*, vol. 49: 604-615.
- Kitcher, P. (1993) *The Advancement of Science: Science without Legend, Objectivity without Illusions*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, chs. 3-5.
- Psillos, S. (1999) *Scientific Realism: How Science Tracks Truth*, London: Routledge, ch. 12.

## **WEEK 8: Methods in Philosophy of Mathematics**

### **Essential Reading:**

Shapiro, S. (2000) 'Intuitionism: Is Something Wrong with our Logic?', *Thinking about Mathematics: The Philosophy of Mathematics*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, ch. 7.

### **Further Reading:**

- Feferman, S. (2000) 'Mathematical Intuition vs. Mathematical Monsters', *Synthese*, vol. 125(3): 317-332.
- Heyting, A. (1931) 'The Intuitionist Foundations of Mathematics', repr. in P. Benacerraf and H. Putnam (eds.), *Philosophy of Mathematics: Selected Readings*, 2<sup>nd</sup> ed., Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983.
- Mancosu, P. (ed.) (1998) *From Brouwer to Hilbert: The Debate on the Foundations of Mathematics in the 1920s*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

## **WEEK 9: What are Intuitions?**

### **Essential Reading:**

Parsons, C. (2000) 'Reason and Intuition', *Synthese*, vol. 125(3): 299-315.

**Further Reading:**

- Bealer, G. (1993) 'The Incoherence of Empiricism', in S. Wagner and R. Warner (eds.), *Naturalism: A Critical Appraisal*, Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, pp. 163-196.
- Fricker, M. (1995) 'Intuition and Reason', *The Philosophical Quarterly*, vol. 45, no. 179: 181-189.
- Goldman, A. (2007) 'Philosophical Intuitions: Their Target, Their Source, and Their Epistemic Status', *Grazer Philosophische Studien*, 74: 1-25.

**WEEK 10: Naturalism****Essential Reading:**

- Kornblith, H. (1999) 'In Defense of Naturalized Epistemology' in *The Blackwell Guide to Epistemology*, J. Greco and E. Sosa (eds.), Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, pp. 158-69.

**Further Reading:**

- Feldman, R. (1999) 'Methodological Naturalism in Epistemology' in *The Blackwell Guide to Epistemology*, J. Greco and E. Sosa (eds.), Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, pp. 170-86.
- Haack, S. (1993) *Evidence and Inquiry: Towards Reconstruction in Epistemology*, Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.
- Kornblith, H. (1999) 'The Role of Intuition in Philosophical Inquiry: An Account with No Unnatural Ingredients', in M. DePaul and W. Ramsey, pp. 129-142.

**WEEK 11: Empirical Psychology meets Philosophy****Essential Reading:**

- Gopnik, A. and E. Schwitzgebel (1999) 'Whose Concepts Are They, Anyway? The Role of Philosophical Intuition in Empirical Psychology' in M. DePaul and W. Ramsey, pp.75-91.

**Further Reading:**

- Kahneman, D. et al. (1982) *Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
- Rosch, E. and C. Mervis (1999) 'Family Resemblances: Studies in the Internal Structure of Categories', in M. DePaul and W. Ramsey, pp. 17-44.
- Shafir, E. (1999) 'Philosophical Intuitions and Cognitive Mechanisms', in M. DePaul and W. Ramsey, pp. 59-74.

**WEEK 12: Reflective Equilibrium****Essential Reading:**

- Stich, S. (1999) 'Reflective Equilibrium, Analytic Epistemology and the Problem of Cognitive Diversity', in M. DePaul and W. Ramsey, pp. 95-112.

**Further Reading:**

- Brandt, R. (1990) 'The Science of Man and Wide Reflective Equilibrium', *Ethics*, vol. 100(2): 259-278.

Cummins, R. (1999) 'Reflection on Reflective Equilibrium', in M. DePaul and W. Ramsey, pp. 113-128.  
Rawls, J. (1971) *A Theory of Justice*, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

### **WEEK 13: Experimental Philosophy**

#### **Essential Reading:**

Alexander, J. and J. M. Weinberg (2007) 'Analytic Epistemology and Experimental Philosophy', *Philosophy Compass*, vol. 2(1): 56-80.

#### **Further Reading:**

Knobe, J. and S. Nichols (eds.) (2008) *Experimental Philosophy*, Oxford University Press.

Knobe, J. (forthcoming) 'What Is Experimental Philosophy?', *The Philosopher's Magazine*, <http://www.unc.edu/~knobe/ExperimentalPhilosophy.pdf>

Nadelhoffer, T. and E. Nahmias (2007) 'The Past and Future of Experimental Philosophy', *Philosophical Explorations*, vol. 10(2):123-149.

### **WEEK 14: Defending Conceptual Analysis**

#### **Essential Reading:**

Sosa, E. (2007) 'Experimental Philosophy and Philosophical Intuition', *Philosophical Studies*, vol. 132(1): 99–107.

#### **Further Reading:**

Bealer, G. (1999) 'Intuition and the Autonomy of Philosophy', in M. DePaul and W. Ramsey, pp. 201-240.

Kauppinen, A. (2007) 'The Rise and Fall of Experimental Philosophy', *Philosophical Explorations*, vol. 10(2): 95-118.

Williamson, T. (2004) 'Philosophical "Intuitions" and Scepticism about Judgement', *Dialectica*, vol. 58(1): 109-153.

### **WEEK 15: In Search of Necessary and Sufficient Conditions**

#### **Essential Reading:**

Ramsey, W. (1999) 'Prototypes and Conceptual Analysis', in M. DePaul and W. Ramsey, pp. 161-177.

#### **Further Reading:**

Chalmers, D. J. and F. Jackson (2001) 'Conceptual Analysis and Reductive Explanation', *Philosophical Review*, vol. 110(3): 315-360.

<http://consc.net/papers/analysis.html>

Craig, E. (1990) *Knowledge and the State of Nature: An Essay in Conceptual Synthesis*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Feldman, R. (1997), 'Review Essay: Human Knowledge and Human Nature, by Peter Carruthers and Knowledge and the State of Nature, by Edward Craig', *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, vol. 57(1): 205-221.

## **WEEK 16: Is Analytic Philosophy on its Deathbed?**

### **Essential Reading:**

Graham, G. and T. Horgan (1999) 'Southern Fundamentalism and the End of Philosophy', in M. DePaul and W. Ramsey, pp. 271-292.

### **Further Reading:**

Harman, G. (1995) 'Doubts about Conceptual Analysis' in J. Hawthorne and M. Michael (eds.) *Philosophy in Mind*, Springer, pp 43-48.

Miller, R. B. (1999) 'Without Intuitions', *Metaphilosophy*, vol. 31(3): 231-250.

Stanley, R. (1985) *The Limits of Analysis*, New Haven: Yale University Press.