Are Universal Criteria of Analogical Reasoning Hopeless?

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One of the most common forms of reasoning in science is reasoning by analogy. Roughly speaking, such reasoning involves the transposition of solutions that work well in one domain to another, on the basis of analogous properties between the two domains. Sometimes such reasoning works, and sometimes it doesn't. Models of analogical reasoning attempt to circumscribe the conditions under which good analogical inferences can be made and bad ones avoided. Two general approaches to modelling can be identified. There are those who attempt to come up with universal criteria of analogical reasoning. And there are those who argue in favour of localised criteria. In this talk, I assess the merits and demerits of both approaches. I concede that there are substantial obstacles standing in the way of universal criteria. Even so, one such criterion is put forth and a corresponding challenge due to Wittgenstein examined. I conclude by arguing that this challenge can be met and thus that there is hope for universal criteria in the study of analogical reasoning.