Informed Voting
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One consequence of the rise of large-scale societies has been the division of labour. Such a division allows people to specialise in certain areas by training and developing skills and ideas over long periods. This in turn improves efficiency. Those who specialise at doing something, do it faster, better and/or with less energy. They also make more informed decisions about their respective domains. Indeed, we expect such people to be well-informed. We can draw on this expectation to formulate the following norm, aptly named the 'informed-ness norm': To increase the chances of effectively discharging domain-specific duties, one ought to be (as) well-informed in that domain (as practically possible). Obviously, this norm is not, and arguably should not, be adhered to with respect to every domain or decision. In this talk, I ask the question whether the informed-ness norm should be adhered to in the domain of political voting. I briefly make the case that it should and consider two voting systems, John Stuart Mill’s plural voting and my own, that attempt to incorporate adherence to the norm. I then proceed to evaluate each system’s pros and cons. I conclude the talk with some remarks about what needs to be the case before we adopt such voting systems.