Norton (2003) develops a material theory of induction that urges us to go local. Why? Because inductive inferences in science are, according to him, “grounded in matters of fact that hold only in particular domains” (p. 647). This theory has been put to work by Saatsi (2009) who uses it to prop up the content-driven or local view of arguments for scientific realism. On this view, which has rapidly been gaining ground, general arguments for or against realism like the no miracles argument and the argument from the pessimistic meta-induction are doomed to fail. The war will be won or lost instead on the many battlefields where specific arguments, the kinds that cite material postulates, reign supreme. In this talk, I counter Saatsi’s anti-generalist tendencies while at the same, and prima facie paradoxically, supporting the central message behind the material theory of induction.

References: