Perhaps the most influential realist view in recent years, structural realism’s appeal can be found in the ease with which it seems to explain away certain difficulties that afflict other, more traditional, versions of realism. Roughly, and somewhat generically formulated, it is the view that our epistemic and perhaps even our ontic commitments must be reduced to the structural features that successful scientific theories ascribe to the unobservable world – see, for example, Votsis (2018). In this talk, I reappraise some of that appeal in light of recent challenges raised by a number of scholars, e.g. Vickers (2019) and Wray (2018), on both sides of the scientific realism debate. Particular emphasis is paid to historical considerations and I consider whether an update to my argument from structural continuity – see, for example, Votsis (2011a; 2011b) – is necessary.


