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  • Structural Realism
    A Brief Intro


    Three major kinds of structural realism can be identified, each with its own satellite variants:

    (1) Epistemic Structural Realism, or ESR for short, holds that our epistemic access is restricted to structural features of the world.

    The position can be traced back at least to the beginning of the 20th century, namely to the independent work of Henri Poincaré and Bertrand Russell. The latter's structuralist inclinations can be seen as early as The Problems of Philosophy (1912). A fully-fledged account only emerged in The Analysis of Matter (1927). There he argued that there are external causes to our perception, admitting that we should “not expect to find a demonstration that perceptions have external causes” (1927, 198). The twentieth chapter of this book is devoted to a causal theory of perception, rejecting “the view that perception gives direct knowledge of external objects” (1927, 197). We only have direct epistemic access to percepts, i.e. the items of our perception. The only way to attain knowledge of the external world is to draw inferences from our perceptions. To underwrite such inferences Russell employed a number of principles. The most important of these are:

    Helmholtz-Weyl Principle (H-W): Different effects (i.e. percepts) imply different causes (i.e. stimuli/physical objects)) (1927, 255).*

    Mirroring Relations Principle (MR): Relations between percepts mirror (i.e. have the same logico-mathematical properties as) relations between their non-perceptual causes (1927, 252).

    Armed with these assumptions Russell argues that from the structure of our perceptions we can “infer a great deal as to the structure of the physical world, but not as to its intrinsic character” (1927, 400). More precisely, he argues that there is at most an isomorphic relation between the structure of our perceptions and the structure of the physical world.

    The recent interest in structural realism was instigated by the publication of John Worrall’s ‘Structural Realism: The Best of Both Worlds?’ in 1989. The article is inspired by Poincaré's brand of ESR which is more sensitive to the history of science. Worrall associates the search for a lasting solution to the scientific realism debate with the need to take into consideration two warring arguments: the no-miracles argument (NMA) and the pessimistic meta-induction argument (PMI). In short, PMI holds that since predictively successful scientific theories have eventually been discarded, we have inductive evidence that even our current theories, despite being even more successful, will also be discarded one day. NMA holds that realism is the only view that does not make the predictive success of science a miracle. Worrall offers ESR as a weaker (in terms of epistemic commitments) but more justifiable realist position that underwrites both of these arguments, and situates itself midway between constructive empiricism and traditional scientific realism. It underwrites the NMA because it argues that the success of science reflects the fact that we have got the structure of the world right. It underwrites the PMI because it concedes that although there is radical discontinuity in theory change, viz. where non-structural descriptions of the nature of entities are involved, there is also considerable continuity at the structural level.

    Stathis Psillos calls the Russellian approach the ‘upward path’ to structural realism, in contrast to the Poincaréan/Worrallian approach or ‘downward path’ to structural realism. One important difference lies in the way the two views are motivated. The Poincaréan approach takes the preservation of structure through theory change as indicative of its truth/approximate truth. The Russellian approach looks not in history but in perception to provide a reconstruction of our non-perceptual knowledge about the world. Another related difference concerns the way in which structure gets demarcated. Worrall and Elie Zahar (2001) favour the Ramsey sentence approach, while Ioannis Votsis (2003, 2005) rejects it in favour of the notion of abstract structure as it is explicated in Michael Redhead (2001). Of course the disagreement is not merely a question of which formal tools are best equipped for the job of representing the structure of the world but also a question of how to draw the line between the structural and the non-structural.

    (2) Ontic Structural Realism, or OSR for short, holds that our ontology is in some sense primarily structural in nature.

    If this sounds sufficiently ambiguous, it is because there are so many different variants of OSR that it is difficult to formulate a commonly shared view. OSR was proposed by James Ladyman (1998). The view was subsequently developed jointly with Steven French. Together they argue that structural realism should be understood not just as an epistemic but also as an ontic position. The motivation for OSR draws on underdetermination in modern, and particularly in quantum, physics. Although originally promoted as the view that only structures exist, i.e. objects can be no more than heuristic vehicles, the position has mutated into a number of different variants. One such variant, which we can call the ‘no individuals view’, denies the existence of individuals but accepts the existence of objects and structures. If you’re wondering what sort of objects these are, they are those for which the law of identity does not hold (see, for example, Steven French and Decio Krause 2006). Another variant, which we can call the ‘no intrinsic natures view’, holds that there exist no intrinsic natures, only haecceity-free individuals and structures (e.g. Ladyman et al. 2007). These two as well as the other main OSR alternatives are wonderfully sketched out in Ladyman’s Structural Realism entry in the Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy (2007).

    (3) Methodological Structural Realism, or MSR for short, concentrates on the role shared structure plays in characterising scientific theories, in relating high-level theory to low-level data and in identifying links between predecessor and successor theories (see Katherine Brading and Elaine Landry 2006).

    * The name 'Helmholtz-Weyl' is given by Stathis Psillos (2001) because, according to him, it was they "who first enunciated it". Though I kept the name, the principle goes at least as far back as Descartes. Hume advertises in the Treatise that “Like causes still produce like effects” (Book II, Part III, §1). This is the H-W principle in contrapositive form. Similarly, Descartes in the sixth Meditation says: "I safely conclude that there are in the bodies from which the diverse perceptions of the senses proceed, certain varieties corresponding to them, although, perhaps, not in reality like them; and since, among these diverse perceptions of the senses, some are agreeable, and others disagreeable, there can be no doubt that my body, or rather my entire self, in as far as I am composed of body and mind, may be variously affected, both beneficially and hurtfully, by surrounding bodies".

    References:
    Brading, K. and E. Landry (2006) ‘Scientific Structuralism: Presentation and Representation’, Philosophy of Science, vol. 73(5):571-581.

    French, S. and D. Krause (2006) Identity in Physics: A Historical, Philosophical and Formal Analysis, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Frigg, R. and I. Votsis (2011) ‘Everything you Always Wanted to Know about Structural Realism but Were Afraid to Ask’, European Journal for Philosophy of Science, 2011, vol. 1(2): 227–276.

    Ladyman, J. (1998) ‘What is Structural Realism?’, Studies in History and Philosophy of Science, vol. 29: 409-424.

    Ladyman, J. (2007) ‘Structural Realism’, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL =http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/structural-realism/

    Ladyman, J. and D. Ross (with D. Spurrett and J. Collier) (2007) Every Thing Must Go: Metaphysics Naturalised, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Poincaré, H. ([1905]1952) Science and Hypothesis, New York: Dover.

    Psillos, S. (2001) ‘Is Structural Realism Possible?’, Philosophy of Science, vol. 68: S13-24.

    Redhead, M.L.G. (2001) ‘The Intelligibility of the Universe’, in A.O'Hear (ed.) Philosophy at the New Millennium, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    Russell, B. (1912) The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Russell, B. (1927) The Analysis of Matter, London: George Allen & Unwin.

    Votsis, I. (2003) ‘Is Structure not Enough?’, Philosophy of Science, vol. 70(5): 879-890.

    Votsis, I. (2005) ‘The Upward Path to Structural Realism’, Philosophy of Science, vol. 72(5): 1361-1372.

    Worrall, J. (1989) ‘Structural Realism: The Best of Both Worlds?’ in Papineau, D. (ed.) The Philosophy of Science, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996.

    Worrall, J. and E. Zahar (2001) ‘Ramseyfication and Structural Realism’, Appendix IV in E. Zahar, Poincaré's Philosophy: From Conventionalism to Phenomenology, Chicago and La Salle (IL): Open Court.

    Bibliography





    I started compiling this bibliography for the Structuralist project at the Centre for Philosophy of Natural and Social Science when I was still a PhD student at the London School of Economics. The project is defunct since 2004 but I continue to conduct research on Structural Realism so I decided to resuscitate the bibliography with the aim to facilitate further research.  I hope to be able to provide regular updates. If you think there are relevant references that are not included in this bibliography please contact me:

    Ioannis Votsis - ioannis.votsis@nchlondon.ac.uk

    This list was last updated on 29 June 2020
     
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    Ainsworth, P. M. (2009) Newman's objection. The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 60(1), 135-171.

    Ainsworth, P. M. (2010) What is ontic structural realism? Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B: Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics, 41(1), 50-57.

    Ainsworth, P. (2011) Ontic structural realism and the principle of the identity of indiscernibles. Erkenntnis, 75(1), 67-84.

    Ainsworth, P. M. (2012) The third path to structural realism. HOPOS: The Journal of the International Society for the History of Philosophy of Science, 2(2), 307-320.

    Arenhart, J. R. B., & Bueno, O. (2015) Structural realism and the nature of structure. European journal for philosophy of science, 5(1), 111-139.

    Asay, J. (2019) Going local: a defense of methodological localism about scientific realism. Synthese, 196(2), 587-609.

    Bain, J. (1998) Representations of Spacetime: Formalism and Ontological Commitment, unpublished Thesis, University of Pittsburgh.

    Bain, J. (2013) Category-theoretic structure and radical ontic structural realism. Synthese, 190(9), 1621-1635.
     
    Beni, M. D. (2015) Structural realism without metaphysics: Notes on Carnap’s measured pragmatic structural realism. Organon F, 22(3), 302-324.

    Beni, M. D. (2016) Epistemic informational structural realism. Minds and Machines, 26(4), 323-339.

    Beni, M. D. (2016) Structural realist account of the self. Synthese, 193(12), 3727-3740.

    Beni, M. D. (2017) Reconstructing the upward path to structural realism. European journal for philosophy of science, 7(3), 393-409.

    Beni, M. D. (2017) Structural realism, metaphysical unification, and the ontology and epistemology of patterns. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science, 31(3), 285-300.

    Beni, M. D. (2018) Syntactical informational structural realism. Minds and Machines, 28(4), 623-643.

    Beni, M. D. (2018) The downward path to epistemic informational structural realism. Acta Analytica, 33(2), 181-197.

    Berenstain, N., & Ladyman, J. (2012) Ontic structural realism and modality. In Structural Realism (pp. 149-168). Springer, Dordrecht.

    Berghofer, P. (2018) Ontic structural realism and quantum field theory: Are there intrinsic properties at the most fundamental level of reality? Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B: Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics, 62, 176-188.

    Bokulich, A., & Bokulich, P. (Eds.) (2011) Scientific structuralism (Vol. 281). Springer Science & Business Media.

    Bradie, M.P. (1977) ‘The Development of Russell's Structural Postulates’, Philosophy of Science, vol 44: 441-63.
    Abstract

    Bradie, M.P. (1988) ‘Russell's Scientific Realism’, Russell, vol 8:195-208.
    Introduction
     
    Brading, K. and E. Landry (2006) ‘Scientific Structuralism: Presentation and Representation’, Philosophy of Science, vol. 73(5): 571-581.
     
    Brading, K., & Skiles, A. (2012) Underdetermination as a path to structural realism. In Structural Realism (pp. 99-115). Springer, Dordrecht.

    Brading, K., & Crull, E. (2017) Epistemic structural realism and Poincaré’s philosophy of science. HOPOS: The Journal of the International Society for the History of Philosophy of Science, 7(1), 108-129.

    Braithwaite, R.B. (1940) ‘The Philosophy of Physical Science’, Mind, vol. 49, n. 196: 455-66.
    Main Idea
     
    Briceño, S., & Mumford, S. (2016) Relations all the way down? Against ontic structural realism. In A. Marmodoro and D. Yates (Eds.), The Metaphysics of Relations, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Bueno, O. (1997) ‘Empirical Adequacy: A Partial Structures Approach’, Studies in History and Philosophy of Science, vol. 28A(4): 585-610.
     
    Bueno, O. (1999) ‘What is Structural Empiricism? Scientific Change in an Empiricist Setting’, Erkenntnis, vol. 50(1), 59-85.
    Abstract

    Bueno, O. (1999) ‘Partial Reference, Partial Structures and Scientific Change’, paper presented at the University of Hannover Conference 'Incommensurability (and Related Matters)'.
    Abstract

    Bueno, O. (2000) ‘Empiricism, Scientific Change and Mathematical Change’, Studies in History and Philosophy of Science, vol. 31A(2): 269-96.
    Abstract
     
    Bueno, O. (2001) ‘Weyl and von Neumann: Symmetry, Group Theory, and Quantum Mechanics’, draft paper presented in Symmetries in Physics, New Reflections: Oxford Workshop, January 2001.
    Abstract
     
    Bueno, O. (2008) Structural realism, scientific change, and partial structures. Studia Logica, 89(2), 213-235.

    Bueno, O. (2010) Structural empiricism, again. In Scientific structuralism (pp. 81-103). Springer, Dordrecht.

    Bueno, O. (2019) Structural realism, mathematics, and ontology. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A, 74, 4-9.

    Cao, T.Y. (1997) Conceptual Development of 20th Century Field Theories, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
    Book Description
     
    Cao, T.Y. (1999) ‘Structural Realism and the Interpretation of Quantum Field Theory’ (draft for talk given at a Sigma Club meeting at LSE).
    Introduction
     
    Cao, T.Y. (2003a) ‘Structural Realism and the Interpretation of Quantum Field Theory’, Synthese, vol. 136(1): 3-24.
     
    Cao, T.Y. (2003b) ‘Can We Dissolve Physical Entities into Mathematical Structures?’, Synthese, vol. 136(1): 57-71.
     
    Cao, T. Y. (2010) From current algebra to quantum chromodynamics: A case for structural realism. Cambridge University Press.

    Carnap, R. (1929) Der Logisches Aufbau der Welt, Berlin: Schlachtensee Weltkreis-Verlag.
     
    Carnap, R. (1956) ‘The Methodological Character of Theoretical Concepts’, in H. Feigl and M. Scriven (eds.) The Foundations of Science and the Concepts of Psychology and Psychoanalysis, Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, vol. 1, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
     
    Cassirer, E. (1936) Determinism and Indeterminism in Modern Physics, New Haven: Yale University Press.
     
    Cassirer, E. (1944) ‘Group Concept and Perception Theory’, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, vol 5: 1-36.
    Abstract (translated)
     
    Cei, A. (2004) ‘Structural Distinctions: Entities, Structures and Changes in Science’, Philosophy of Science, vol. 72(5):1385–1396.
    Abstract
     
    Cei, A. (2010) Structural Realism as a Form of Humility. In M. Suárez, M. Dorato and M. Rédei (Eds.), EPSA Philosophical Issues in the Sciences. Launch of the European Philosophy of Science Association, vol. 1, Springer.

    Chakravartty, A. (1998) ‘Semirealism’, Studies in History and Philosophy of Science, vol. 29A(3): 391-408.
    Abstract
     
    Chakravarrty, A. (2003) ‘The Structuralist Conception of Objects’, Philosophy of Science, vol. 70(5): 867-878.
     
    Chakravartty, A. (2004) ‘Structuralism as a Form of Scientific Realism’, International Studies in the Philosophy of Science, vol. 18, 151-171.
     
    Chakravartty, A. (2012) Ontological priority: The conceptual basis of non-eliminative, ontic structural realism. In Structural Realism (pp. 187-206). Springer, Dordrecht.

    Chang, H. (2003) ‘Preservative Realism and Its Discontents: Revisiting Caloric’, Philosophy of Science, vol. 70(5): 902-912.
     
    Clement, W.C. (1953) ‘Russell's Structuralist Thesis’, The Philosophical Review, vol 62(2): 266-75.
    Introduction
     
    Cordero, A. (2011) Scientific realism and the divide et impera strategy: The ether saga revisited. Philosophy of Science, 78(5), 1120-1130.
    Cruse, P. (2005) ‘Ramsey Sentences, Structural Realism and Trivial Realization’, Studies in the History and Philosophy of Science, vol. 36A(3): 557-576.
     
    Demopoulos, W. and M. Friedman (1985) ‘Critical Notice: Bertrand Russell's The Analysis of Matter: Its historical context and contemporary interest’, Philosophy of Science, vol. 52: 621-39.
    Summary
     
    DiSalle, R. (2006) ‘Mathematical Structure, “World-Structure,” and the Philosophical Turning-Point in Modern Physics’, in Interactions: Mathematics, Physics and Philosophy, 1860-1930 (Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science), V. Hendricks et al. (eds.) Dordrecht: Kluwer.
     
    Domski, M. (preprint) ‘The Epistemological Foundations of Structural Realism: Poincaré and the Structure of Relations’, paper given to the Research Workshop of the Division of History and Philosophy of Science, University of Leeds.
    Introduction
     
    Doppelt, G. D. (2011) From standard scientific realism and structural realism to best current theory realism. Journal for general philosophy of science, 42(2), 295-316.

    Doppelt, G. (2013) Explaining the success of science: Kuhn and scientific realists. Topoi, 32(1), 43-51.

    Doppelt, G. (2014) Best theory scientific realism. European journal for philosophy of science, 4(2), 271-291.

    Dorato, M. (1999) ‘Cao on Substantivalism and the Development of 20th Century Field Theories’, Epistemologia, vol. 22: 151-66.
    Abstract (translated)
     
    Dorato, M. (2000) ‘Substantivalism, Relationism and Structural Spacetime Realism’, Foundations of Physics, vol. 30(10): 1605-28.
    Abstract
     
    Dorato, M. (2008) Is structural spacetime realism relationism in disguise? The supererogatory nature of the substantivalism/relationism debate. Philosophy and Foundations of Physics, 4, 17-37.

    Dorr, C. (2010) Review of James Ladyman and Don Ross, every thing must go: Metaphysics naturalized. Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews, https://ndpr.nd.edu/news/every-thing-must-go-metaphysics-naturalized/

    Duhem, P. ([1914] 1991) The Aim and Structure of Physical Theory, Princeton (NJ): Princeton University Press.
     
    Eddington, A.S. (1939) The Philosophy of Physical Science, Cambridge University Press.
    Preface
     
    Eddington, A.S. (1941) ‘Group Structure in Physical Science’, Mind, vol. 50, n. 99: 268-79.
    Main Idea
     
    English, J. (1973) ‘Underdetermination: Craig and Ramsey’, Journal of Philosophy, vol. 70: 453-62.
    Main Idea
     
    Engler, F.O. (2002) ‘Structure and Heuristic: In Praise of Structural Realism in the Case of Niels Bohr’, Vienna Circle Institute Yearbook, vol. 10: 297-309.
     
    Esfeld, M. (2009) The modal nature of structures in ontic structural realism. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science, 23(2), 179-194.

    Esfeld, M. (2012) Causal realism. In Probabilities, laws, and structures (pp. 157-168). Springer, Dordrecht.

    Esfeld, M. (2013) Ontic structural realism and the interpretation of quantum mechanics. European journal for philosophy of science, 3(1), 19-32.

    Esfeld, M. (2015) Review The Structure of the World: Metaphysics and Representation, Mind, 124(493): 334-338.

    Esfeld, M. (2017) How to account for quantum non-locality: ontic structural realism and the primitive ontology of quantum physics. Synthese, 194(7), 2329-2344.

    Esfeld, M., & Lam, V. (2008) Moderate structural realism about space-time. Synthese, 160(1), 27-46.

    Esfeld, M., & Lam, V. (2010) Holism and structural realism. In Worldviews, Science And Us: Studies Of Analytical Metaphysics: A Selection of Topics from a Methodological Perspective (pp. 10-31). London: World Scientific.

    Esfeld, M., & Lam, V. (2010) Ontic structural realism as a metaphysics of objects. In Scientific structuralism (pp. 143-159). Springer, Dordrecht.

    Esfeld, M., Lazarovici, D., Lam, V., & Hubert, M. (2017) The physics and metaphysics of primitive stuff. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 68(1), 133-161.

    Floridi, L. (2008) ‘A Defence of Informational Structural Realism’, Synthese, vol. 161(2): 219-253.
    Abstract
     
    Floridi, L. (2009) ‘Against Digital Ontology’, Synthese, 168(1): 151-178.
    Abstract
     
    Fraser, J. D. (2018) Renormalization and the formulation of scientific realism. Philosophy of Science, 85(5), 1164-1175.

    French, S. (1998) ‘On the Withering Away of Physical Objects’, in E. Castellani (ed.), Interpreting Bodies: Classical and Quantum Objects in Modern Physics, Princeton University Press, pp. 93-113.
    Introduction
     
    French, S. (1999) ‘Models and Mathematics in Physics: The role of group theory’, in J. Butterfield and C. Pagonis (eds.), From Physics to Philosophy, Cambridge University Press, pp. 187-207.
    Introduction
     
    French, S. (2000) ‘The Reasonable Effectiveness of Mathematics: Partial structures and the Application of Group Theory to Physics’, Synthese, vol. 125(1-2): 103-20.
    Abstract
     
    French, S. (2001) ‘Getting Out of a Hole: Identity, Individuality and Structuralism in Space-Time Physics’, Philosophica (Belgium), vol. 67(1): 11-29.
     
    French, S. (2001) ‘Symmetry, Structure and the Constitution of Objects’, draft.
    http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/archive/00000327/00/Symmetry&Objects_doc.pdf
    Abstract
     
    French, S. (2003) ‘Scribbling on the Blank Sheet: Eddington’s Structuralist
    Conception of Objects’, Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics, vol. 34(2): 227-259.
     
    French, S. (2006) ‘Structure as a Weapon of the Realist’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society,vol. 106, pp. 167-185.
     
    French, S. (2010) The interdependence of structure, objects and dependence. Synthese, 175(1), 89-109.

    French, S. (2011) Shifting to structures in physics and biology: A prophylactic for promiscuous realism. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C: Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences, 42(2), 164-173.

    French, S. (2012) The presentation of objects and the representation of structure. In Structural Realism (pp. 3-28). Springer, Dordrecht.

    French, S. (2012) The Resilience of Laws and the Ephemerality of Objects: Can a Form of Structuralism be Extended to Biology? In Probabilities, laws, and structures (pp. 187-199). Springer, Dordrecht.

    French, S. (2012) Unitary inequivalence as a problem for structural realism. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B: Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics, 43(2), 121-136.

    French, S. (2013) Eschewing entities: outlining a biology based form of structural realism. In EPSA11 perspectives and foundational problems in philosophy of science (pp. 371-381). Springer, Cham.

    French, S. (2013) Semi-realism, sociability and structure. Erkenntnis, 78(1), 1-18.

    French, S. (2014) The Structure of the World: Metaphysics and Representation, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    French, S. (2017) (Structural) realism and its representational vehicles. Synthese, 194(9), 3311-3326.

    French, S. and H. Kamminga (1993) Correspondence, Invariance and Heuristics: Essays in Honour of Heinz Post, Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science, vol. 148, Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Press.
     
    French, S. and J. Ladyman (2003a) ‘Remodelling Structural Realism: Quantum
    Physics and the Metaphysics of Structure’, Synthese, vol. 136(1): 31-56.
    Abstract
     
    French, S. and J. Ladyman (2003b) ‘The Dissolution of Objects: Between Platonism
    and Phenomenalism’, Synthese, vol. 136(1): 73-77.
     
    French, S. and J. Saatsi (2006) ‘Realism about Structure: The Semantic View and Non-linguistic Representations’, Philosophy of Science, vol. 73(5): xx-xx.
     
    French, S. and D. Rickles (2006) ‘Quantum Gravity Meets Structuralism: Interweaving Relations in the Foundations of Physics’, in D. Rickles, S. French, and J. Saatsi (eds.), The Structural Foundations of Quantum Gravity, Oxford: Clarendon Press.
     
    French, S., & Ladyman, J. (2010) In defence of ontic structural realism. In Scientific structuralism (pp. 25-42). Springer, Dordrecht.

    Gandy, R. (1973) ‘ “Structure” in Mathematics’ in D. Robey (ed.), Structuralism: An Introduction, Oxford: Clarendon Press, pp. 138-53.
    Introduction
     
    Frigg, R., & Votsis, I. (2011) Everything you always wanted to know about structural realism but were afraid to ask. European journal for philosophy of science, 1(2), 227-276.

    Giedymin, J. (1982) Science and Convention: Essays on Henri Poincarés Philosophy of Science and the Conventionalist Tradition, Oxford: Pergamon.
     
    Gironi, F. (2014) Naturalizing Badiou: Mathematical Ontology and Structural Realism. Springer.

    Glick, D. (2016) The ontology of quantum field theory: Structural realism vindicated? Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A, 59, 78-86.

    Glick, D. (2020) Generalism and the Metaphysics of Ontic Structural Realism. The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 71(2), 751-772.

    Gower, B.S. (2000) ‘Cassirer, Schlick and “Structural” Realism: The philosophy of the exact sciences in the background to early logical empiricism’, British Journal for the History of Philosophy, vol. 8(1): 71-106.
    Introduction
     
    Hanson, N.R. (1955) ‘Causal Chains’, Mind, vol. 64: 289-311.
    Abstract
     
    Heis, J. (2014) Realism, functions, and the a priori: Ernst Cassirer's philosophy of science. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A, 48, 10-19.

    Hoyningen-Huene, P. (2013) The ultimate argument against convergent realism and structural realism: the impasse objection. In EPSA11 perspectives and foundational problems in philosophy of science (pp. 131-139). Springer, Cham.

    Hoyningen-Huene, P. (2018) Are there good arguments against scientific realism? In Philosophy of science (pp. 3-22). Springer, Cham.

    Isaac, A. M. (2014) Structural realism for secondary qualities. Erkenntnis, 79(3), 481-510.

    Ivanova, M. (2011) Friedman’s relativised a priori and structural realism: In search of compatibility. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science, 25(1), 23-37.

    Ivanova, M. (2013) Did Perrin’s Experiments Convert Poincaré to Scientific Realism? HOPOS: The Journal of the International Society for the History of Philosophy of Science, 3(1), 1-19.

    Ivanova, M. (2015) Conventionalism, structuralism and neo-Kantianism in Poincaré׳ s philosophy of science. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B: Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics, 52, 114-122.

    Kantorovich, A. (2009) Ontic structuralism and the symmetries of particle physics. Journal for general philosophy of science, 40(1), 73-84.

    Ketland, J. (2004) ‘Empirical Adequacy and Ramsification’, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, vol. 55(2): 287-300.
     
    Kincaid, H. (2008) Structural realism and the social sciences. Philosophy of Science, 75(5), 720-731.

    Kitcher, P. (2001) ‘Real Realism: The Galilean Strategy’, Philosophical Review, vol. 110(2): 151-197.
     
    Ladyman, J. (1998a) ‘What is Structural Realism?’, Studies in History and Philosophy of Science, vol. 29: 409-24.
    Abstract
     
    Ladyman, J. (1998b) Structural Realism and the Model-Theoretic Approach to Physical Theories, PhD Dissertation, University of Leeds.
    Abstract
     
    Ladyman, J. (2001) ‘Science, Metaphysics and Structural Realism’, Philosophica (Belgium), vol. 67(1): 57-76.
     
    Ladyman, J. (2008) Structural realism and the relationship between the special sciences and physics. Philosophy of Science, 75(5), 744-755.

    Ladyman, J. (2011) Structural realism versus standard scientific realism: the case of phlogiston and dephlogisticated air. Synthese, 180(2), 87-101.

    Ladyman, J. (2014) ‘Structural Realism’, Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, Edward N. Zalta (ed.),
    http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/structural-realism/

    Ladyman, J. (2018) Scientific realism again. Spontaneous Generations: A Journal for the History and Philosophy of Science, 9(1), 99-107.

    Ladyman, J. (2019) Introduction: Structuralists of the world unite, Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A, Volume 74, April 2019, Pages 1-3.

    Ladyman, J. et al. (2007) Every Thing Must Go Metaphysics Naturalized, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Ladyman, J., & Bigaj, T. (2010) The principle of the identity of indiscernibles and quantum mechanics. Philosophy of Science, 77(1), 117-136.

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    Abstract
     
    Maxwell, G. (1968) ‘Scientific Methodology and the Causal Theory of Perception’, in I. Lakatos and A Musgrave (eds.) Problems in the Philosophy of Science, Amsterdam: North-Holland Publishing Company.
    Main Idea
     
    Maxwell, G. (1969) ‘Knowledge, Mind, and Nature: An introduction to theory of knowledge and the philosophy of mind’, The Philosophical Review, vol 78, no 3: 329-97.
    Main Idea
     
    Maxwell, G. (1970a) ‘Structural Realism and the Meaning of Theoretical Terms’, in S. Winokur and M. Radner (eds.) Analyses of Theories, and Methods of Physics and Psychology, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, pp. 181-92.
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    Maxwell, G. (1970b) ‘Theories, Perception and Structural Realism’ in R. Colodny (ed.) Nature and Function of Scientific Theories, Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, pp. 3-34.
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    Meyer, M. (2018) Nietzsche’s Ontic Structural Realism? In P. Katsafanas (Ed.), The Nietzschean Mind, London: Routledge.

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    Redhead, M.L.G. (1990) ‘Is the End of Physics in Sight?’, in French, S. and Kamminga, H. (eds.) Correspondence, Invariance and Heuristics: In honor of Heinz Post, Dordrecht and Boston: Kluwer Academic Press, 1993.
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    Abstract (translated)
     
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