ioannisvotsis

Structural Realism bibliography

I started compiling this bibliography for the Structuralist project at the Centre for Philosophy of Natural and Social Science when I was still a PhD student at the London School of Economics. The project is defunct since 2004 but I continue to conduct research on Structural Realism so I decided to resuscitate the bibliography with the aim to facilitate further research.  I hope to be able to provide regular updates. If you think there are relevant references that are not included in this bibliography please contact me:

Ioannis Votsis - votsis@phil-fak.uni-duesseldorf.de

This list was last updated on 19 April 2008
 
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Bain, J. (1998) Representations of Spacetime: Formalism and Ontological Commitment, unpublished Thesis, University of Pittsburgh.
 
Bradie, M.P. (1977) ‘The Development of Russell's Structural Postulates’, Philosophy of Science, vol 44: 441-63.
Abstract
From 1914 Russell's epistemology was dominated by the attempt to show how we come by our knowledge of the external world. As he gradually became aware of the inadequacies of the 'pure empiricist' approach, Russell realised that his program was viable only insofar as certain postulates of inference were allowed. In this paper I trace the development of the structural postulates from Analysis of Matter to Human Knowledge. The basic continuity of Russell's thought is established. Certain confusions implicit in the various formulations of the postulates are brought to light. Finally, it is argued that the viability of Russell's program rests on a larger number of independent postulates than he thought were needed. Some implications of Russell's work for current work in the philosophy of science are briefly sketched. (p.441)
Bradie, M.P. (1988) ‘Russell's Scientific Realism’, Russell, vol 8:195-208.
Introduction
   The entry on 'realism' in Baldwin's Dictionary notes that the term has two significant but distinct meanings in philosophy. In the older sense, it is a 'logical-metaphysical' theory about the nature of universals and their relation to particulars. In the more modern sense, it is an 'epistemological-metaphysical' theory which holds that 'reality exists apart from its presentation to, or conception by, consciousness'. Russell was a realist in both senses. In this paper, I focus, for the most part, on the development of Russell's realism in the second sense from 1910 to 1915.
   After abandoning idealism in 1901, Russell became, and professed to remain, a realist. But a consistent picture of what he took realism to entail is not easy to come by. Part of the problem is that Russell used the term 'realism' in several different senses throughout the period of interest. In Our Knowledge of the External World, we can discern at least four distinct notions of 'real'. In the following, I examine what Russell has to say about the concept of reality and its correlate 'existence', especially with regard to the question of determining the respective ontological status of sense-data and physical objects. It is sometimes suggested that Russell abandoned realism, at least with respect to physical objects, during his constructivist phase. I think this is a mistake based on a failure to appreciate the multidimensionality of Russell's view of 'realism'. I do not, however, pretend that what I have to say here is the final word. It is, at best, a good beginning.
   I shall proceed by examining, in order of publication, five key works by Russell during the period: 'Knowledge by Acquaintance and Knowledge by Description', The Problems of Philosophy, Our Knowledge of the External World, 'The Relation of Sense-Data to Physics', and 'The Ultimate Constituents of Matter'. The primary object is to try to tease out Russell's position vis-à-vis scientific realism, which I here take to be, minimally, the view that theoretical entities of well-confirmed theories exist and are real. (p195)  
Brading, K. and E. Landry (2006) ‘Scientific Structuralism: Presentation and Representation’, Philosophy of Science, vol. 73(5): xx-xx.
 
Braithwaite, R.B. (1940) ‘The Philosophy of Physical Science’, Mind, vol. 49, n. 196: 455-66.
Main Idea
This is a review of Arthur Eddington's book The Philosophy of Physical Science. Among other things, Braithwaite appeals to Newman (1928), claiming that Newman's criticism applies equally well to Eddington's notion of group structure.  
Bueno, O. (1997) ‘Empirical Adequacy: A Partial Structures Approach’, Studies in History and Philosophy of Science, vol. 28A(4): 585-610.
 
Bueno, O. (1999) ‘What is Structural Empiricism? Scientific Change in an Empiricist Setting’, Erkenntnis, vol. 50(1), 59-85.
Abstract
In this paper a constructive empiricist account of scientific change is put forward. Based on da Costa's and French's partial structures approach, two notions of empirical adequacy are initially advanced (with particular emphasis on the introduction of degrees of empirical adequacy). Using these notions, it is shown how both the informativeness and the empirical adequacy requirements of an empiricist theory of scientific change can then be met. Finally, some philosophical consequences with regard to the role of structures in this context are drawn.
Bueno, O. (1999) ‘Partial Reference, Partial Structures and Scientific Change’, paper presented at the University of Hannover Conference 'Incommensurability (and Related Matters)'.
Abstract
   As is well known, scientific change has two important dimensions: conceptual change and structural change. The formulation of a new theory involves the introduction of new concepts to explain empirical phenomena, and this process often leads to substantial reformulations in the old theory's conceptual framework. As a result, the structures (in particular, the models) used in the formulation of the old theory are replaced by new ones. In this way, conceptual change and structural change go hand to hand. Since the work of Kuhn [1962], this phenomenon became a crucial factor in the agenda of any reasonable account of scientific change.
   As is also well known, two types of realism have been put forward to explain scientific change. According to scientific realism, scientific change is accommodated in terms of the search for approximately true theories. And although the scientific realist acknowledges that there might be some sort of loss when the scientific community shifts from one theory to another, well-established parts of the old framework - in particular, certain kinds of entities introduced in explanations - are typically preserved (Popper [1963] and Boyd [1990]). From a structural realist point of view, what remains stable over scientific change is not an ontology of entities, but the relevant relations defined over them - in other words, the structure. It is structure that the realist should be realist about (Worrall [1989], Ladyman [1998] and French [1999]).
   In this paper, I shall argue, firstly, that these two versions of realism are undermined by the inadequacy of accommodating the two dimensions of scientific change. The existence of conceptual change brings serious difficulties for scientific realism, and the existence of structural change makes structural realism looks quite implausible.
   Secondly, using a framework developed by da Costa and French [1989] and [1990], in terms of partial structures and quasi-truth, I shall provide an alternative account of scientific change which is able to handle both conceptual and structural changes. The account provided is anti-realist, and it is compatible with van Fraassen's constructive empiricism (van Fraassen [1980] and [1989]).
Bueno, O. (2000) ‘Empiricism, Scientific Change and Mathematical Change’, Studies in History and Philosophy of Science, vol. 31A(2): 269-96.
Abstract
The aim of this paper is to provide a unified account of scientific and mathematical change in a thoroughly empiricist setting. After providing a formal modelling in terms of embedding, and criticising it for being too restrictive, a second modelling is advanced. It generalises the first, providing a more open-ended pattern of theory development, and is articulated in terms of da Costa and French's partial structures approach. The crucial component of scientific and mathematical change is spelled out in terms of partial embeddings. Finally, an application of this second pattern is made, with the examination of the early formulation of set theory (in particular, the works of Cantor, Zermelo and Skolem).  
Bueno, O. (2001) ‘Weyl and von Neumann: Symmetry, Group Theory, and Quantum Mechanics’, draft paper presented in Symmetries in Physics, New Reflections: Oxford Workshop, January 2001.
Abstract
In this paper, I shall discuss the heuristic role of symmetry in the mathematical formulation of quantum mechanics. I shall first set out the scene in terms of Bas van Fraassen's elegant presentation of how symmetry principles can be used as problem-solving devices (see van Fraassen [1989] and [1991]). I will then examine in what ways Hermann Weyl and John von Neumann have used symmetry principles in their work as a crucial problem-solving tool. Finally, I shall explore one consequence of this situation to recent debates about structural realism and empiricism in physics (Worrall [1989], Ladyman [1998], and French [1999]).  
Cao, T.Y. (1997) Conceptual Development of 20th Century Field Theories, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Book Description
The purpose of this book is to give a broad synthesis of 20th century field theories, from the general theory of relativity to quantum, field theory and gauge theory. These theories are treated primarily as conceptual schemes, in terms of which our conceptions and integrated picture of the physical world are formed. The aim is to give a cogent historico-critical expostion of the conceptual foundations of the theories to reveal a pattern and direction to the evolution of these conceptions.  
Cao, T.Y. (1999) ‘Structural Realism and the Interpretation of Quantum Field Theory’ (draft for talk given at a Sigma Club meeting at LSE).
Introduction
In order to address Kuhn's claim, or more generally in order to develop a realist conception of science and a continuous conception of history of science, a mere appealing to formal logic or empiricism is not of great help. According to Rudolf Carnap, formal logic is unable to address what he calls the external questions that are related with radical changes of conceptual framework or scientific revolutions. And it is [a] truism that empiricism has no theoretical resource to deal with the underdetermination thesis, which challenges the status of empirical evidence as a bridge connecting theoretical entities and physical reality. Taking the history of 20th century physics as an example, then what was required, it seemed to me, was a conceptual analysis of its theoretical structure and of the evolution of this structure, which aimed at a clarification of what the basic ontology is for the discipline and its replacement. Then with a structural understanding of ontology and a realist understanding of structural knowledge, namely that they are true and retained across theory changes, we would be able to, first, make a realist claim that we could have objective knowledge of even the non-observable ontology; and second, understand the radical changes of ontology in the development of science, in terms of accumulation and reconfiguration of recognisable, cumulative and modifiable structural descriptions of ontology; and third, understand scientific revolutions in terms of ontological synthesis on the basis of a Hegelian concept aufhebung (sublation). (pp.1-2).  
Cao, T.Y. (2003a) ‘Structural Realism and the Interpretation of Quantum Field Theory’, Synthese, vol. 136(1): 3-24.
 
Cao, T.Y. (2003b) ‘Can We Dissolve Physical Entities into Mathematical Structures?’, Synthese, vol. 136(1): 57-71.
 
Carnap, R. (1929) Der Logisches Aufbau der Welt, Berlin: Schlachtensee Weltkreis-Verlag.
 
Carnap, R. (1956) ‘The Methodological Character of Theoretical Concepts’, in H. Feigl and M. Scriven (eds.) The Foundations of Science and the Concepts of Psychology and Psychoanalysis, Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, vol. 1, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
 
Cassirer, E. (1936) Determinism and Indeterminism in Modern Physics, New Haven: Yale University Press.
 
Cassirer, E. (1944) ‘Group Concept and Perception Theory’, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, vol 5: 1-36.
Abstract (translated)
This essay offers an analysis of the concept of objectivity as a function of the concept of invariability with relation to a special group of transformations in order to reveal the existent analogies between the phenomena of visible constancy and the 'geometrical' properties as they are defined in group theory. According to the principles of group theory, only those properties can be considered as geometrically real which remain invariant under the type of transformation that is specified by the group which supports the corresponding geometrical system. In this way, the various cones which are conceptually distinct with respect to the group defined by Euclidean geometry are conceptually identical within a system whose defining group contains afine or projective transformations. This task of 'objectivation' by dint of the selection of certain rules of transformation appears, though in rudimentary form, even in the domain of 'pure' perception. Modern psychological investigations have established the inadequacy of the traditional sensualist conception of perception, according to which perception is a process akin to either photographic reproduction or a reflection of 'given' atomic stimuli. This proves experimentally that, in Kantian jargon, the possible experience (perception) plays a constitutive role in the real experience (perception). Provided that the lighting of our special perspective keeps changing, it would not be possible later on to perceive the 'real' colour and size of an object without getting to a selection of properties relatively invariant. As demonstrated by the Gestaltpsychologie (psychology of shape), we perceive 'forms' (melodies, for instance) that enjoy a certain independence from the 'materials' (in the case of a melody this would be the notes, as far as your absolute positions are concerned) in which they are incorporated at this transitory moment of being perceived. This perception of invariables cannot be explained in terms of dubious hypotheses such as the one of radical memory or 'unconscious inference' (Helmholtz), but they have to be admitted as an innate function of 'objectivation').  
Cei, A. (2004) ‘Structural Distinctions: Entities, Structures and Changes in Science’, Philosophy of Science, vol. 72(5):1385–1396.
Abstract
I argue that the pessimistic meta-induction (PMI) seems to point an ontological priority of the relations over the objects of the scientific theories of the kind suggested by French and Ladyman (2003). My strategy will involve a critical examination of epistemic structural realism (ESR) and an historical case-study: the prediction of Zeeman's effect in Lorentz's theory of the electron.  
Chakravartty, A. (1998) ‘Semirealism’, Studies in History and Philosophy of Science, vol. 29A(3): 391-408.
Abstract
Entity realism and structural realism are thought to represent incompatible variations on traditional scientific realism. Entity realists appear to sanction belief in the existence of entities, but not the truth of structural claims; structural realists make the opposite commitment. This paper focuses on properties we detect, in virtue of which we infer the existence of entities. Mathematical relations taken to define theoretical structures are, in fact, relations between detectable properties. This points to a surprising result: entity and structural realism, properly construed, entail precisely the same conclusions regarding the existence and causal behaviours of entities, and knowledge of their properties. The positions, thus, entail one another; they are one and the same position: semirealism.  
Chakravarrty, A. (2003) ‘The Structuralist Conception of Objects’, Philosophy of Science, vol. 70(5): 867-878.
 
Chakravartty, A. (2004) ‘Structuralism as a Form of Scientific Realism’, International Studies in the Philosophy of Science, vol. 18, 151-171.
 
Chang, H. (2003) ‘Preservative Realism and Its Discontents: Revisiting Caloric’, Philosophy of Science, vol. 70(5): 902-912.
 
Clement, W.C. (1953) ‘Russell's Structuralist Thesis’, The Philosophical Review, vol 62(2): 266-75.
Introduction
In this paper I shall examine the arguments which Russell has used in support of the structuralist thesis in his recent book Human Knowledge. The conclusion I reach is that Russell's arguments do not establish his thesis, and that considerations which he himself raises make it likely that his thesis is, in fact, false. (p 266)  
Cruse, P. (2005) ‘Ramsey Sentences, Structural Realism and Trivial Realization’, Studies in the History and Philosophy of Science, vol. 36A(3): 557-576.
 
Demopoulos, W. and M. Friedman (1985) ‘Critical Notice: Bertrand Russell's The Analysis of Matter: Its historical context and contemporary interest’, Philosophy of Science, vol. 52: 621-39.
Summary
Demopoulos and Friedman consider Russell's structural realism as it was developed in The Analysis of Matter. They agree with Grover Maxwell that Russell's position anticipates in several ways the Ramsey-sentence approach to theories. Furthermore they argue that there are insurmountable difficulties to this position that were first raised by MHA Newman in 1928. In particular, they argue that if a theory is consistent and all its observational consequences true, then the truth of its Ramsey-sentence follows as a theorem of set theory or second-order logic. This presumably makes Russell's structural realism collapse into phenomenalism. To this they add that there are striking similarities between Newman's point and Putnam's model-theoretic argument aimed against realist accounts of reference and truth. They also point out that there are analogous difficulties with Carnap's Aufbau and, given a certain reading, Wittgenstein's Tractatus.  
DiSalle, R. (2006) ‘Mathematical Structure, “World-Structure,” and the Philosophical Turning-Point in Modern Physics’, in Interactions: Mathematics, Physics and Philosophy, 1860-1930 (Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science), V. Hendricks et al. (eds.) Dordrecht: Kluwer.
 
Domski, M. (preprint) ‘The Epistemological Foundations of Structural Realism: Poincaré and the Structure of Relations’, paper given to the Research Workshop of the Division of History and Philosophy of Science, University of Leeds.
Introduction
   However, even with the influence of Worrall's piece, there still remains a pressing and crucial question: 'what exactly is structural realism?'. As James Ladyman rightfully pointed out in 1998, it is unclear from Worrall's presentation whether 'structural realism' is a metaphysical or an epistemological position. That is, is the structural realist claiming that our scientific theories only provide knowledge of 'structure' because that is all that exists in the world, or is it because that is all we are capable of knowing given our own epistemological constraints (whatever they may be). There are also other issues that Worrall fails to adequately explain - such as how 'truth' or 'approximate truth' comes to be associated with a theory's mathematical structure, and also, how the mathematical form of a theory relates to the content of a theory.
   What I wish to focus on are precisely these issues that Worrall does not fully explore, and in particular, I will turn to Poincaré's arguments concerning objective knowledge and the form and content of a theory. My initial hope when I began this project was to gain a better understanding of how structural realism could be further developed as an epistemic claim. For although there is some ambiguity in Worrall's presentation regarding metaphysics and epistemology, there is little doubt that Poincaré's interests fall on the epistemological side of the divide. And by appropriating Poincaré's broader epistemology, I believe that a criticism launched against structural realism by Stathis Psillos (1995) in regard to the distinction between a theory's form and content can be evaded. However, in the end, I hope to show that the response offered to Psillos on the grounds of Poincaré's philosophy is not one a structural realist could accept, because I don't believe that Poincaré is a structural realist or any type of realist, for that matter. Even with the arguments aligning Poincaré with structural realism (as offered by Worrall, Zahar, and Gower), strikingly absent from Poincaré's epistemology is the claim that our scientific theories aim at truth rather than mere empirical adequacy - a claim that both Gower and Papineau require for any realist position. What I will emphasise below, is that for Poincaré, theories aim neither at truth nor at 'mere empirical adequacy'; rather, there is a much more complicated process of idealisation, experiment, and the choice of conventions that is involved in the development of our scientific theories. I believe his position may be better characterised as a form of 'structural empiricism' or even a 'structural neo-Kantianism'. (pp. 1-2)  
Dorato, M. (1999) ‘Cao on Substantivalism and the Development of 20th Century Field Theories’, Epistemologia, vol. 22: 151-66.
Abstract (translated)
These philosophical and historiographical options are here critically discussed by comparing them with the outcomes of the debate between relationalists and substantivalists on the nature of space-time, within the so-called 'geometric program'. If, on the one hand, the distinction traced by Cao between structural realism and entity realism does not seem sufficiently founded, on the other hand, his also accurate reconstruction of the philosophical positions historically assumed by Einstein regarding this problem presents some interpretative inconsistencies.  
Dorato, M. (2000) ‘Substantivalism, Relationism and Structural Spacetime Realism’, Foundations of Physics, vol. 30(10): 1605-28.
Abstract
Debates about the ontological implications of the general theory of relativity have long oscillated between spacetime substantialism and relationism. I evaluate such debates by claiming that we need a third option, which I refer to as 'structural spacetime realism.' Such a tertium quid sides with the relationists in defending the relational nature of the spacetime structure, but joins the substantivalists in arguing that spacetime exists, at least in part, independently of particular physical objects and events, the degree of 'independence' being given by the extent to which geometrical laws exist 'over and above' physical events exemplifying them. By showing that structural spacetime realism is the natural outcome of a semantic, model-theoretic approach to the nature of scientific theories. I conclude by arguing that the notion of partial isomorphic representation is the most plausible candidate to connect spacetime models with reality.  
Duhem, P. ([1914] 1991) The Aim and Structure of Physical Theory, Princeton (NJ): Princeton University Press.
 
Eddington, A.S. (1939) The Philosophy of Physical Science, Cambridge University Press.
Preface
Neither the scientific advances of the last decade nor the years of reflection have altered the general trend of my philosophy. I say 'my philosophy', not as claiming authorship of ideas which are widely diffused in modern thought, but because the ultimate selection and synthesis must be a personal responsibility. If it were necessary to give a short name to this philosophy, I should hesitate between 'selective subjectivism' and 'structuralism'. The former name refers to the aspect most prominent in the first eight chapters; the latter refers to a more mathematical conception which dominates the rest of the book. Both can now be carried out much farther than in The Nature of the Physical World. The domain of subjectivity has been extended as a consequence of our better understanding of quantum mechanics; and the conception of structure has been made more precise by the connection now recognised between the foundations of physics and the mathematical theory of groups. (pp. viii-ix)  
Eddington, A.S. (1941) ‘Group Structure in Physical Science’, Mind, vol. 50, n. 99: 268-79.
Main Idea
This is Eddington's reply to Braithwaite's review of his book. Eddington argues, among other things, that Newman's problem does not apply to his own notion of group-structure.  
English, J. (1973) ‘Underdetermination: Craig and Ramsey’, Journal of Philosophy, vol. 70: 453-62.
Main Idea
English proves that two or more Ramsey-sentences with the same observational consequences (i.e. that are empirically equivalent) cannot be inconsistent as Quine had argued.  
Engler, F.O. (2002) ‘Structure and Heuristic: In Praise of Structural Realism in the Case of Niels Bohr’, Vienna Circle Institute Yearbook, vol. 10: 297-309.
 
Esfeld, M. and V. Lam (forthcoming) ‘Moderate Structural Realism about Space-Time’, Synthese.
Prepublication: http://springerlink.metapress.com/content/1573-0964.
 
Floridi, L. (2008) ‘A Defence of Informational Structural Realism’, Synthese, vol. 161(2): 219-253.
Abstract
This is the revised version of an invited keynote lecture delivered at the 1st Australian Computing and Philosophy Conference (CAP@AU; the Australian National University in Canberra, 31 October – 2 November, 2003). The paper is divided into two parts. The first part defends an informational approach to structural realism. It does so in three steps. First, it is shown that, within the debate about structural realism (SR), epistemic (ESR) and ontic (OSR) structural realism are reconcilable. It follows that a version of OSR is defensible from a structuralist-friendly position. Second, it is argued that a version of OSR is also plausible, because not all relata (structured entities) are logically prior to relations (structures). Third, it is shown that a version of OSR is also applicable to both sub-observable (unobservable and instrumentally-only observable) and observable entities, by developing its ontology of structural objects in terms of informational objects. The outcome is informational structural realism, a version of OSR supporting the ontological commitment to a view of the world as the totality of informational objects dynamically interacting with each other. The paper has been discussed by several colleagues and, in the second half, ten objections that have been moved to the proposal are answered in order to clarify it further.  
Floridi, L. (forthcoming) ‘Against Digital Ontology’, Synthese.
Abstract
The paper argues that digital ontology (the ultimate nature of reality is digital, and the universe is a computational system equivalent to a Turing Machine) should be carefully distinguished from informational ontology (the ultimate nature of reality is structural), in order to abandon the former and retain only the latter as a promising line of research. Digital vs. analogue is a Boolean dichotomy typical of our computational paradigm, but digital and analogue are only “modes of presentation” of Being (to paraphrase Kant), that is, ways in which reality is experienced and/or conceptualised by an epistemic agent at a given level of abstraction. A preferable alternative is provided by an informational approach to structural realism, according to which knowledge of the world is knowledge of its structures. The most reasonable ontological commitment turns out to be in favour of an interpretation of reality as the totality of structures dynamically interacting with each other. The paper is the first part (the pars destruens) of a two-part piece of research. The pars construens, entitled “A Defence of Informational Structural Realism”, is forthcoming in Synthese.  
French, S. (1998) ‘On the Withering Away of Physical Objects’, in E. Castellani (ed.), Interpreting Bodies: Classical and Quantum Objects in Modern Physics, Princeton University Press, pp. 93-113.
Introduction
   In his 1988 presidential address to the Philosophy of Science Association, Arthur Fine urged the assembled cohorts to 'actively engage philosophy with ongoing science' and reminded us of the 'potential in science itself for addressing virtually all sorts of interpretative questions and issues that philosophy traditionally pursues'.
   Someone who has taken this latter naturalistic claim very seriously is Dudley Shapere, who has argued that science can in fact resolve traditional philosophical questions concerning, for example, identity and existence. At the same 1988 meeting, he suggested that 'by being internalised into the scientific process, even such concepts as explanation and existence can be subject to alteration in the light of what we learn'.
   I want to point out a problem for this program of 'reading metaphysics off current physics', to put it crudely, which arises from what might be called the 'underdetermination' of metaphysics by physics. The piece of metaphysics that I want to use as an example concerns, of course, individuality. (p. 93)  
French, S. (1999) ‘Models and Mathematics in Physics: The role of group theory’, in J. Butterfield and C. Pagonis (eds.), From Physics to Philosophy, Cambridge University Press, pp. 187-207.
Introduction
The relationship between mathematics and science is clearly of fundamental concern in both the philosophy of mathematics and the philosophy of science. How this relationship should be represented is a crucial issue in this area. One possibility is to employ a model-theoretic framework in which 'physical' structures are regarded as embedded in 'mathematical' ones. In section two I will briefly outline a form of this type of account which offers a function space analysis of theories (Redhead 1975). This function space analysis is then used to represent the relationship between theoretical and mathematical structures. In subsequent sections I will consider the role of group theory in physics from within this metatheoretical framework and then draw some conclusions for realism in the philosophy of science. (p. 187)  
French, S. (2000) ‘The Reasonable Effectiveness of Mathematics: Partial structures and the Application of Group Theory to Physics’, Synthese, vol. 125(1-2): 103-20.
Abstract
Wigner famously referred to the 'unreasonable effectiveness' of mathematics in its application to science. Using Wigner's own application of group theory to nuclear physics, I hope to indicate that this effectiveness can be seen to be not so unreasonable if attention is paid to the various idealising moves undertaken. The overall framework for analysing this relationship between mathematics and physics is that of da Costa's partial structures programme.  
French, S. (2001) ‘Getting Out of a Hole: Identity, Individuality and Structuralism in Space-Time Physics’, Philosophica (Belgium), vol. 67(1): 11-29.
 
French, S. (2001) ‘Symmetry, Structure and the Constitution of Objects’, draft.
http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/archive/00000327/00/Symmetry&Objects_doc.pdf
Abstract
In this paper I focus on the impact on structuralism of the quantum treatment of objects in terms of symmetry groups and, in particular, on the question as to how we might eliminate, or better, reconceptualise such objects in structural terms. With regard to the former, both Cassirer and Eddington not only explicitly and famously tied their structuralism to the development of group theory but also drew on the quantum treatment in order to further their structuralist aims and here I sketch the relevant history with an eye on what lessons might be drawn. With regard to the latter, Ladyman has explicitly cited Castellani's work on the group-theoretical constitution of quantum objects and I indicate both how such an approach needs to be understood if it is to mesh with Ladyman's 'ontic' form of structural realism and how it might accommodate permutation symmetry through a consideration of Huggett's recent account.  
French, S. (2003) ‘Scribbling on the Blank Sheet: Eddington’s Structuralist
Conception of Objects’, Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics, vol. 34(2): 227-259.
 
French, S. (2006) ‘Structure as a Weapon of the Realist’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society,vol. 106, pp. 167-185.
 
French, S. and H. Kamminga (1993) Correspondence, Invariance and Heuristics: Essays in Honour of Heinz Post, Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science, vol. 148, Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Press.
 
French, S. and J. Ladyman (2003a) ‘Remodelling Structural Realism: Quantum
Physics and the Metaphysics of Structure’, Synthese, vol. 136(1): 31-56.
Abstract
We outline Ladyman's 'metaphysical' or 'ontic' form of structural realism and defend it against various objections. Cao, in particular, has questioned the view of ontology presupposed by this approach and we argue that by reconceptualising objects in structural terms it offers the best hope for the realist in the context of modern physics.  
French, S. and J. Ladyman (2003b) ‘The Dissolution of Objects: Between Platonism
and Phenomenalism’, Synthese, vol. 136(1): 73-77.
 
French, S. and J. Saatsi (2006) ‘Realism about Structure: The Semantic View and Non-linguistic Representations’, Philosophy of Science, vol. 73(5): xx-xx.
 
French, S. and D. Rickles (2006) ‘Quantum Gravity Meets Structuralism: Interweaving Relations in the Foundations of Physics’, in D. Rickles, S. French, and J. Saatsi (eds.), The Structural Foundations of Quantum Gravity, Oxford: Clarendon Press.
 
Gandy, R. (1973) ‘ “Structure” in Mathematics’ in D. Robey (ed.), Structuralism: An Introduction, Oxford: Clarendon Press, pp. 138-53.
Introduction
The purpose of this paper is to describe and discuss the notion of 'abstract structure' as it occurs in mathematics. I shall also consider briefly some of the uses and abuses of this notion by those who are interested in structuralism. (p. 138)  
Giedymin, J. (1982) Science and Convention: Essays on Henri Poincaré’s Philosophy of Science and the Conventionalist Tradition, Oxford: Pergamon.
 
Gower, B.S. (2000) ‘Cassirer, Schlick and “Structural” Realism: The philosophy of the exact sciences in the background to early logical empiricism’, British Journal for the History of Philosophy, vol. 8(1): 71-106.
Introduction
One of the conspicuous features of current philosophy of science is the bewildering variety of scientific realisms and anti-realisms confronting us. This is not so very surprising if we bear in mind that the seeds of the many relevant issues were planted at the beginning of the 20th century, at a time of unprecedented innovatory research in the mathematical and physical sciences, by scientists such as Mach, Planck, Poincaré and Duhem, and that there has been ample opportunity for the yield of those seeds to be gathered and sifted. We have, though, done little which would help us to understand how those seeds germinated, grew and prospered. In this paper I wish to examine just one of those seeds. It has lately assumed an importance because of its relevance to ways in which we might restrict the ambitious scope of scientific realism without curtailing that scope in an anti-realist manner. There is, I shall argue, a broader context that is usually recognised for versions of restricted realism and by drawing attention to it I intend to try to bring into focus some neglected discussions which played a part in the origins of logical empiricism and which are capable, I believe, of illuminating those origins as well as some of our present preoccupations. More particularly, by drawing attention to the emergence of a version of realism we now call 'structural' realism, I shall try to support the claim that Schlick's realism and empiricism contain significant Kantian elements. But before turning to the historical issues, let me set out some of the chief features of realism that forms the background to this exploration of those issues. (pp. 71-2)  
Hanson, N.R. (1955) ‘Causal Chains’, Mind, vol. 64: 289-311.
Abstract
The author discusses the notions of causal chains as indicative of how some people think. In Human Knowledge Russell says that 'inferences from experiences to the physical world can… be justified by the assumption that there are causal chains, each member of which is a complex structure ordered by the spatio-temporal relation of compresence'. The author argues that the causal chain theory is unsupportable, although by virtue of analogy it has some acceptable applications.  
Ketland, J. (2004) ‘Empirical Adequacy and Ramsification’, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, vol. 55(2): 287-300.
 
Kitcher, P. (2001) ‘Real Realism: The Galilean Strategy’, Philosophical Review, vol. 110(2): 151-197.
 
Ladyman, J. (1998a) ‘What is Structural Realism?’, Studies in History and Philosophy of Science, vol. 29: 409-24.
Abstract
Below I will argue that structural realism gains no advantage over traditional scientific realism if it is understood as merely an epistemological refinement of it, and instead it ought to be developed as a metaphysical position. I explain why the semantic approach to scientific theories offers the natural framework for this, and what a metaphysical structural realism must involve if it is to do justice to the intuition behind the no-miracles argument.  
Ladyman, J. (1998b) Structural Realism and the Model-Theoretic Approach to Physical Theories, PhD Dissertation, University of Leeds.
Abstract
   This dissertation addresses the debate about 'scientific realism'. I first explain what scientific realism entails and then present the most significant arguments against it, namely the underdetermination argument and the argument from theory change. I argue that the former is inconclusive but that the latter presents a serious problem for the realist. Chapter two explains Bas van Fraassen's alternative to scientific realism, 'constructive empiricism', which realists have argued is incoherent on various grounds. I argue that none of these arguments is compelling, and clarify van Fraassen's position. Chapter three analyses the debate about constructive empiricism and inference to the best explanation. I argue that a widespread interpretation of van Fraassen's epistemology is mistaken and hence that recent criticisms of constructive empiricism miss their mark. I explain how van Fraassen's empiricist philosophy should be understood, and conclude that constructive empiricism is incompatible with his philosophy of modality.
   In chapter four I consider problems of underdetermination for scientific realism originating in actual physical theory. I present Roger Jones' argument that the realist has no epistemic grounds for choosing among multiple formulations of classical mechanics, each of which has different ontological and metaphysical commitments. Quantum mechanics and general relativity each present further dilemmas for the realist; in particular, debate has been enjoined about whether the theories are committed to an ontology of individuals. I argue that this motivates structural realism. In chapter five, after presenting the 'received' or 'syntactic' view of theories and the difficulties it faces, I argue for the 'semantic' or 'model-theoretic' alternative against recent criticisms. Chapter six applies this account of theories and models to idealisation in quantum mechanics and to the development of the London and London model of superconductivity.  
Ladyman, J. (2001) ‘Science, Metaphysics and Structural Realism’, Philosophica (Belgium), vol. 67(1): 57-76.
 
Ladyman, J. et al. (2007) Every Thing Must Go Metaphysics Naturalized, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Ladyman, J. (2007) ‘Structural Realism’, Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, Edward N. Zalta (ed.),
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/structural-realism/

Landry, E. (forthcoming) ‘Shared Structure Need Not Be Shared Set-Structure’, Synthese.
 
Lyre, H. (2004) ‘Holism and Structuralism in U(1) Gauge Theory’, Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics, vol. 35B(4): 643-670.
 
McArthur, D. (2003) ‘Reconsidering Structural Realism’, Canadian Journal of Philosophy, vol. 33(4): 517-536.
 
McArthur,D. (2006) ‘Contra Cartwright: Structural Realism, Ontological Pluralism and Fundamentalism about Laws’, Synthese, vol. 151(2): 233-255.
 
McLendon, H.J. (1955) ‘Uses of Similarity of Structure in Contemporary Philosophy’, Mind, vol. 64: 79-95.
Abstract
   This article is concerned with the use of the concepts 'similarity of structure' and 'isomorphism'. The author's concern is 'to judge the philosophical importance of this piece... not merely as it appears in Russell's system making, but also as it is used in much of the system building characteristics of recent philosophy of analysis'.
   (NB: McLendon's objection to Russell's structuralism is quite similar to Newman's (1928) though he seems to be unware of it. Interestingly, McLendon thanks Quine for bringing this objection to his attention. I have found no indication as to whether Quine himself was familiar with Newman's article.)  
Maxwell, G. (1968) ‘Scientific Methodology and the Causal Theory of Perception’, in I. Lakatos and A Musgrave (eds.) Problems in the Philosophy of Science, Amsterdam: North-Holland Publishing Company.
Main Idea
   In this article Maxwell argues against what he calls 'excessive empiricism' and in favour of structural realism by means of the causal theory of perception. He begins by arguing that '[i]n a real and important sense… all of the external world, including even our own bodies is unobserved and unobservable… [I]f we are to retain our starting position, the causal theory of perception, we must maintain a realist position regarding the sphere of the non-mental' (p. 152). According to Maxwell the only view that can do justice to the challenge posed by concept empiricism/ concept idealism, viz '[h]ow… can we conceive of or meaningfully ascribe any properties to the entities of an external world[?]', is structural realism. He goes on to say that '[t]he notion of form or structure needed here may accurately be said to be logical (and/or mathematical) and, in a sense, abstract; characterizations of it will be in terms of logic alone, ie the logical connectives, quantifiers and variables - they will contain no descriptive terms' (pp. 152-3). In a footnote, Maxwell corrects himself by saying that 'structure should not be identified with form; rather it is form plus causal connections with experience' (p. 154).
   To make the notion of structure more perspicuous he furnishes an example of two systems that have a certain 'structural similarity'. He explains that such a similarity is due to the fact that they 'share a certain formal property' which is of course 'defined in logical terms alone' (p. 154). The way in which Maxwell expresses this shared formal property is via the Ramsey sentence, though he does not mention it by name. Using, in part, Kantian language Maxwell set the conditions for the view he espouses saying that on the one hand we have direct knowledge of phenomena that are wholly in the mind while on the other there are things in themselves of which we have no direct knowledge but 'the bulk of our common sense and scientific knowledge concerns them' (p. 154). He offers as examples of this latter type of knowledge 'not only electrons, protons, forces, and fields but also tables, chairs, and human bodies'. He goes on to say that '[a]ll of our knowledge of these is, of course, indirect' and hence 'purely structural' (pp. 154-5).
   The consequences of this view are that 'we can name neither individuals nor properties of the external (non-mental) world. Strictly speaking expressions referring to the things in themselves will contain only logical signs [including] existentially quantified variables [and] they will contain neither proper names nor predicate constants' (p. 155). Following Russell, Maxwell adds that 'many of the terms we ordinarily think of as names are better characterized as abbreviations for definite descriptions' (p. 155). To illustrate the superiority of structural realism over representative realism, Maxwell notes that unlike what is required in representative realism 'it is not essential to [structural realism] that the sense impressions or perceptual experiences, or whatever we decide to call them "resemble" the physical objects which may be among their causal antecedents' (p. 155). According to Maxwell, sense impressions have structures and '[t]o postulate a similarity between a sense impression and the physical object hypothesized to be its causal antecedent would be to postulate a structural similarity, i.e., to postulate that at least a certain subset of the features of the impression are isomorphic with a subset of the features of the physical object' (p. 156).
   (Note: Accompanying this paper is commentary by Quine, Popper, Ayer and Kneale as well as Maxwell's reply to them).  
Maxwell, G. (1969) ‘Knowledge, Mind, and Nature: An introduction to theory of knowledge and the philosophy of mind’, The Philosophical Review, vol 78, no 3: 329-97.
Main Idea
This is a review of a book by Bruce Aune (1967). Maxwell comments on Aune's acceptance of Russell's view that our knowledge of the external world is structural. He also makes a couple of other points relating to structural realism such as his rejection of Aune's idea that there are public entities: '[A]ll public entities in any usual sense are naïve-realist and thus non-existent. Their counterparts in the revised world picture are nonpublic (that is, unobservable) entities, characterized only structurally, whose existence is postulated in order to give a causal explanation of our (again nonpublic) sense impressions that comprise what in ordinary language we refer to as "hearing speech" or "seeing printed words"'. (p. 396)  
Maxwell, G. (1970a) ‘Structural Realism and the Meaning of Theoretical Terms’, in S. Winokur and M. Radner (eds.) Analyses of Theories, and Methods of Physics and Psychology, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, pp. 181-92.
Conclusion
In this paper an attempt has been made to apply Russell's principle of acquaintance and some of his work on descriptions, augmented either by use of the Ramsey sentence or by model theory, to some of the main problems of the theory of scientific theories. The problem of the meaning of theoretical terms has been eliminated while, at the same time, a means of explicating a realist interpretation of theories is provided. The approach also yields an explication of the view of Russell and others that our knowledge of the physical world is limited to its purely structural aspects. A framework for a view that might be called 'structural realism' is thereby provided. (p. 192)  
Maxwell, G. (1970b) ‘Theories, Perception and Structural Realism’ in R. Colodny (ed.) Nature and Function of Scientific Theories, Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, pp. 3-34.
Conclusion
In closing, let us take a brief look at the implications of these considerations for empiricism, in general, and for empiricist meaning criteria, in particular. We saw earlier that the most widespread kind of contemporary empiricism, judgement empiricism, turns out to be identical with strict confirmationism and must, therefore, be abandoned, as must all meaning criteria based on confirmation. These are now seen to be instances of the fallacy of epistemologism. Surprisingly enough, however, it turns out that contemporary scientific knowledge affords strong support for a modified version of a rather old-fashioned theory of meaning, sometimes called 'concept empiricism', which, in turn, entails a different kind of meaning criterion. In my exposition of it, I assumed logical terms to be unproblematic and used Russell's principle of acquaintance as a 'meaning criterion' both for propositions and for descriptive (non-logical) terms. This is seen to be surprisingly unrestrictive both ontologically and epistemically once strict inductivism is abandoned and the powerful referential power of definite and indefinite descriptions, as explicated by Russell and Ramsey, is recognised. (pp. 30-1)  
Morganti, M. (2004) ‘On the Preferability of Epistemic Structural Realism’, Synthese, vol. 142(1): 81-107.
 
Muller, F.A. (1998) Structures for Everyone: Contemplations and proofs in the foundations and philosophy of physics and mathematics, Amsterdam: A Gerits & Son.
Summary
In this thesis, the author has explained an answer to the question what kind of language suffices and which assumptions suffice to formulate and to shore, respectively, the whole of physical and mathematical theories - in so far as his cerebral cortex overviews this. In brief, this thesis is an old-fashioned quest for a founding language and a founding theory for physical and mathematical knowledge. Prior to the question whether we ought to do this lies the question whether we can do this, because if we answer the last-mentioned question negatively, then to address the aforementioned question is like clapping wings in a vacuum: one does not advance one scintilla. The author claims to show that it can be done. Whether something ought or ought not to be done, lies beyond the realm of theorem and proof. Parenthetically, the author thinks it ought to be done, because beauty is imperative. This is an aesthetic judgement.  
Newman, M.H.A. (1928) ‘MR Russell's “Causal Theory of Perception” ’, Mind, vol 37: 137-48.
Summary
   In this critical review of The Analysis of Matter, Newman argues against Russell’s claim that we can know only the (abstract) structure of the external world, alleging that this makes scientific knowledge trivial. Indeed, the only way to avoid the triviality accusation, according to him, is to abandon ESR.
   First, Newman takes ESR knowledge claims to be trivial, for he takes Russell’s structuralism to amount to assertions of the following type: “[t]here is a relation R such that the structure of the external world with reference to R is W” (1928: 144). He argues that, aside from indicating the required cardinality, these assertions are not saying anything of importance since we can derive the same assertions for any given class by appeal to the following theorem: “For given any aggregate A, a system of relations between its members can be found having any assigned structure compatible with the cardinal number of A” (140). In other words, given the right number of objects we can set up any structure we like. Yet, we expect knowledge of the external world to be the outcome of empirical investigation not of a priori reasoning. Indeed, the only information that requires empirical investigation under Russell’s view, according to Newman’s argument, is information about the size of a given class.
   Second, Newman argues that the only way to avoid the triviality accusation is to give up ESR. This much, according to him, is evident in the idea “that it is meaningless to speak of the structure of a mere collection of things, not provided with a set of relations”, and “[t]hus the only important statements about structure are those concerned with the structure set up … by a given, definite, relation” (140). The sole way to avoid trivialization, Newman holds, is to specify the particular relation(s) that generate(s) a given structure. That is, if we uniquely specify R, instead of just saying ‘There is a relation R that has a certain structure W’, the fact that R has structure W is no longer trivial. The problem is that to specify R, one inevitably goes beyond the epistemic commitments of the structural realist, thereby abandoning ESR. (Votsis 2004, pp. 46-7)  
Palter, R. (1956) ‘Physics and Structure’, The Philosophical Review, vol. 65(3): 371-84.
Introduction
In an article in this journal, William C Clement claims to have refuted Russell's argument for his so-called 'structuralist thesis' and moreover to have shown that the thesis is, in fact, probably false. In this paper I shall examine Clement's arguments and attempt to show that they are not valid. I shall not defend the structuralist thesis, but I shall seek to clarify it and thereby dispel the plausibility of certain common objections to the thesis. (p. 371)  
Poincaré, H.  ([1905]1952) Science and Hypothesis, New York: Dover.
Introduction (ch.10)
   The ephemeral nature of scientific theories takes by surprise the man of the world. Their brief period of prosperity ended, he seems them abandoned one after another; he sees ruins piled upon ruins; he predicts that the theories in fashion to-day will in a short time succumb in their turn, and he concludes that they are absolutely in vain. This is what he calls the bankruptcy of science.
   His scepticism is superficial; he does not take into account the object of scientific theories and the part they play, or he would understand that the ruins may be still good for something. No theory seemed established on firmer ground than Fresnel's, which attributed light to the movements of the ether. Then if Maxwell's theory is today preferred, does that mean that Fresnel's work was in vain? No; for Fresnel's object was to know whether there really is an ether, if it is or is not formed of atoms, if these atoms really move in this way or that; his object was to predict optical phenomena.
   This Fresnel's theory enables us to do today as well as it did before Maxwell's time. The differential equations are always true, they may be always integrated by the same methods, and the results of this integration still preserve their value. It cannot be said that this is reducing physical theories to simple practical recipes; these equations express relations, and if the equations remain true, it is because the relations preserve their reality. They teach us now, as they did then, that there is such and such a relation between this thing and that; only, the something which we then called motion, we now call electric current. But these are merely names of the images we substituted for the real objects which Nature will hide for ever from our eyes. The true relations between these real objects are the only reality we can attain, and the sole condition is that the same relations shall exist between these objects as between the images we are forced to put in their place. If the relations are known to us, what does it matter if we think it convenient to replace one image by another? (pp. 160-1)  
Post, H.R. (1971) ‘Correspondence, Invariance and Heuristics: In praise of conservative induction’, Studies in the History and Philosophy of Science, vol. 2: 213-55.
Abstract
This is an essay on inter-theory relations in natural science. A number of rules are stated that are claimed to be both descriptive in the history of science, and heuristic guidelines in the construction of new theories. In particular, the relation between the symmetries exhibited by two theories connected by correspondence is discussed.  
Psillos, S. (1995) ‘Is Structural Realism the Best of Both Worlds?’, Dialectica, vol. 49:15-46.
Abstract
In a recent series of papers, John Worrall has defended and elaborated a philosophical position - traced back to Poincaré - which he calls structural realism. This view stands in between scientific realism and agnostic instrumentalism and intends to accommodate both the intuitions that underwrite the 'no miracles' argument for scientific realism and the existence of scientific revolutions which lead to radical theoretical changes. Structural realism presents itself as the best of both worlds. In this paper I critically examine the epistemic status of structural realism and argue that it is not the best of both worlds. Yet, I stress that it reveals an insight which, properly understood, can cast new light on the debates over scientific realism.  
Psillos, S. (1999) Scientific Realism: How science tracks truth, London: Routledge.
Introduction (ch.7)
Structural realism relies on a distinction between the nature of an entity, or process, and its structure, and claims that the latter is captured by the mathematical equations describing the behaviour of an entity, while the former somehow 'lies beyond' what can be quantitatively described. This is a view which I aim to challenge. The thesis that I shall motivate and defend is that Worrall's attempted reconciliation of the pessimistic induction and the no miracle argument is not best captured by the structure versus content distinction. (pp. 146-7)  
Psillos, S. (2000) ‘Carnap, the Ramsey-Sentence and Realistic Empiricism’, Erkenntnis, vol. 52(2): 253-79.
Abstract
Based on archival material from the Carnap and Feigl Archives, this paper re-examines Carnap's approach to the issue of scientific realism in the 1950s and the early 1960s. It focuses on Carnap's reinvention of the Ramsey-sentence approach to scientific theories and argues that Carnap wanted to entertain a genuine neutral stance in the realism-instrumentalism debate. Following Grover Maxwell, it claims that Carnap's position may be best understood as a version of 'structural realism'. However, thus understood, Carnap's position faces the challenge that Newman raised against Russell's structuralism: the claim that the knowledge of the unobservable is limited to its purely structural characteristics is either uninformative or unsustainable.  
Psillos, S. (2001a) ‘Is Structural Realism Possible?’, Philosophy of Science, vol 68(3): S13- S24.
Introduction
Structural realism (SR) is a cluster of attempts to defend a substantive philosophical position concerning what there is in the world and what can be known of it. It is realist because it typically asserts the existence of a mind-independent world, and it is structural because what is knowable can reach only up to the structural features of the world. This paper aims to unravel and criticise the metaphysical presuppositions of SR. It will question its very possibility as a substantive - and viable - realist thesis. (p. 1)  
Psillos, S.  (2001b) ‘Author’s Response to Symposium on Scientific Realism: How Science Tracks Truth’, Metascience, vol. 10(3): 366-371.
 
Psillos, S. (2006) ‘The Structure, the Whole Structure and Nothing but the Structure?’, Philosophy of Science, vol.73(5): xx-xx.
 
Putnam, H. (1978) ‘Realism and Reason’ in Meaning and the Moral Sciences, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.
Summary
In this essay Putnam mounts an attack against metaphysical realism and in particular its contention that a theory that is ideal with respect to 'operational utility, inner beauty and elegance, "plausibility", simplicity, "conservatism", etc' might still be false (p. 125). The central argument against metaphysical realism is Putnam's famed model-theoretic argument. In short, the argument purports to show that an ideal theory cannot be false. Other arguments follow. Finally, Putnam defends internal realism from the same objections and argues that 'a verificationist view of truth and a correspondence theory of truth (in the sense of empirical realism) are not incompatible'. (p. 5)  
Quine, W.V.O. (1968) ‘Comment’ in the Discussion section of Maxwell’s ‘Scientific Methodology and the Causal Theory of Perception’, in I. Lakatos and A. Musgrave (eds.) Problems in the Philosophy of Science, Amsterdam: North-Holland Publishing Company.
 
Quine, W.V.O. (1969) Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York: Columbia University Press.
 
Quine, W.V.O. (1992) ‘Structure and Nature’, in Journal of Philosophy vol 89, no 1:5-9.
Main Idea
Elaborating on his thesis of ontological relativity Quine says: 'The conclusion is that there can be no evidence for one ontology over against another, so long anyway as we can express a one-one correlation between them. Save the structure and you save all' (p. 8). A page later he concludes: 'My global structuralism should not… be seen as a structuralist ontology. To see it thus would be to rise above naturalism and revert to the sin of transcendental metaphysics. My tentative ontology continues to consist of quarks and their compounds, also classes of such things, classes of such classes, and so on, pending evidence to the contrary. My global structuralism is a naturalistic thesis about the mundane human activity, within our world of quarks, of devising theories of quarks and the like in the light of physical impacts on our physical surfaces.' (p. 9)  
Ramsey, F.P. (1929) ‘Theories’, repr. in D.H. Mellor (ed.) Foundations: Essays in philosophy, logic, mathematics and economics, London: Routledge, 1978.
Main Idea
This is Ramsey's famed account of theories that later became known as the Ramsey-sentence approach. In short, Ramsey gets rid of predicates that apply to unobservable entities by existentially quantifying over them. Assuming that a scientific theory can be finitely axiomatised in a first-order language we existentially quantify all theoretical terms (thereby eliminating direct reference to them) the result of which keeps the structure and observable consequences of the theory intact. Grover Maxwell had first pointed out that this approach is congenial to structural realism and had in fact been anticipated by Russell's (1927).  
Redhead, M.L.G. (1990) ‘Is the End of Physics in Sight?’, in French, S. and Kamminga, H. (eds.) Correspondence, Invariance and Heuristics: In honor of Heinz Post, Dordrecht and Boston: Kluwer Academic Press, 1993.
Introduction
One of the central concerns of Heinz Post's work in the philosophy of science has involved problems of intertheory relations, both with respect to the diachronic correspondence between successive theories and the synchronic reduction of one theory to another. The general correspondence principle articulated by Post (1971) demands that successor theories and reducing theories should conserve the successes of replaced theories and reduced theories, respectively, while overcoming their perceived flaws. Post's thesis is that unification by means of theory reduction and 'conservative induction' in the formulation of new theories, providing that the corresponding principle is satisfied, are progressive procedures and, hence, goals worth pursuing in science. The aim of this paper is to evaluate what the prospects are for a final 'end-product' for these unifying processes of theory evolution and theory reduction. (p. 327)  
Redhead, M.L.G. (1995) From Physics to Metaphysics, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Book Description
The book is drawn from the Tarner Lectures delivered in Cambridge in 1993. It is concerned with the ultimate nature of reality and how this is revealed by modern physical theories such as relativity and quantum theory. The objectivity and rationality of science are defended against the views of relativists and social constructivists. It is claimed that modern physics gives us a tentative and fallible, but nevertheless rational, approach to the nature of physical reality. The role of subjectivity in science is examined in the fields of relativity theory, statistical mechanics and quantum theory, and recent claims of an essential role for human consciousness in physics is rejected. Prospects for a 'theory of everything' are considered, and the related question of how to assess scientific progress is carefully examined.  
Redhead, M.L.G.  (2001a) ‘The Intelligibility of the Universe’, in A.O'Hear (ed.) Philosophy at the New Millennium, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 73-90.
Introduction
   Hume famously warned us that the '[The] ultimate springs and principles are totally shut up from human curiosity and enquiry'. Or, again, Newton: 'Hitherto I have not been able to discover the cause of these properties of gravity… and I frame no hypotheses.' Aristotelian science was concerned with just such questions, the specification of occult qualities, the real essences that answer the question 'What is matter, etc?', the preoccupation with circular definitions such as dormative virtues, and so on. The rise of modern science is usually seen as a break with the sterility of Aristotelianism, so what exactly is it that modern science does discover, if it is not the essential nature of matter, of force, of energy, of space and time? A famous answer was provided by Poincaré: 'The true relations between these real objects are the only reality we can attain.' This is often regarded as the manifesto of so-called structural realism, as espoused in recent years by John Worrall, for example (cp his (1989)). In response to the arguments of Larry Laudan (1982) against convergent realism, Worrall points to the continuity in the formal relations between elements of reality expressed by mathematical equations, while the intrinsic nature of these elements of reality gets constantly revised. Thus notions like phlogiston and ether get discarded but the mathematical relationships involving such entities survive in Lavoisier's oxygen chemistry (crudely, combustion results in an increase in weight because subtracting the negative weight of phlogiston is mathematically equivalent to adding positive weight of oxygen) or in the modern theory of the electromagnetic field, which simply dispenses with the underpinning of stresses and strains in a mechanical ether.
   Popper is another philosopher who attacked what he called methodological essentialism, the thesis that it is the task of science 'to discover and to describe the true nature of things'. Rather he advocated methodological nominalism which aims at 'describing how a thing behaves in various circumstances, and especially whether there are any regularities in its behaviour'.
   If we follow these lines of thought we will be led to a more limited, but in many ways more defensible, account of what we might want to mean by the intelligibility of the universe.
   In this paper I want to explore the structuralist approach to the nature of scientific theorising, but first we need to be a little more precise as to how exactly the structuralist thesis should be formulated. (pp. 1-2)  
Redhead, M.L.G. (2001b) ‘Quests of a Realist’, Symposium on Stathis Psillos’ Scientific Realism: How science tracks truth, Metascience, vol. 10(3): 341-7.
 
Rosner, J.A. (1996) ‘Quine's Global Structuralism’, Dialectica, vol. 50(3): 235-42.
Abstract
Quine's ontological relativity thesis requires that objects be treated as 'neutral nodes' in the logical structure of our total theory of the world. It is by treating objects as neutral that we are able to vary ontology yet leave the evidential support of our theory undisturbed. In this article, I present arguments against the possibility of treating objects as 'neutral'.  
Russell, B. (1912) The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Relevance
One of Russell's first expressions of structural realist ideology can be found in this celebrated book. Taking for granted the existence of our own perceptions, Russell progressively argues for the existence of matter. The end result of his investigation is that we have good reasons to believe that the causes of the sense-data we perceive are physical objects. But what can science tell us about physical objects? Russell's answer is unmistakably clear: 'We can know the properties of the relations required to preserve the correspondence with sense-data, but we cannot know the nature of the terms between which the relations hold' (pp. 15-16). And again a page later: 'Thus we find that, although the relations of physical objects have all sorts of knowable properties, derived from their correspondence with the relations of sense-data, the physical objects themselves remain unknown in their intrinsic nature, so far at least as can be discovered by means of the senses' (p. 17). Indeed, Russell's structural realist ideology can be found even in his theory of truth (and belief), appropriately named 'correspondence by congruence theory' and appearing in chapter 12.  
Russell, B. (1914) ‘The Relation of Sense-Data to Physics’, Scientia.
Summary
Russell begins by stating a problem that the verification of physics faces: 'Physics exhibits sense-data as functions of physical objects, but verification is only possible if physical objects can be exhibited as functions of sense-data.' (pp. 146-7). What follows is an exposition of what Russell thinks to be the relationship between sense-data and physics. First of all he defines sense-data and sensibilia and clarifies their ontological status. Then he exhorts the method of logical construction for its accordance to what he calls the 'supreme maxim of scientific philosophising', a variant of Occam's razor. The maxim calls for the substitution of inferred entities by logical constructions whenever possible. Following this he lays the foundations of his constructions by distinguishing between two types of spaces, private space and perspective space. Armed with these he finally constructs the three dimensional space of physics.  
Russell, B. (1927) The Analysis of Matter, London: George Allen & Unwin.
Relevance
In this book, Russell's structural realism receives a more thorough treatment. Here he argues that it is both reasonable and fruitful to assume the existence of external causes - 'material' events - admitting that we should 'not expect to find a demonstration that perceptions have external causes' (p. 198). Assuming, among other things, that similar causes have similar effects, he argues that we can infer the structure of the external world from the structure of our perceptions: '[t]hese principles enable us to infer a great deal as to the structure of the physical world, but not as to its intrinsic character' (p. 400). The notion of 'structure' or 'relation-number', first defined in Principia Mathematica and used interchangeably in formal contexts, is defined in terms of the notion of 'relation'. That is, talk of structure is invariably talk of the structure of a relation or of a system of relations - this latter notion signifies one or more relations defined over a domain. The structure of a relation is simply 'the class of relations similar [ie isomorphic] to the given relation'. (p. 250)  
Russell, B. (1948) Human Knowledge: Its scope and limits, London: George Allen & Unwin.
 
Russell, B. (1968) The Autobiography of Bertrand Russell, vol 2, London: George Allen & Unwin.
Main Idea
Reprinted here is Russell's letter to MHA Newman conceding that strictly speaking we cannot say that our knowledge of the external world is merely structural.  
Saunders, S. (1993) ‘To What Physics Corresponds’, in S. French and H. Kamminga (eds.), Correspondence, Invariance and Heuristics: Essays inHonour of Heinz Post, pp 295-325, Dordrecht, Reidel.
Introduction
In what follows, I wish to reconsider certain ideas to be found in Post's (1971) defence of the 'retentionist' or 'accumulativist' view of science. In particular I shall focus on heuristics and methodology and will confine the discussion to physics, specifically to theories of dynamics (this, I hazard, is to be counted a constraint in principle: it seems unlikely that similar considerations will apply to any other branch of empirical science.) Post's thesis (what he calls the 'generalized principle of correspondence') is both historical and methodological; it may simply put as the claim that what is taken over from preceding theories is not only those laws and experimental facts which are well-confirmed, but also 'patterns' and 'internal connections', that in this way the successor theory accounts for whatever success its precursor enjoyed, for it '…will in fact embody a good deal of the (lower) theoretical structure of the [precursor] theory'. (p. 295)  
Saunders, S. (2003) ‘Critical Notice: Tian Yu Cao's “The Conceptual Development of 20th Century Field Theories” ’, Synthese, vol. 136(1): 79-105.
Introduction
   Tian Yu Cao has written a serious and scholarly book covering a great deal of physics...I shall read him as making two principal claims. The first is what he says it is: these theories are intertwined, and provide clear evidence of continuity of development, preserving what he calls 'structural' aspects of phenomena (or theories of phenomena). He speaks of this in terms of 'ontological synthesis'; he supposes that this is at odds with Kuhn's views on the nature of scientific change.
   The second claim is largely tacit. It is that the conceptual problems and foundational questions of quantum physics, including questions of ontology, realism, and truth, have nothing to do with the problem of measurement in quantum mechanics. In fact Cao completely ignores the problem of measurement, dismissing out of hand its modern treatment by physicists and philosophers of physics.
   We shall leave aside metaphysical speculations and unsuccessful physical attempts (such as the hidden-variable hypothesis, or hydrodynamic and stochastic interpretations) and concentrate on the interpretations that acted as guides in the historical development of quantum physics.
   When he comes on to consider the later history of quantum field theory and gauge theory, the problem of measurement drops out of sight entirely. It played (almost) no role in either area, so Cao feels he is entitled to ignore it. Yet he is saying something about realism all the same; these programs are supposed to be consistent with realism, and even to lend support to it, regardless of the measurement problem.
   Both claims are interesting and, if true, they are important. Are they true? This is a question I shall pursue. I will not be able to do full justice to Cao's book, for it encompasses more than these two claims; but it seems to me that they are the most interesting ones for philosophers. I shall begin with the first, and with the examples cited by Cao in support of it. As we shall see these examples have their shortcomings; they are, I shall argue, the wrong kinds of examples. I think he is right to say that something structural is preserved across theory change, but this claim needs to be disentangled from any particular thesis (such as Cao puts forward) about how quantum mechanics and relativity theory are to be reconciled with one another. Later on I will give some different examples, that suggest better what this 'something' might be. Unfortunately for Cao's second claim, however, this does lead on directly to the problem of measurement. (p. 1)  
Saunders, S. (2003) ‘Structural Realism, Again’, Synthese, vol. 136(1): 127-133.
 
Schlick, M. (1925) General Theory of Knowledge, translated by A.E. Blumberg and H. Feigl, New York: Springer-Verlag.
Main Idea
Demopoulos and Friedman (1985) point out the similarities between Schlick and Russell's work: 'Schlick argues that modern physics deals with real unobservable entities (atoms, electrons, the electromagnetic field), which cannot be understood as logical constructions out of sense-data in the manner of Mach's Analysis of Sensations (1897) or Russell's 1914 external-world program (1918, §26). Such entities are not experienceable, intuitable, or even picturable; accordingly, Schlick goes so far as to call them 'transcendent' entities and 'things-in-themselves' (1918, §25). Nevertheless, this 'transcendence' presents no obstacle to our knowledge or cognition, for knowledge relates always to purely formal or structural properties - not to intuitive qualities or content. Thus, while we cannot experience or intuit the entities of modern physics, we can grasp their formal or structural features by means of axiomatic or implicit definitions, in the style of Hilbert's Foundations of Geometry (1899) - and this is all that knowledge or cognition requires (1918, §§5-7). The similarities with Russell's view of 1927 are patent.' (p. 625)  
Slowik, E. (2005) ‘Spacetime, Ontology, and Structural Realism’, International Studies in the Philosophy of Science, vol. 19(2): 147-166.
 
Solomon, G. (1989) ‘An Addendum to Demopoulos and Friedman (1985)’, Philosophy of Science, vol. 56: 497-501.
Abstract
MHA Newman (1928) criticised Russell's structuralist philosophy of science. Demopoulos and Friedman have discussed Newman's critique, showing its relevance to the structuralist positions held by Schlick and Carnap, and to Putnam's argument against 'metaphysical realism.' I discuss Richard Braithwaite's (1940) appeal to Newman in a critique of Arthur Eddington. Braithwaite believed Newman had shown that 'structure depends upon content'. Eddington, in his reply, misunderstood the generality of Newman's argument.  
Solomon, G. (1990) ‘What Became of Russell's Relation-Arithmetic?’, Russell, vol. 9: 168-73.
Summary
Solomon begins by noting the importance that Russell ascribed to relation-arithmetic. Contra Russell he argues that relation-arithmetic received significant attention and thus thinks that Russell's disappointment is due to a personal disinterest in the developments of mathematical logic that came after the publication of the second edition of Principia Mathematica. Indeed, Solomon cites as an example of the influence of relation-arithmetic Tarski who 'provided a general algebraic setting for discussing relation-arithmetic' (170). Solomon then asks what is the philosophical value of relation-arithmetic, if, as Russell maintained, it is required for dealing with structure and structure itself is required to understand the empirical world. To answer that he reminds us of Russell's structural realist project The Analysis of Matter and claims that it was 'fatally criticized' by MHA Newman as Russell himself conceded in a letter. Solomon notes that Newman's contribution is not mentioned in Russell's autobiographical My Philosophical Development perhaps because he thought that his later epistemology evaded Newman's critique. Finally, Solomon wonders whether Russell's post-Newman appeal to knowledge by acquaintance of non-structural features of the empirical world makes his resulting theories more plausible.  
Stachel, J. (2005) ‘Structural Realism and Contextual Individuality’, in Hilary Putnam (Contemporary Philosophy in Focus), Y. Ben-Menahem (ed.), Cambridge: CUP, pp. 203-219.
 
Stein, H. (1987) ‘After the Baltimore Lectures: Some philosophical reflections on subsequent development of physics’ in R. Kargon and P. Achinstein (eds.) Kelvin's Baltimore Lectures and Modern Theoretical Physics, Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press.
Relevance
It is only at the very last paragraph of this article that Stein reveals his structural realist inclinations. Speaking of the conceptual continuity that can be found between the properties of earlier and those of later theories, he says: 'What is in fact "recognizable" is a distinct relationship, from older to newer theory, of mathematical forms - not a resemblance of "entities". This has always seemed to me the most striking and important fact about the affiliations of scientific theories. I do not suggest a philosophical "explanation" of this fact; I cite it, on merely historical evidence, just as a fact'. (p. 393)  
Stein, H. (1989) ‘Yes, But… Some skeptical remarks on realism and antirealism’, Dialectica, vol. 43: 47-65.
Abstract
This paper argues that the much-discussed issue between 'scientific realism' and 'instrumentalism' has not been clearly drawn. Particular attention is paid to the claim that only realism can 'explain' the success of scientific theories and - more especially - the progressively increasing success of such theories in a coherent line of inquiry. This claim is used to attempt to reach a clearer conception of the 'content' of the realist thesis that underlies it; but, it is here contended, that attempt fails, and the claim itself hangs in the air. A series of increasingly sophisticated versions of the 'instrumentalist' thesis is considered, and both these and the contentions of realism are placed in relation both to particular examples of scientific development and positions historically maintained by philosophers and by scientists.  
Stump, D. (1989) ‘Henri Poincaré’s Philosophy of Science’, Studies in History and Philosophy of Science, vol. 20(3): 335-363.
 
Uebel, T.E. (1999) ‘Transformations of “Conventionalism” in the Vienna Circle’, Philosophia Scientiae, vol. 3(2): 75-94.
Abstract
The constitutive influence of Poincaré, Duhem and Rey on the philosophy of the Vienna Circle, long obscured, has become more widely recognised. Two aspects of the Viennese reception of these 'French Conventionalists' are explored here for the light they may throw on the circle's own, still insufficiently understood, conventionalism. First, what was the Viennese perception of what has recently been called (Poincaré's) 'structural realism'? What if any part of that doctrine became assimilated into their theories? Second, in the absence of a realist interpretation of the conventionalists' structuralism, how were the principles guiding theory construction and validation to be legitimated? It will be suggested that the left Vienna Circle developed a decidedly constructivist version of conventionalism in response.  
Van Fraassen, B. (1997) ‘Structure and Perspective: Philosophical perplexity and paradox’ in M.L. Dalla Chiara et al. (eds.) Logic and Scientific Methods, Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Press.
Abstracts
   Abstract1: In reaction to revolutionary developments in modern science, both philosophers and scientists have suggested that science describes only the structure, as opposed to content, of the world. The described structure is structure invariant under changes of perspective (frames of reference, observers, alternative measurement set-ups). Extrapolating the view too far, the disappearance of content and of individual perspective leaves us with structure itself as surrogate content for a logically incoherent view from nowhere. Both empiricism and scientific realism face a quandary, with attempts to find a 'foundation' for science outside what is described in physical theory (whether qualities of experience or a postulated 'ready-made' world) notably lacking in success. In this paper I shall re-examine the prospects for a view of science which is empiricist but not foundationalist.
   Abstract2: Structuralism (one variety of): the view that science describes only the structure (and not the content) of its domain. A view entangled from the beginning with the view that science is a representation of nature. There were and are good reasons to be attracted to structuralism. But it needs to be explained, for as stated it rests on an obscure and possibly untenable distinction between structure and content. Problem: attempts to make it precise have tended to reduce it to absurdity. Example: the Ramsey sentence view is a moderate form of structuralism. Lewis' postulate of natural classes can then be read as an attempt to rescue it from the reductio. Elgin's criticisms and Laurie Paul's 'symmetry' objection may be read as saying that this sort of rescue cannot work. My problem: my view of science belongs to the 'semantic approach' which is pretty clearly a form of structuralism (though certainly as moderate as the Ramsey sentence version, in its deference to our understanding of 'old' terms). I argue that it does not reduce to absurdity because the structuralism pertains to the raw materials for representation (the models which are used to represent) and not to the representing activity.  
Van Fraassen, B. (2006) ‘Structure: Its Shadow and Substance’, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, vol. 57(2): 275-307.
Introduction
   Views of science and of nature change hand in hand. In the 17th century the new sciences inspired a hard-line ascetic metaphysics. Theorising, the new scientists stripped the world of its appearances, its qualitative riches, leaving res extensa as the sole reality of nature, veiled before the mind in its sensory illusions. New instruments such as the microscope promised to confirm the theories directly, and the newly schooled mathematical imagination promised to represent reality as fully intelligible to the mind.
   But as science moved on to new conceptions of nature, its self-image changed as well. Here I shall try to follow two lines of retrenchment as physical theory lent itself increasingly less to naïve realism: reification and structuralism. Within these, I will focus specifically on the new structural realism, which recently tried to position itself between scientific realism and instrumentalism. After examining its difficulties, I will offer an empiricist view in response to the same ambition.  
Votsis, I. (2003) ‘Is Structure Not Enough?’, Philosophy of Science, vol. 70(5): 879-890.
Abstract
This paper counters an objection raised against one of Bertrand Russell’s lesser-known epistemological views, viz. ‘‘structural realism’’ (SR). In short, SR holds that at most we have knowledge of the structure of the external (i.e., physical) world. M. H. A. Newman’s allegedly fatal objection is that SR is either trivial or false. I argue that the accusation of triviality is itself empty since it fails to establish that SR knowledge claims are uninformative. Moreover, appealing to Quine’s notion of ontological relativity, I suggest that far from being false, SR knowledge claims seem to be the most that we can hope for. (p.879)  
Votsis, I. (2004) The Epistemological Status of Scientific Theories: An Investigation of the Structural Realist Account, University of London, London School of Economics, PhD Thesis.
Abstract
   In this dissertation, I examine a view called ‘Epistemic Structural Realism’, which holds that we can, at best, have knowledge of the structure of the physical world. Put crudely, we can know physical objects only to the extent that they are nodes in a structure. In the spirit of Occam’s razor, I argue that, given certain minimal assumptions, epistemic structural realism provides a viable and reasonable scientific realist position that is less vulnerable to anti-realist arguments than any of its rivals.
   The first chapter presents an overview of the scientific realism debate, concentrating on the epistemological dimension. The second chapter tracks the development of structural realism, differentiates between several versions, and outlines the objections that have been raised against it. The third chapter provides answers to a large subset of these objections, namely those launched by Stathis Psillos, who spearheads the critique of epistemic structural realism. The fourth chapter offers an attempted solution to M.H.A. Newman’s objection that the epistemic structural realist view, if true, trivialises scientific knowledge. The fifth chapter presents a historical case study of the caloric theory of heat. I utilise the study to answer the pessimistic meta-induction argument. The sixth chapter addresses the argument from the underdetermination of theory by evidence. I argue that epistemic structural realism can potentially restrict the impact of the argument by imposing structural constraints on the set of all possible theories compatible with the evidence. The seventh and final chapter outlines briefly some promising avenues for future research.  
Votsis, I. (2005) ‘The Upward Path to Structural Realism’, Philosophy of Science, vol. 72(5): 1361-1372.
Abstract
In a recent PSA paper (2001a), as well as some other papers (1995, 2000, 2001b) and a book chapter (1999, Chapter 7), Stathis Psillos raised a number of objections against structural realism. The aim of this paper is threefold: (1) to evaluate part of Psillos’ offence on the Russellian version of epistemic structural realism (ESR); (2) to elaborate more fully what Russellian ESR involves; and (3) to suggest improvements where it is indeed failing. (p.1361)  
Votsis, I. (2007) ‘Uninterpreted Equations and the Structure-Nature Distinction’, Philosophical Inquiry, vol. 29(3-4): xx-xx.
Introduction
Stathis Psillos ((1995), (1999), (2000), (2001a), (2001b)) spearheads the critique of epistemic structural realism (ESR). ESR comes in two flavours, Russellian and Poincaréan-Worrallian. Psillos raises objections to both. In this paper, I evaluate two of Psillos’ leading objections against Poincaréan-Worrallian ESR, namely: (1) ESR commits us only to uninterpreted equations, but these are not by themselves enough to produce predictions, and, therefore, do not deserve all the epistemic credit (1999: 153-4; 2001a: S21). (2) The structure vs. nature distinction cannot be sustained (1999: 157).  
Worrall, J. (1982) ‘Scientific Realism and Scientific Change’, Philosophical Quarterly, vol. 32(128): 201-231.
 
Worrall, J. (1989) ‘Structural Realism: The best of both worlds?’ repr. in D. Papineau (ed.) The Philosophy of Science, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996.
Abstract
The main argument for scientific realism is that our present theories in science are so successful empirically that they can't have got that way by chance - instead they must somehow have latched onto the blueprint of the universe. The main argument against scientific realism is that there have been enormously successful theories which were once accepted but are now regarded as false. The central question addressed in this paper is whether there is some reasonable way to have the best of both worlds: to give the argument from scientific revolutions its full weight and yet still adopt some sort of realist attitude towards presently accepted theories in physics and elsewhere. I argue that there is such a way - through 'structural' realism, a position adopted by Poincaré, and here elaborated and defended.  
Worrall, J. (1994) ‘How to Remain (Reasonably) Optimistic: Scientific realism and the “luminiferous ether” ’, in D. Hull, M. Forbes and R.M. Burian (eds.), PSA 1994, vol. 1, East Lansing, MI: Philosophy of Science Association.
Abstract
Fresnel's theory of light was a) impressively predictively successful yet b) was based on an 'entity' (the elastic-solid ether) that we now 'know' does not exist. Does this case 'confute' scientific realism as Laudan suggested? [It is argued that] previous attempts (by Hardin and Rosenberg and by Kitcher) to defuse the episode's anti-realist impact [have failed]. The strongest form of realism compatible with this case of theory-rejection is in fact 'structural' realism. This view was developed by Poincaré who also provided reasons to think that it is the only realist view of theories that really makes sense.  
Worrall, J. (2000) ‘Miracles and Models: Saving structural realism?’, paper given to the annual meeting of the British Society for the Philosophy of Science, Sheffield, 2000.
Main Idea
This is a lengthy outline for a presentation rather than a paper. It addresses what Worrall thinks are the three main difficulties for structural realism (SR): a) that the Fresnel-Maxwell case is (maximally) atypical, b) that the 'no miracles argument' is not much of an argument and c) that the 'Newman argument' is lethal. To these sketches - some of them more detailed than others - four possible replies are offered.  
Worrall, J. and Zahar, E. (2001) ‘Ramseyfication and Structural Realism’, Appendix IV in Zahar E. Poincaré’s Philosophy: From Conventionalism to Phenomenology, Chicago and La Salle (IL): Open Court.
 
Wright, J. (1989) ‘Realism and Equivalence’, Erkenntnis, vol. 31: 109-28
Abstract
   Prominent philosophers, such as Nelson Goodman and Hilary Putnam, have argued that the existence of cognitively equivalent but apparently incompatible theories creates a difficulty for metaphysical realism. In the paper, it is argued that such theories actually create a difficulty for Putnam's 'internal realism'. A version of metaphysical realism, called 'structural realism', is sketched which can account for cognitively equivalent but apparently incompatible theories.
   Note: The author presents a structural realist view and brands it accordingly without indicating whether he is aware that others have employed the same term for similar ideas: 'If all the epistemically ideal theories were equivalent, we would surely want an explanation of this fact. Equivalent theories agree on the causal relations that hold between entities, although they may disagree on what those entities are and may also disagree on how geometrical and mathematical entities are to be defined. The realist can say that the reason why all the epistemically ideal theories agree on causal relations is because these causal relations are theory-independent features of reality and that our scientific method is able to uncover the theory-independent features of the world… A natural name for such a position would be structural realism.' (p. 125)  
Zahar, E.  (1996) ‘Poincaré’s Structural Realism and his Logic of Discovery’, in Jean-Louis Greffe, Gerhard Heinzmann and Kuno Lorenz (eds.) Henri Poincaré: Science and Philosophy, Berlin: Academie Verlag and Paris: Albert Blanchard.
 
Zahar, E. (1997) ‘Poincaré's Philosophy of Geometry, or Does geometric conventionalism deserve its name?’, Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics, vol. 28B(2): 183-218.
Abstract
Two main aims are pursued in this paper. The first is to show that, in mathematical geometry, Poincaré was a conventionalist who rejected all forms of synthetic a priori geometric intuition. He moreover followed a unified heuristic based on the study of certain groups of Mobius transformations. This method was informed by his work on the theory of Fuchsian functions; it yielded two models of hyperbolic geometry: the disk model and the Poincaré half-plane, which are connected by a Mobius transformation. From these group-theoretic considerations Poincaré derived an expression for the Riemannian distance. I secondly defend the thesis that, in physical geometry, Poincaré was a structural realist whose so-called conventionalism was epistemological, not ontological. Here he started directly from a Riemannian metric together with an associated universal field. He adopted a realist attitude towards both the field and that geometry which is most coherently integrated into some highly unified and empirically confirmed hypothesis. More generally, he looked upon the degree of unity of any system as an index of its verisimilitude. I finally show that, by Einstein's own admission, the general theory of relativity is compatible with Poincaré's epistemological theses.  
Zahar, E. (2000) ‘Les fondements de la geometrie selon Poincaré’, Philosophia Scientiae, vol. 4(1): 145-86.
Abstract (translated)
In this article, we will pursue two goals. The first is to show that in mathematical geometry, Poincaré, rejecting all apriorism, is truly conventionalist: the geometrical postulates are regarded as disguised definitions of the basic concepts, their role reduced to the determination of certain models, ie of interpretations which verify the fundamental axioms. Poincaré uses a unified heuristics founded on the theory of groups of Mobius transformations (MT). This method, initiated in his work on the Fuchsian functions, leads to the construction of two models of hyperbolic geometry: the half-plane D and the disc W, which are then applied one to the other by means of an MT. From these algebraic considerations Poincaré draws the analytical expression of the Riemannian distance ds. Our second goal is to defend the thesis that with regard to physical geometry, Poincaré subscribes to an ontological structural realism, his conventionalism being not metaphysical, but strictly epistemological. Its method consists in posing - or rather conjecturing - a Riemannian metric coupled to a universal field, where naturally the latter can be null. Poincaré adopts a realistic attitude with respect to the field and the underlying geometry; provided, of course that this is integrated into a scientific system unified and corroborated by experiment. In general, Poincaré takes the degree of convenience - ie of unity and simplicity - of a theory as an objective measure of its verisimilitude or proximity to the truth. It should be noted that this concept of verisimilitude remains intuitive, and therefore not mathematised. We show finally that, with the agreement even of Einstein, general relativity is completely compatible with Poincaré's epistemological point of view.  
Zahar, E. (2001) Poincaré’s Philosophy: From Conventionalism to Phenomenology, Chicago and La Salle (IL): Open Court.
 
Zahar, E. (2004) ‘Ramseyfication and Structural Realism’, Theoria, vol. 19:1(49): 5-30.
 
Zahar, E. (2007) Why Science Needs Metaphysics: A Plea for Structural Realism, Chicago and La Salle (IL): Open Court.

Philosophisches Institut, Heinrich Heine Universität Düsseldorf, Universitätsstraße 1, Gebäude 23.21/04.86, D-40225 Düsseldorf, Germany. Tel.: +49 (0) 211 81-11473, Fax: +49(0) 211 81-11750. Email: votsis@phil-fak.uni-duesseldorf.de